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2Abstract
This thesis considers the status of consent within both 
contemporary theories of political obligation, and within 
the theories of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. The 
definitions of consent and obligation offered at the 
beginning of the thesis seek to capture the paradigm 
meanings of both terms.
It is argued that consent, as defined here, is difficult to 
locate either in contemporary political society, or in the 
systems described by Hobbes and Locke. In the latter case, 
the reasons for reaching this conclusion are not the ones 
most commonly offered. In assessing the role and status of 
consent in classic social contract theory, particular 
attention is given to Hobbes's accounts of human nature and 
the state of nature, as well as his theory of determinism. 
Locke's theory of natural law is hlso examined in terms of 
its political significance.
The final conclusion reached in the thesis is that consent, 
as properly understood, should be a significant component 
of any acceptable theory of political obligation. 
However, this would require a substantial revision of the 
ordinary understanding of the concept, as well as a clearer 
understanding of the position of obligations within a 
general moral hierarchy.
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7Introduction
The immediate purpose of this thesis is to consider the 
concept of consent as presented within the theories of 
political obligation offered by Thomas Hobbes and John 
Locke. Both Hobbes and Locke are taken to be traditional 
social contract theorists, and as such it is assumed that 
individual consent plays a central role in both of their 
theories. Generations of philosophers have offered their 
interpretations of how such consent operates, with few 
questioning the assumption that it is of crucial 
importance. I shall allow for the possibility that this 
concept plays a rather different role to that assumed by 
many commentators.
However, the work is not intended merely, or even 
primarily, as one of historical scholarship, and if it has 
nothing to offer beyond textual re-analysis it will somehow 
have failed. The 'problem' of political obligation to 
which so many philosophers refer is a current one, and the 
possibility of a consent-based solution is still being 
explored. There is, therefore, a second, and not 
necessarily subsidiary strand to this enquiry, such that a 
clearer understanding of the concepts and mechanisms 
employed by the classic social contract theorists should 
provide valuable insight for those attempting to utilise
8consent within contemporary theories of political 
obligation.
Within this overall task, it becomes necessary not only to 
explore consent and obligation as presented by Hobbes and 
Locke, but also to look at the concepts as they are, or 
rather should be, employed in contemporary theory. This 
task is the subject of Chapter One in which the key 
vocabulary of social contract theory discourse is closely 
examined. Although there may not be anything particularly 
original to offer in this area it is important to address 
some persisting confusions of terminology, and to offer 
clear definitions which may then be employed in the later 
chapters of the thesis, and in subsequent work.
Chapter One therefore looks at the term obligation, and 
contrasts it with notions of duty, and statements of what 
one ought to do morally. After a discussion of 
specifically political obligations the term consent is 
introduced, defined and analyzed. The chapter closes with 
an account of the ideological and philosophical context 
within which consent is most frequently employed.
Chapters Two and Three of the thesis focus upon Hobbes, and 
as such are closely interrelated. Having said this, it is 
also important to remember that the definitions offered in 
the first chapter will have implications for what is said 
from there on, and that Hobbes's (and Locke's) use of key
9terms will be judged against the standards set in that 
chapter. Furthermore, attention will be given to 
contemporary debates surrounding the important issues in 
each chapter, in the hope that past and present voices can 
join together and tackle the questions raised.
In Chapter Two I consider whether it is feasible to assume 
that men in a Hobbesian state of nature will be 
psychologically equipped to participate in a consenting 
process. This involves a reassessment of Hobbes's account 
of human nature, and of his account of social interactions 
prior to the formation of the commonwealth. Such a 
reassessment is only possible after first analysing the 
concepts 'state of nature' and 'human nature', and it is 
further dependent upon understanding the way in which 
Hobbes's scientific interests affect his political 
analysis.
Chapter Three examines the question of whether the 
Hobbesian individual is a suitable 'consenter' from a 
different angle. This time the issues arise out of 
Hobbes's claim that men do not have free will in the sense 
commonly understood by us. In order to establish whether 
determinism and voluntarism are in any sense compatible I 
first look at determinism in general, and then at Hobbes's 
account of the determined will. Once again it is important 
to understand the relationship between the scientific and 
the social scientific within his work.
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The fourth chapter of the thesis turns our attention to 
Locke, and looks at the way in which his theory of natural 
law operates alongside his consent-based theory of 
political obligation. In order to explain how natural law 
relates to the question of political obligation in Locke's 
work I look at how men come to know the laws of nature, and 
where such laws stand in the hierarchy of moral commands. 
Having established the role of natural law I go on to see 
what implications this has for Locke's utilisation of 
individual consent.
When reading the works of these two great philosophers I 
have attempted to avoid aligning myself to any particular 
school of scholarship. Whilst it is useful to refer to the 
work of eminent commentators - indeed many are quoted - 
there are dangers involved in adopting their perspectives, 
as opposed to simply examining their opinions. If there is 
a methodological stand taken here it is that one should 
approach a philosophical text without prejudice or 
pre-conception, and beware of the way in which detail can 
be obscured by automatic pigeon-holing.
Some of the arguments offered in this thesis will require 
a careful re-reading of the texts, and an abandonment of 
certain traditional assumptions concerning what Hobbes and 
Locke say. The end results may be surprising but they 
should also be credible, because what is attempted is a 
re-reading as opposed to a re-writing. In any text the
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writer puts a certain amount into his work and leaves it to 
the reader to derive meaning from it. Sometimes the writer 
facilitates this process, sometimes it is in his interest 
to hinder it, and no reader should become complacent about 
the meaning a writer intends. However familiar a text may 
be to a reader, or maybe even a generation of readers, it 
is always possible that the meaning as intended by the 
author has been obscured or even lost. This thesis 
attempts to read the texts in a manner faithful to the 
philosophers' intentions, and if it fails to do this then 
the whole project is undermined.
12
Chapter One 
Obligation, Consent and Related Concepts
Social contract theory has not lacked attention in the 
three hundred odd years since Thomas Hobbes offered his 
particular version of it. It has to be said however, that 
familiarity has in this instance bred carelessness rather 
than contempt. The now familiar vocabulary of social 
contract discourse is rarely taken back to basics, 
definitions of key terms often differ in important 
respects, and as a result confusions arise. This is
particularly regrettable given Hobbes's insistence upon 
definitional accuracy (Locke alas was less rigorous).
The appropriate starting point for any enquiry into 
political obligation must be to ask what it means to have, 
or be under, such an obligation. To understand this 
clearly it is necessary to strip the term back and explore 
first the general concept - obligation - of which political 
obligation is one type. The vagaries of ordinary usage 
demand not only that a clear definition of this term is 
offered, but also that it is separated off from those with 
which it is often taken to be synonymous, namely duty and 
'ought'.
The Oxford English Dictionary makes no attempt to separate 
terms when, for example, it defines duty as "moral or legal
13
obligation, what one is bound or ought to do." 1 Admittedly 
in everyday language these terms are often used
understanding. Richard Brandt2 is reluctant to make too 
much of the distinction between terms as adopted in 
ordinary usage, although he accepts that there is a 
paradigm usage in which distinctions are clearer.
There is sometimes a sub-class, within the wider class 
of all correct uses of a term, which has two
features. First, members of this sub-class are felt 
to be especially natural uses of the term: there is 
no better word for the occasion and there are no 
better occasions for the word. We might express part 
of what this comes to in another way: there is a
class of contexts such that, if speakers were given 
a choice between phrases incorporating 'duty'
'obligation' 'wrong' 'ought' and so on, the vast
majority would make the same selection, although for 
other contexts where one of these words can be 
applied with perfect correctness, speakers would have 
no preference for one phrase over another. Second, 
the contexts in which a given term is felt to be 
especially appropriate have certain features in
common, and the term has come to some extent, to 
suggest these feature; speakers associate, the two to 
some degree. It seems likely that only relatively 
few words have paradigm uses in this sense.3
It will be suggested here that a political philosopher 
should be concerned precisely with such paradigm uses,
1 Concise Oxford English Dictionary, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1989, p.300.
2 R. B. Brandt, 'The Concepts of Obligation and Duty', Mind, 
LXXXIII, 1964, pp.374-392.
3 Ibid., p.385.
interchangeably, without effect on *
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rather than, to borrow further from Brandt's vocabulary, 
the extended uses of ordinary discourse.4
Those who feel that there are important distinctions to be 
made, whether it be between paradigm or extended uses of 
the terms, reject what has been called the 'Traditional 
Assumption'5 that the statements 'You ought to do x', 'It 
is your duty to do x' and 'You have an obligation to do x' 
are logically equivalent. They in turn claim that this 
(false) assumption has led to the quite distinct features 
of each statement being obscured. Simmons states that "the 
looseness and inconsistencies of ordinary moral discourse 
do often result in their free substitution for one another. 
But it also seems clear that in their central or standard 
uses, judgements of obligation (and duty) play a special 
role in moral discourse to be distinguished from the roles 
of other sorts of moral judgements." 6
The aim here is to establish the 'paradigm' use of each of 
these terms in the hope that the distinctions between them 
will thereby become apparent, and indeed helpful to the 
larger enquiry.
4 Cf. A.J. Simmons, Moral Principles and Political 
Obligation, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1979, 
pp.11-14. Simmons is equally convinced that the 
philosopher's concern with paradigm meanings may lead them 
to be more rigorous than ordinary language requires.
5 Cf. H. Beran 'Ought, Obligation and Duty' Australasian 
Journal of Philosophyr Vol 50 No 3, Dec 1972, pp.207-221.
6 Simmons, op cit., p.8.
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In his article 'Ought, Obligation and Duty' Harry Beran 
offers a counter thesis (I) to the Traditional Assumption 
of similitude (AS), such that:
(la) Ought- and Obligation-statements are not logically 
equivalent.
(Ib) Ought- and Duty-statements are not logically 
equivalent.
(Ic) Obligation- and Duty-statements are not logically 
equivalent.7
It will be useful to test this counter thesis, especially 
(la) and (Ic) which are concerned most directly with 
obligation. First however, for reasons that will become 
clear below, it will be helpful to establish the meaning 
given to ought- statements generally, and, more importantly 
for present purposes, those delivered in a moral context.
Ought-statements
David Gauthier makes the distinction between two types of 
ought as follows:
a practical judgement which has moral force is based 
on considerations independent of the will (purpose, 
aims, desires) of the prospective agent and dependent 
solely on the intrinsic nature of the act itself, 
whereas a practical judgement which has prudential
7 Beran, op cit., p. 287.
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force is based on considerations dependent on his 
will. The correctness of this distinction is of no 
concern; it does seem to establish two classes of 
grounds which, it may be urged, distinguish two 
species of judgements, and two senses of 'ought'.8
According to Gauthier, whether or not one ought to do 
something in the moral sense depends only upon the 
intrinsic nature of the act in question, whereas whether 
one ought prudentially to do something cannot be decided 
without reference to one's will.
Presumably one can distinguish between:
(i.) ought-statements with prudential force - of which 
there are a multitude of varieties eg. medical oughts, 
financial oughts, aesthetic oughts, etc.,
(ii.) ought-statements with moral force
and, although Gauthier does not discuss this third 
category.
(iii.) ought-statements with both prudential and moral 
force.
The dictate 'we ought to pay our bills' for example, is 
easily open to interpretation as a moral as well as
8 D. Gauthier, Practical Reasoning, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1963, p.20.
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prudential ought - we (morally) ought to pay our bills 
because we have entered a contract (promised) to do so and 
received services upon the basis of a promise of payment, 
and if we don't our services will be disconnected 
(prudential).
In Gauthier's terms we are doing what we ought to do 
morally only if we pay our bills because that is the right 
thing to do. If we pay them simply to avoid being cut off 
we are doing the right thing, but our judgement has 
prudential rather than moral force. A Kantian moral 
philosopher would choose to make a clear distinction 
between being moral (paying your bill because it is the 
right thing to do) , or as Gauthier puts it acting 
independent of your will, and doing what ostensibly appears 
to be a moral act (paying your bill) for prudential 
reasons. If we knew that there was no possibility of being 
cut off the prudential reason for paying would disappear, 
but the moral reason would remain, and we would only be 
morally correct if we continued to act in the same way.9
Another way to present the distinction between prudential 
and moral oughts is this. According to Beran, a prudential 
ought-statement claims to be a solution to a problem, and 
as such it offers not only reasons, but conclusive reasons 
for acting in a particular way (this is stronger than
9 Cf. I. Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 
Chapter Two, edited by H.J. Paton under the title The Moral 
Law, London, Hutchinson, 1948.
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Gauthier's idea of 'judgements').10 By this argument, 'A 
ought to do X' is logically equivalent to -
1. There is a problem.
2. The problem must be solved.
3. X will solve the problem.
4. Therefore, there are conclusive reasons for A doing X.
Adding to this idea Simmons points out that 
ought-statements usually arise out of a process of 
deliberation, and there is a conclusiveness about them that 
is lacking in both duty and obligation statements.11 
Although telling someone they ought to do something might 
be interpreted as offering advice, it is advice based on a 
consideration of all factors thought relevant to solving 
the problem at hand.
One is reminded of Kant's discussion of hypothetical 
imperatives12 which generally take the form 'do X if you 
want Y '. A prudential ought will be the product of a 
process of deliberation directed towards solving the
10 'If I am told that I ought to do X, I can legitimately ask 
'Why ought I do X?' or 'what reasons are there for doing 
X?' and if it really is the case that I ought to do X then 
there must not be merely a reason for my doing X but 
conclusive reasons for my doing X; that is the reasons for 
my doing X must be better than any reasons for doing any 
alternative action open to me.' Beran op cit., p.211.
11 Simmons, op cit. p. 10.
12 Kant, op cit., p. 78.
practical problem at hand (Y), and to say one ought to do
Gauthier's requirement that reference be made to the will 
of the agent.
To fit the description offered by Beran, a moral ought 
statement also needs to arise from a process of 
deliberation, but it must be possible to show that the
prudential ought. Simmons feels that a moral ought means 
'all things considered you should do X'.13 Although this 
is a helpful starting point it does not get to the heart of 
the matter. It is not simply the case that finding out 
what one ought to do morally requires a fuller enquiry. 
Consider the following advice:
"Since you wish to avoid catching a cold you ought to wear 
your coat."
There is no way in which the ought in this quote could be 
construed as a moral ought, although it is no doubt the 
product of a process of deliberation considering all things 
relevant to the problem. It fits the Simmons definition, 
and suggests that after deliberation a conclusive reason 
has apparently been identified for acting in a particular 
way. The problem or end being the avoidance of a cold, and 
the ought being dependent for its force upon its perceived
X only makes sense if one is known to want Y. Hence
force of such a statement is somehow
13 Simmons, op cit., p. 10.
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appropriateness to that end. A complete disregard for 
moral questions is appropriate to the context because the 
problem does not have a moral aspect.
If instead one considers the claim:
"Given that you earn more than enough to live on you ought 
to give money to charity."
One immediately notices a difference in the nature of the 
second statement which has an obvious moral dimension, and 
therefore demands that an 'all things considered' solution 
addresses ethical or moral issues, that is questions of 
right and wrong. But one might also consider a less 
obvious example.
"If you want your hair to look nice you ought to use hair 
spray."
In this instance the problem addressed is a practical one, 
but there are ethical implications attached to the various 
solutions. I may accept that I ought (prudentially) to use 
hair spray, and simply choose a spray that works well on my 
hair. Alternatively I might acknowledge the environmental 
implications, and my responsibilities to future 
generations, and feel that I ought (morally) to choose an 
environmentally friendly product.
Essentially I can choose to tackle the problem at a purely 
practical level, or I might acknowledge that my choice is
21
in some sense a moral decision. Until fairly recently one 
would not have been expected to be aware of a moral 
dimension to an issue such as hair care. Now however one 
might believe that:
"If you want your hair to look nice you ought to use hair 
spray, some of which contain CFCs which are harmful to the 
atmosphere. This being so you ought to use the ozone 
friendly variety."
To return to Simmons's definition, a moral ought does mean 
that all things considered you should do X, but it is the 
nature of the problem which dictates the type of 
considerations appropriate. The true nature of the 
problem/issue towards which the ought statement is directed 
must be established before stating that by taking all 
things into consideration one establishes what one ought to 
do morally. The problem may be purely practical with no 
moral content, in which case moral ought statements would 
be redundant. It may be overtly moral, or increasingly it 
may be a practical problem with moral implications 
attached. In both the latter cases an 'all things 
considered' solution would necessarily address what one 
ought to do morally, which is often a very different form 
of enquiry to one concerning what one ought to do 
prudentially.
Essentially moral ought statements indicate what needs to 
be done in order to do the right thing morally. By stating 
you ought (morally) to do X we are saying that all things
22
considered there are conclusive reasons for believing that 
X is morally the right thing to do, or perhaps that doing 
X is the best way of achieving Y which is the best moral 
outcome.
However, if we accept Gauthier's idea that moral oughts are 
independent of the will, there may well be a gap between 
recognising that X is the right thing to do and actually 
doing it. Moral motivation may, as Hume believed, depend 
upon the presence of an accompanying desire to do what is 
right.14 If this is the case we might still prefer the 
formulation 'if you want to achieve Y (to be moral), do 
X'(the right thing). If the desire for Y is not present 
then there will be a grave problem in motivating people to 
do X.
Quite apart from the problems associated with getting 
people to act upon moral judgements it is also important to 
decide what shall be allowed to count as a conclusive 
reason in moral terms - that is what makes us believe it is 
right to do X. How can we identify the best moral outcome 
and the best way to achieve it? This in itself is an 
enormous subject which cannot be adequately tackled here, 
but it is possible to exclude some possibilities.
14 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Bk 2 Part 3 
Section 3, (ed) P. Nidditch, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1978.
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Given our initial rejection of the assumption of 
similitude, it is not open to us to claim that what we
d*
ought is those things which we have an obligation or duty
f -  A-
to do. As Beran points out, to say 'I have an obligation 
to do x, but ought (morally) not to do x' is not 
self-contradictory, and it is perfectly logical to state 
that 'A has an obligation to pay B $5' without having to 
necessarily state that 'A ought to pay B $5.'1S Similarly, 
if I have made a promise to someone I am obligated to do as 
I have promised, but it does not necessarily mean that, 
here and now, I ought to do that thing. So for example I
 7 Vmight choose to temporarily overlook my obligation to visit77 *
my grandmother if on the way to her house I pass a 
distressed person requiring assistance. In both cases 
there may well be overriding moral considerations which 
determine that, from an all things considered moral point 
of view, what I am obligated to do is not the same as what 
I ought to do.
Obligations (and duties) are not the only reasons for moral 
actions,16 and other sorts of reasons may well be those 
that determine what we ought to do in certain situations, 
where reference to one's obligations is insufficient to 
account for 'all things having been considered'. As H.L.A. 
Hart points out obligations and duties account for only a
,s Beran, op cit., p. 207 .
16 Ibid. , p . 217 .
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'small segment' of morality17. Simmons makes a similar 
point by highlighting the existence of moral dilemmas, and 
conflicting obligations, both of which suggest that 
reference beyond one's obligations is sometimes necessary 
to determine what one ought to do.18 An obligation or a 
duty may be readily overridden by another choice of action 
which more successfully deals with 'the problem of morally 
doing the right thing'.
One can attempt to address the problem of what do morally 
by employing an ethical theory, of which there are many 
varieties. One is particularly interesting in this context 
because of the low priority it affords to obligations and 
duties.
Utilitarianism establishes what one ought to do by 
attempting to determine which of the options available to 
the agent will succeed in promoting the greatest good. 
Thus it focuses on the consequences of actions, rather than 
their status as duties, obligations or whatever else. An 
act utilitarian calculates the utility (good or value) of 
every individual action , and would be ruthless in his 
disregard of standing obligations, duties, and indeed 
rights that did not promote utility. Whilst allowing the
17 H.L.A. Hart, 'Legal and Moral Obligation' in A. Melden 
(ed.) Essays in Moral Philosophy, University of Washington 
Press, 1958. p.84.
18 Simmons, op cit., p. 7.
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possibility of secondary principles (secondary that is to 
utility), a rule utilitarian would also, in the last 
resort, allow these to be abandoned in the face of a 
convincing (utilitarian) moral ought.19
To return to an earlier example, if more good would come of 
my helping a distressed stranger than from visiting my 
grandmother, the fact that I have an obligation to do the 
latter does not in itself determine that this is what I 
ought to do. It may form a part of my reason for my 
ultimate choice but it cannot, for the utilitarian, 
override the fact that more good will come of my helping 
the stranger. This will also be true for other 'brands' of 
ethical theorists.
In the light of the foregoing discussion an adequate 
definition would have to run something like this:
Ought-statements signal the existence of conclusive 
reasons for acting and in a moral context these 
reasons often exist independent of commitment and 
roles.20
19 This is necessarily a very incomplete account of 
utilitarianism offered only as a brief example. Cf. A. 
Quinton Utilitarian Ethics, London, Duckworth, 1989 for a 
general historical introduction to utilitarianism, and S. 
Scheffler (ed) Consequential ism and its Critics, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 1988, for a more contemporary 
analysis.
20 Beran, op cit., p.217.
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This final qualification makes clear an important element 
of the distinctions to be made between ought-statements, 
and duty and obligation statements, respectively. As will 
become clear below, obligations are often seen to be born 
of specific commitments, and duties are frequently 
understood as attached to roles or positions in society. 
Moral ought-statements are therefore d i f f e r e n t a n d  at 
times conflict with not only prudential ought-statements, 
but also duty statements and obligation-statements in 
another important respect. An example in the following 
form highlights this point:
"It is my duty as an employee to do as my superiors 
instruct, it is possible that they will tell me that 
I ought (prudentially) to be ruthless in my dealings 
with competitors, and so I should if I wish to succeed 
within the firm, but I ought not (morally) to allow 
these goals to go against my principles of fair 
dealing."
In an amoral context what one ought to do can be linked 
clearly and explicitly to the solution of a practical 
problem, or fulfilment of a specific goal. It is 
determined by what one wants to achieve, and varies 
accordingly, it is therefore useful to know what role an 
individual has in relation to a specific task, so that you 
can find out what they (as opposed to anyone else) ought to 
be doing.
27
In a moral context however, what we ought to do is
f A
essentially fixed - we ought to do what is right - the 
problem is adding content to this abstract ideal. In this 
context people's roles or positions do not tell us what 
they ought to be doing but rather whether they can do it, 
how they can do it, and possibly who can best do it ('it' 
being the right thing) . This point will need to be 
discussed further below.
Suffice to say at this stage,in moral terms, what one ought 
to do is the bottom line. To not do what one ought to do 
is necessarily to act wrongly, whereas not to fulfil one's 
obligations or, to fail to do one's duty 21 is only prima 
facie wrong.22 However, as soon as we attempt to do what 
is right we realise that what we ought to do may not be 
what we want to do, nor may it be what we think we should 
do prudentially, or even what we have agreed to do. Rather 
it is what we should do based upon the best possible reason 
for acting ie. the belief that it is morally right. 
Furthermore, adding content to this notion 'morally right' 
introduces a host of new problems and issues.
21 The term 'duty' is used here to denote a special duty or 
legal duty as opposed to a moral duty. cf. H.L.A Hart 'Are 
there any Natural Rights?' Philosophical Review, Vol 64, 
1955, especially pp.60-63 for a discussion of special 
rights and correlative duties.
22 The notion of prima facie right and wrong is most famously 
employed by the philosopher W. D. Ross in his work The 
Right and the Good, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1967.
28
Duty-statements
Fortunately it is possible for present purposes to leave 
statements of what one ought to do in an essentially 
abstract form. We can assert that we ought to do what is 
right, whilst admitting that we do not as yet know what 
that entails. What is right may be open to fierce debate, 
people may also disagree as to the best means of 
determining what is right. We must discover what we ought 
to do, and initially it may be far from obvious. To speak 
of duty is to be immediately more specific.
In their most straight-forward form duties are generally 
understood as role-related, you acquire them by being a 
certain person, or by fulfilling a particular role. They 
tend to be easily identifiable and clearly promulgated. 
Certain duties exist without any particular person being 
required to fulfil them because, for example, the post or 
position to which they attach is vacant. However, when 
someone fills the post it is thought that the duties become 
their own. They can be on or off duty, they can swap 
duties, but they have little room for negotiation or 
personal interpretation of what the duties entail.
Brandt identifies the following paradigm context for the 
use of the duty-statements:
a) An individual occupies an office or station in an 
organisation or some kind of system.
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b) A certain job is deemed of some value for the welfare of 
the organisation.
c) This job is associated, somehow or other, with the 
office occupied by the individual.
d) Performance is expected and required of him.23
Brandt clearly sees the most appropriate use of the term 
duty being restricted to situations in which the key words 
indicated above are represented. Duties are a component of 
a system or organisation, with prescribed offices and jobs, 
which individuals are expected to fulfil. Indeed, one 
might choose to include in a discussion of the nature of 
duties the fact that they are generally backed by 
institutional sanctions which are brought in to force if 
they are not fulfilled.
For Hart, what duty and obligation statements have in 
common is that their use is most appropriate in a legal 
context. He considers it 'absurd' to transport the terms 
too readily into moral discourse. However, he is 
interested to see how the 'legally-coloured' concepts of 
obligation and duty can be used in certain moral 
situations.24 Hart agrees with Kurt Baier25 that duties 
are most usefully understood as attached to specific roles 
or offices in social life. As such they are not truly
23 Brandt, op cit., p. 388.
24 Hart, op cit., p. 84.
25 K. Baier, 'Moral Obligation', American Philosophical 
Quarterly, Vol 3, Number 3, July 1966.
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created by the deliberate choice of the individual. In 
accepting certain positions or adopting certain roles you 
by implication take on certain duties, some of which may 
not even be apparent when the choice is made. They are by 
no means universal, in that, for example, the duties of 
parenthood in one society may be quite different from those 
ascribed to the role in another. However, within a 
particular social system the duties of parenthood, at least 
to some minimum level are clearly stated, and often backed 
by law.
Before moving on, it is worth picking up on Hart's point 
concerning the appropriate employment of the term duty. It 
is interesting to note that we are selective in our use of 
the term, and wary of certain situations in which its use 
would be more than inappropriate, indeed it would be 
offensive. To illustrate this point one need only think 
of the way in which basic moral principles are generally 
taught. As Hart points out, we do not feel it necessary to 
impress upon people the idea of a duty not to torture 
children26, however, we do try and instil in people a 
general duty to help those less fortunate than themselves.
This is an interesting difference which seems to suggest 
the following - in moral instruction the term duty is most 
readily employed in situations where we may be unable, or
unwilling, what we ought to do. The
2ft Hart, op cit., p.82.
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idea that we have a duty to do X is used to encourage 
positive actions which may not otherwise be pursued, but it 
is not generally used to discourage those things which are 
easily identified as morally wrong.
For example, most of us believe that it is morally wrong to 
torture children. In the vast majority of cases, the 
knowledge of the pain involved, and the perception we have 
of the victim, have sufficient moral force to ensure that 
we do not do it (or tolerate it), without us needing to be 
told we have a duty not to do it. On the other hand, in 
cases where the moral rights and wrongs of an issue are 
debated the concept of duty is more readily introduced, 
sometimes in the hope of gaining acquiescence from those 
who cannot accept the specific reasons given for acting or 
refraining from acting in a particular way. This is most 
obviously demonstrated in the case of legal duties which 
sometimes require people to do things which morally they 
find unacceptable, or to refrain from doing things they 
have no moral qualms about.
Returning to the notion of duties being attached to 
positions, this seems to coincide with ordinary 
understanding. An applicant for a job is told of her 
duties, not obligations, and the terms are not necessarily 
interchangeable. The distinction may lie here: When
occupants of particular posts or positions within a society 
or organisation are assumed to have specific jobs to
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perform for the good of that society or organisation, the 
message is conveyed to them in terms of their duties. If 
they themselves see their task as requiring the acceptance 
of further responsibilities, they may be prepared to take 
these on as personal obligations. The duties one takes on 
are often stated in a contract of employment, and in some 
professions there may be a general ethical code which 
specifies duties of a moral nature specific to the 
profession.
It is fair to say that certain duties follow on, 
independent of any further specific commitments one makes. 
So for example, a teacher acquires certain specific duties 
as a part of their job, and they cannot avoid such duties 
without rejecting the post to which they are attached. If 
they move to a different school it will not necessarily be 
possible to assume that exactly the same duties will attach 
to their new post, although certain fundamental ones will 
remain unchanged.
Beyond this however they may be free to choose whether to 
add further obligations, and to a certain extent they are 
free to interpret what their professional duties entail. 
All teachers for example may have both a contractual and a 
moral duty to treat their pupils fairly and avoid 
discriminating between them. Some teachers will understand 
this duty as simply requiring them not to disadvantage any 
pupil through their own behaviour, others will feel that
33
the duty requires them to compensate in some way for past 
disadvantages. Beyond the basic requirement it is left to 
the individual to determine what the duty entails.
Speaking of obligations as opposed to duties, a teacher 
may, for example, undertake to coach the school badminton 
team after hours. Having done so she has a personal 
obligation to the pupils involved in the activity. Giving 
up her spare time is probably 'beyond the call of duty', 
but if she is willing to do it, and undertakes to do so, 
the teacher creates for herself an obligation to fulfil the 
task. If she fails to turn up for practices, she cannot be 
accused of not doing her duty as a teacher, but she can be 
criticised for failing to fulfil her obligations. Were she 
to ask to be released from the task, she would not be 
re-negotiating her professional duties, but requesting that 
she be released from a personal obligation. The importance 
of such distinctions should become apparent below.
It is of course possible to speak of duty in a wider sense 
such that it seems to coincide more closely or even exactly 
with what one ought to do. This happens when we utilise 
the idea of moral duties. In discussing the teacher, 
reference was made to her professional and moral duties. 
Once again it is possible that these duties will be 
identical, or that moral duties will be more demanding than 
professional duties, or indeed that her professional duties
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will go beyond the moral duties of those who do not share 
her position or role.
If used in a Kantian sense, one's moral duty is what one 
ought to do, and what one ought to do is one's duty.27 
Kant makes duty logically equivalent to what is rational
and moral rather than, for example, what is legally
specified or contractually laid out. It might be worth 
considering whether this usage should be seen as an 
'extended use' of the term duty, or a special case with its 
own paradigm context.
Simmons clearly distinguishes between what he calls 
positional duties and natural duties, in much the same way 
as attempted here.28 Positional duties are attached to 
specific posts or positions in society, in the way that 
Hart and Baier would claim is only proper if the term duty 
is to be appropriately employed. Natural duties, on the 
other hand can be understood variously as the commands of 
natural law, God given duties, the dictates of pure reason, 
or the duties that one should ascribe to man qua man. The 
important point being that one is under such duties 
irrespective of the particular roles, positions or status 
one occupies, they are in fact universal.
27 This is to stress the coincidence between what is
rational and what is moral as well as the idea that 
establishing what is rational necessarily informs one of 
ones duty, and that acting from a sense of duty is what 
ought to be done.
28 Simmons, op cit., pp. 16-24.
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This distinction may not at first appear to offer much 
beyond the previous distinction between what one has a duty 
to do, and what one ought to do. However, it soon becomes 
apparent that Simmons wishes to say more than 'natural 
duties may override positional duties', he in fact appears 
to make the distinction in order to make clear that 
positional duties as such have no moral significance. For 
Simmons, the existence of a positional duty is "a morally 
neutral fact".29
I will argue that these positional duties do not have 
moral weight, that my (eg.) "legal obligations" impose 
no moral constraints on action. And more generally I 
will argue that no positional duties establish
anything concerning moral requirements  I want to
suggest... that all cases in which a positional duty 
seems to establish a moral requirement fit one of 
these two patterns....[Either]...it was the manner in 
which the position was entered which established the 
moral requirement in question; an obligation to 
perform the positional duties was undertaken, and in 
the absence of this undertaking the fact that an 
individual had those positional duties established 
nothing. In the second case, the existence of the 
positional duty was irrelevant to the moral 
requirement which anyone regardless of position, would 
have in the situation described. There simply 
happened to be a natural duty to do what there was 
also a positional duty to do.30
Simmons's point is basically this. In every instance in 
which we can identify what we take to be a positional duty, 
one or both of the conditions outlined below must hold in
29 Ibid, p.21.
30 Ibid p. 20.
36
order for the individual in the position to have that duty 
in a morally significant sense.
1. The individual entered the position to which the duties 
attach willingly.
2. The duty is such that anyone in the situation (as 
opposed to the position) described would have the same 
duty.
These requirements substantially alter the more traditional 
perceptions concerning positional duties, and are designed 
to protect against the concept of duty being used to excuse 
people from doing what they ought to do morally.
There are famous examples in history of people offering as 
their defence against accusations of immorality that they 
were 'only doing their duty'. Simmons rightly points out 
that this is no defence if one willingly and knowingly 
accepted the position to which these duties attached. By 
accepting the position you accept the duties attached to it 
(even though there may be overriding moral reasons for you 
not to perform them) . If however a role or position was 
forced upon youf or unintentionally assumed, it is 
questionable whether you have the same responsibility to 
perform positional duties demanded of you.
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Judith Jarvis Thomson uses this argument to powerful effect 
in her well-known article on abortion.31 She invokes the 
example of a famous violinist whose only chance of survival 
rests with your agreeing to be wired up to his body for the 
next nine months. You are not happy with this ideaf but 
the violinist's fans kidnap you and you are rigged up 
against your will. Thomson is sure that you have no duty 
or obligation to this man, and to continue with the 
procedure would be a substantial act of charity. She sees 
this example as analogous to an unwanted pregnancy which 
results from rape or contraceptive failure, and states that 
a woman has no duty to bring a foetus to full term in such 
circumstances.
One can extend Thomson's argument beyond the point she 
takes it, and state that if you were to proceed with the 
pregnancy and give birth to the child, you would surely 
acquire the same duties of non-maleficence towards it as 
one has towards any other human being. Once you have 
chosen to take on the role of parent, the facts of 
conception become irrelevant, and would not justify 
subsequent acts of cruelty. Even if the option of 
termination were unavailable, choosing to raise the child 
once it has been born, rather than offering it for 
adoption, would mean that one had willingly taken on the 
duties of parenthood.
31 J. Jarvis Thomson, 'In Defence of Abortion', 
Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol.l no. 1, Fall 1971, 
pp.47-66.
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It would appear that before enquiring as to the content of 
positional duties, it is important to establish "the manner 
in which the position was entered", and the extent to which 
these positional duties can be reinterpreted as moral 
duties. Only if the position has been voluntarily filled 
does the duty have any moral force, and that force is 
essentially the result of the duty being open to 
re-interpretation as an obligation. By voluntarily taking 
on a position, an individual is assumed to voluntarily take 
on the duties attached to it. A personal commitment makes 
what might seem at first glance a duty fit more easily into 
the category of obligation.
Simmons's second requirement places the emphasis upon the 
situations that people find themselves in, rather than the 
positions they hold. Consider for example an off duty 
doctor enjoying an evening at the theatre. Halfway through 
the performance someone is taken ill and a call goes out 
for a doctor. If such a call had gone out in the hospital 
five minutes before the doctor was due to come off duty 
then it is clear she had a positional duty to respond. 
Once the situation arises in the theatre the question 
surely is not whether the doctor has a positional duty to 
help, despite being off duty at present. Rather, we would 
assume that everyone has a (moral) duty to help in any way 
they can, and being a doctor means that she is in a 
particularly good position to do so. If she sat back and 
kept quiet, we might criticise her as a human being, rather
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than as a doctor. If there is a coincidence between the 
demands of moral and positional duties, the distinction 
serves no moral purpose. The fact of the existence of a 
positional duty seems neither here nor there, what makes 
the difference is the fact that the doctor is better 
equipped to fulfil the moral duty which is shared by 
everybody in the theatre.
Mish'alani helps clarify the issue of when one needs to 
enquire beyond one's positional duties in order to 
establish what one ought to do in the following way.
The facts of one having certain duties and being under 
certain obligations.. .bear on what one ought to do. 
For there will be things which a person ought to do in 
view of the duties he bears, although the step from 
the fact that he bears such and such a duties to the 
judgement that he ought here-and-now to conduct 
himself thus-and-so is by no means a simple step.32
Our positional duties are only relevant to our moral 
decisions if the positions to which they attach were chosen 
by us in some true sense, and/or if the actions they demand 
could be demanded of any individual in the same situation. 
Essentially, a positional duty might have very obvious and 
powerful legal force, and thus might signal quite clearly 
what we ought to do in a prudential sense. However, it is 
less obvious that it will signal what we ought to do in a
32 J.K. Mish'alani, v"Duty", "Obligation” and "Ought"', 
Analysis, 30, 1969, pp.33-40, cited in Beran op. cit.
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moral sense. Our moral duties may at times conflict with 
our positional duties, and they may demand more of us than
k
our positional duties^,
It is therefore most important to retain a clear 
distinction between duties in the sense suggested by the 
paradigm case offered above, and those which are referred 
to as moral duties. It is also important to recognise that 
if we wish the existence of a positional duty to tell us 
something useful about what we morally ought to do, it has 
to be possible to interpret the duty as binding for the 
sorts of reasons discussed above.
It would appear that the paradigm case offered here does 
not close the gap between positional duties and moral 
duties, and therefore we must acknowledge that a 
consequence of accepting such a definition is that the 
existence of a duty to do X does not necessarily help us to 
discover whether we ought morally to do X in a particular 
situation.
Obligation Claims
In as much as a man regards himself as a social being 
and desires a social life, he gives up the solitary 
supremacy of his own will, and concedes that what is 
to happen is not to be determined by his will alone.
He must either subject himself to obligations, or else
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suffer the logical loneliness of the man without 
ties.33
Having defined 'ought' and 'duty' we have to decide how if 
at all this contributes towards an understanding of 
obligation. As Hart suggests, there is more reason for 
linking obligation and duty, than linking obligation and 
ought statements. The first point to mention is that both 
types of statement are part of a social set up, most 
suitably perhaps a legal system. However, it will soon
become apparent that to understand the binding force of 
those obligations that appear legal in form it is necessary 
to have an understanding of the nature of moral obligation.
• # JObligation are usually seen as individual creations in that „” 
i A
they arise out of specific commitments one takes upon 
oneself. They are not always independent of the will 
because whilst they may be directed towards the moral goal 
of 'doing the right thing', they could equally be directed 
towards furthering one's egotistic (non-moral) goals.
The involvement of a second party or parties, and the 
existence of a larger social environment is central to most 
definitions offered.
33 J. Lucas, The Principles of Politics, Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1985, p.49.
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If I tell you what your obligations are, I do not 
necessarily give you advice of any kind; I simply 
report that you stand in certain relations to other 
people, relations of commitment and trust. 34
This seems a much more accurate statement concerning the 
basic function of obligation statements than that offered 
by Baier who states that:
...whenever a wrong-claim indicates a task to someone, 
then it constitutes a moral directive and being the 
addressee of such a moral directive amounts to having 
a moral obligation.35
This appears to be a more appropriate description of an 
ought-statement, or perhaps a moral duty claim. If we tell 
someone it is wrong to drive past the scene of a traffic 
accident without offering assistance, then surely we are 
saying they ought to stop (assuming, for example, that they 
are not on their way to another emergency), and possibly, 
that it is their moral duty to stop. To say that it is 
their obligation to stop seems to include elements of 
commitment, and allude to specific relationships not
34 J. Feinberg, 'Supererogation and Rules', Ethics 71, 
1961, p.278.
35 Baier, op cit., p.212.
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apparent in the situation. Brandt's paradigm context seems 
to make this clear.36
He identifies the following Paradigm context for obligation 
claims:
a) A roughly specifiable service is 'required' of one 
person.
b) Two parties are involved: the one who is required to 
perform a service, and the one for whom, or at the bidding 
of whom, the service is to be performed.
c) A prior transaction, the promise or benefaction, is the 
source of the relationship.37
Note the tone of language and terminology used here, and 
the subtle manner in which it differs from the paradigm 
case for duty. This is very much the vocabulary of the 
market place. The emphasis is on transactions, 
relationships and the exchange of 'services'. 'To show why 
or that someone has an obligation we show how he came to 
have it. '38 Obligation is clearly a relational concept, 
which we seek to identify by locating what Lemmon calls a 
'previous committing action'*39
36 Brandt's paradigm case is very similar to that put 
forward by H. L. A. Hart in his article 'Are There Any 
Natural Rights?' cited above.
37 Brandt, op cit., p. 387.
38 R. K. Dagger, 'What is Political Obligation?', The 
American Political Science Review 71, 1977, p.87.
39 E.J. Lemmon, 'Moral Dilemmas', Philosophical Review 
71, April 1962, p.141.
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Their status as obligations may be independent of 
their content for we not only have legal duties and 
obligations, but we create or impose them (eg by 
making contracts). They may be varied and modified 
and extinguished and persons may (notably when 
obligations are created by contracts) be released from 
them.40
Simmons borrows heavily from Hart to come up with the 
following points of distinction between duties and 
obligations as they are commonly understood. He sees an 
obligation as 'a moral requirement generated by the 
performance of some voluntary act (or omission).'41 
Although the act may be the deliberate undertaking of an 
obligation, it need not be. For example, by convention, 
the acceptance of certain favours or services from others 
might be taken to create an obligation in you to provide 
the same, if the need arises.
The important point is this: unlike duties, of which we can 
be informed, obligations require special performances, as 
reflected in the language of obligation, whereby we 
'obligate ourselves'.42 If we voluntarily enter a position 
with duties attached to it, the case is relatively 
straightforward (assuming that the duties are morally 
acceptable). Having accepted the post we are usually taken 
to have accepted an obligation to perform those duties.
40 Hart, op cit., p. 84.
41 Simmons, op cit., p. 14.
42 Ibid. , p. 14 .
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However, whilst you can slip into (accept) existing duties 
specified for you by someone else, you more commonly create 
obligations for yourself, the verb is significantly active.
I might take it for granted that if someone invites me to 
dinner more than once, that by accepting I place myself 
under an obligation to invite them back. My partner on the 
other hand might see no necessary connection between the 
events. As Hart explains, in situations where obligations 
rest on something other than specific express commitments, 
for example receipt of benefits, one requires that the 
obligee recognise internally the creation of an obligation. 
This might be the work of conscience or maybe even 
etiquette.
This raises some interesting points which need to be 
addressed in preparation for later discussions. When 
demanding 'internal recognition' Hart could be taken to 
mean one of two things. He could be claiming that the 
obligation only exists if it is recognised, meaning that I 
have an obligation but my partner doesn't. Alternatively 
he could mean that the obligation exists independent of our 
recognising it, having been created by the circumstances. 
In this case recognition is required to make it 
motivationally effective. We are both under the
obligation, but only I will act because of it.
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Irrespective of examples such as the above, it is still 
fair to say that obligations generally have a specificity 
that goes beyond even duty claims. The obliger, as a 
specific person, owes an obligation to an obligee[s], a 
specific person or persons. This is strikingly different 
from the idea of moral duties, where an individual owes 
certain duties to all other individuals. The language once 
again reflects this difference with the vocabulary of 
obligation claims being suggestive of personal debts, which 
can be discharged, whilst moral duties at least are 
continuously binding. Having said that, one can be on or 
off (non-moral) duty, in a way in which one cannot 'lose' 
an obligation without discharging it, or having it 
cancelled.
Obligations are ususally more specific, in that there is 
usually a common agreement as to what one is obligated to 
do even in the less explicit cases. For example, the fact 
that my acquaintance has invited me to supper on more than 
one occasion would not be felt to create an obligation in 
me to invite him to my home for the entire Christmas 
period. However, if I accept a general moral duty to help 
those in need, this could involve me in anything from 
contributing to charity to rescuing a drowning man.
Duties and obligations also differ in terms of their 
relationship to rights. Simmons, following on from Hart, 
argues that obligations generate correlative rights, and
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that by incurring an obligation one allows another person 
to acquire a special right to the performance of that which 
you are obliged to do.43
Legal vocabulary provides a useful distinction here, which 
clearly points to the difference in terms of 
rights-entailment between duties and obligations. In the
case of obligations the right created is a 'right in
personam'— in other words we can identify the benefactor, —
A  A
and trace back the creation of the right to a special 
relationship between her and the obligee. It is by virtue 
of this that Hart calls such rights 'special rights'.44 In 
the case of moral duties the rights are 'in rem', that is 
rights that are held in the same way by all other people. 
The security offered by such a right is far less than in 
the case of a right within personal relationships, because 
specific relationships of duty cannot be identified in the 
same way as for obligations.
I may have a moral duty to help those less fortunate than 
myself, but this fact is of little help to a starving man 
who tries to show that my duty is to him specifically. 
However, were I to take on a specific commitment to help 
him, through a charity, then I would have an obligation 
which he has a right to expect me to fulfil.
43 Ibid. , p. 15 .
44 H.L.A. Hart "Are there Any Natural rights?" p. 183-
184.
Finally Simmons makes an extremely useful point when he 
states that
it is the nature of the transaction or relationships 
into which the obliger and obligee enter, not the 
nature of the required act, which renders the act 
obligatory ,45
This is not to say that the moral impermissibility of an 
act cannot render it incapable of being obligatory, the law 
certainly allows for this. The important point is that 
Simmons places voluntarism at the heart of the concept of 
obligation, and demands that so called obligation claims be 
thoroughly tested against strict voluntarist standards. 
Given the emphasis that has been placed upon the active 
nature of obligating oneself, it would be useful to 
investigate various explanations as to how this is 
achieved.
Just as there are different forms of ought claims there are, 
ostensibly at least, various different obligation claims.
According to Baier:
What is common to all cases of obligation is a moral 
directive which has somehow given rise to a task. The 
different ways in which the task arises generate the 
different "types" of obligation.46
45 Simmons, op cit., p. 15.
46 Baier, op cit., p. 213
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He goes on to explain that an obligation may be moral in 
one of two senses, or maybe in both. Obligations are moral 
in a binding sense if they entail that one morally ought to 
do what they prescribe. They are moral in a 'genetic' 
sense if they come into existence as the result of falling 
under a general moral directive.
For example, if I have promised, as in the example Baier 
offers, to get home early my promise is moral in the 
genetic sense because "keep promises" is a general moral 
directive. "Getting home on time" is not a general moral 
directive, nor is it morally binding. However, if I 
promise to get home on time, the obligation to do so is 
morally binding as a result of the promise. That is 
"getting home on time" is morally binding upon me because 
"keeping promises" is morally genetic and binding (for 
everyone).
...every obligation even those which are non moral in 
the genetic sense, must be capable of reformulation in 
such a way as to make them moral also in the genetic 
sense. What is distinctive about such cases (eg. 
obligation arising from promises) is that their 
genesis requires both a general moral directive "keep 
promises" and an empirical fact- e.g., the fact that 
[Jones] did promise not to work late- which defines 
the specific task in which the obligation consists. 47
47 Ibid p. 212.
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Dictionary definitions of obligation tend to emphasise the 
link with physical restraint, and conjure up images of 
being bound, forced or even coerced to act in accordance 
with one's obligations.48 Some philosophers have similarly 
sought to emphasise this element, most obviously the 
command theorists such as Austin49 and to a lesser extent 
Hart. However, if we accept the requirement of
voluntarism, it is not easy to build in a strong element of 
coercion, sanction or restraint without diminishing the 
moral worth of obligation claims.5U
To explain: Basic command theory would run something like
this:
1. X is in command (ie. in a position to issue 
commands backed by sanctions).
2. X commands that I do Y.
3. Therefore, I am obligated to do Y.
This is obviously unsatisfactory on a number of counts, not 
least because of its embodiment of the naturalistic 
fallacy. As Baier points out,51 if we wish to get close to
48 Concise Oxford English Dictionary, p. 700.
49 J. Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined 
and the Uses and Study of Jurisprudence, (ed) . H.L.A. Hart, 
Reprint edition, New York, Library of Ideas, 1954.
50 According to Lucas, explanations of political 
obligation that rely on the threat of force are 
'intellectually opaque' cf. Lucas op cit., p.44.
51 Baier, op.cit., p.214.
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saying that I ought (morally) to obey Y we need to include 
a further proposition
4. One has an obligation to obey sanctions backed by 
commands.
We should not however be prepared to accept (4.) as it 
stands. We need a further statement explaining why I am 
prepared to accept X's commands as obligatory.
One could take the opportunity to convert this into a 
version of voluntarism by stating the case thus -
1. X is in command
la. I placed X in that position and agreed to obey him.
2. X commands that I do
3. Therefore, I am obligated to do Y
Here both the fact of a specific commitment, and the 
internal acceptance of the idea that the commitment should 
be honoured is required. The existence of sanctions, and 
the possibility of force being used, is relevant only in so 
far as it bears on the question of obedience rather than 
obligation.
Alternatively, one could leave the command theory intact by 
stating:
1. X is in command.
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2. X commands that I do Y.
3. Therefore, I ought (prudentially) to do Y, because, if 
I don't I shall be punished by X.
Here it is the simple fact of X being in command and having 
the power to apply sanctions should I disobey that explains 
my decision to do as he commands. However, it is surely 
more correct in such an example to describe oneself as 
being obliged to obey, rather than having an obligation to 
do so. To fail to make such a distinction would imply a 
position whereby obligations exist whenever there is 
sufficient force available to ensure performance. The 
decision to obey becomes purely prudential, and obedience 
provides no evidence of preceding voluntary commitments or 
existing obligations.
Even if we accept Hart's claim that:
If we have an obligation to do something then there is 
a sense in which we are bound to do it, and where we 
are bound there is some sense in which we are 
compelled to do it. 52
There still remains the question of whether we are 
obligated because we are bound, as the command theorists 
seem to suggest, or, whether we are bound because we are 
obligated, which seems to be a more attractive idea.
52 Hart, op cit, p. 95.
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This is not to say that there cannot be a close tie between 
obligation and coercion. In moral terms, the fact that 
someone fails to discharge their obligations is taken to 
require justification, and where such justification is not 
possible, sanctions are often imposed. Failure to meet 
obligations, when they have not been overridden by a 
stronger ought or moral duty claim, results in the 
imposition of pressure or sanctions, be they moral or 
legal. Sanctions are protective of obligations^ not 
constitutive of them. It is interesting to note however, 
that if the act an individual is obligated to perform is 
illegal the law will have no part in enforcing its 
performance.33
To contain the use of force within an explanation of the 
origin of obligations is not uncommon, but it should be 
discouraged. As Hart concludes 'reason demands voluntary 
co-operation in a coercive system. ,5A Whereas Dagger 
wishes only that 'coercion as related to obligation, is a
33 This is in opposition to Simmons's point that the 
content of an obligation is irrelevant to its binding
nature. Simmons was concerned with moral obligations but 
certainly in terms of legal obligations an individual would 
not be forced to fulfil an obligation if the actions
required to do so were illegal. This is particularly
interesting when the act has been deemed illegal because of 
its supposed immorality, for example contracts of 
surrogacy. In this country at least the courts have
refused to uphold contractual obligations on the part of 
surrogate mothers to hand over their offspring.
54 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press 1961, p 193. Having said this Hart has 
also justified the use of coercive means to ensure the 
performance of an obligation cf. 'Are there Any Natural 
Rights?' p.178.
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response to one whose abuse threatens the practices through 
which we undertake obligations and conduct our lives.'55
To return to the Traditional Assumption which is under 
examination, it has been argued that obligation in its 
paradigm form, (and in many instances of ordinary usage), 
is distinct from the concepts of 'duty', 'ought', and of 
'being obliged'. Obligation is a relational concept, that 
relies on the existence and form of commitments made, 
rather than on the nature of the task involved. To have an 
obligation to do something, is to consider oneself bound to 
do that thing UNLESS, from an 'all things considered moral 
point of view' one can justify not doing it - the claim 
that we ought (morally) to do X 'trumps'56 the claim that 
we have an obligation to do something else. So if I am 
obligated to someone, they have a right to expect me to 
perform the task in question UNLESS I can show that from an 
'all things considered moral point of view' there are good 
reasons (conflicting moral duties perhaps) why I should not 
be required so to act. In the absence of such reasons, the 
obligation ends only when it is discharged or cancelled. 
The happiest context within which to place 'obligation' is 
within a framework such as a legal system, where the 
vocabulary common to the use of the concept is most readily 
found. In the light of this assessment an adequate
55 Dagger, op.cit., p.89.
56 The idea of 'trumping' is developed by A. Gewirth in 
his article 'Are there any Absolute rights?' Philosophical 
Quarterly, 31, 1981, pp.1-16.
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definition of obligation would have to contain a fair 
amount of detail, and run something like this:
An obligation is a specific undertaking which results 
from voluntary act on the part of the person 
obligated. The committing act may be a direct 
expression of acceptance of the obligation, or it may 
rely on one accepting that other actions indirectly 
create obligations. Unless overridden by a stronger 
moral claim, an obligation remains in force until it 
is discharged. In moral terms the content of the 
obligation is irrelevant to its binding force.
As such it is distinct from a moral ought statement which 
has been defined as a statement signalling the existence of 
conclusive reasons for acting in a particular way to 
promote the moral good, and a non-moral duty which is 
bestowed by a system upon the position we accommodate 
within it. When employing these terms in either moral or 
political discourse it is important to bear these 
distinctions in mind and to avoid the tendency to use the 
interchangeably. To blur the distinctions is to forfeit 
valuable material.
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Political Obligation
Having established a working definition for the term 
obligation, and an understanding of what it means in 
general terms to be obligated, one can move on and discuss 
political obligation. However, there are still confusions 
to be dealt with, and important distinctions to be made 
once the terms have been transported into a political 
context. McPherson for one is very nervous about utilising 
the terms introduced above in a political setting, and 
feels that our desire to do so is symptomatic of a more 
general tendency to interpret human behaviour in terms of 
an individualistic/moralistic model, rather than a 
behaviourist or functionalist model.
The effects on practice of regarding one's relation to 
the state too much in terms of 'duty', 'obligation' 
and the like, are to invite the wrong kind of 
enthusiasm for possibly doubtful ends and an 
inappropriate kind of guilt at failure to do one's bit 
adequately towards achieving them.57
This is a helpful warning and one which should encourage us 
to enquire closely as to which, if any of the concepts can 
be most appropriately employed.
To define the 'political context' is itself a complex task. 
As Flathman points out - " 'politics' and 'political' are 
not among the more precisely delineated concepts in our
57 T. McPherson, Political Obligation, London,
Routledge & Kegan, op cit., p.85.
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language." 58 Dagger in turn includes them in the class 
of essentially contestable concepts.59 Lucas adopts the 
term in its 'wide, original sense in which it applies not 
only to politics in the modern, narrow sense, but to legal 
and social affairs, and all that pertains to men's (sic) 
public life. '60 This has the merit of broadening the 
public out beyond the purely procedural aspects of 
politics, but it does not embrace the contemporary notion 
of the 'personal as political'. However, in this context 
such an understanding of the political will suffice. 
Political obligations thereby become obligations concerned 
with matters pertaining to a person's social/legal/public 
existence.61
There is little point in being more specific than this 
unless a far more limited definition of 'politics' is 
sought. However, it is worth pointing out that not all 
political obligations are legal obligations, not all social
58 R. Flathman, Political Obligation, London, Croom 
Helm, 1972, p.46.
59 Dagger op cit., p. 92. Dagger credits the 
development of this notion to W. B. Gallie in his work 
Philosophy and the Historical Understanding, Schocken, 
1966.
60 Lucas, op cit., p.20.
61 It is however important to acknowledge a distinction 
in kind between legal and political obligations, cf. J. Raz 
The Authority of Law, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1979, 
pp.232-249: M.B.E. Smith 'Is there a prima facie obligation 
to obey the Law?' Yale Law Journal Vol 82, 1973, p.950ff: 
R. Wasserstrom 'The Obligation to Obey the Law' in R. S. 
Summers (ed) Essays in Legal Philosophy, Oxford, Blackwell, 
1968.
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obligations have a political element, and certain areas of 
one's public life will not be subject to obligations one 
would describe as political.
Simmons says that "(as a rough approximation) a political
obligation is a moral requirement to support and comply
. . . . . / 'with the political institutions of ones country of 4
residence."62 Flathman believes "an obligation is
political when it is an integral part of the political
arrangements and practices of the society".63 What these
definitions have in common is the sense in which they
suggest that the very existence of political obligations is
contextually determined, and that to identify political
obligations one must first prove the existence of a viable
political system. This is a familiar view to which
philosophers ^scribe in varying degrees, and it follows on ft-Ur<>■(**
from the paradigm case of obligation outlined above which
relies on the existence of some form of system within which
obigees and beneficiaries function. L
S
To make the classification of obligations dependent on 
context is a wise move. As McPherson points out, reference 
to different types of obligation can be understood in one 
of two ways.64 As is intended here, one might simply be
62 Simmons, op cit., p.29.
63 Flathman, op cit., p. 63.
64 McPherson, op cit., p. 70.
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referring to the variety of contexts within which 
obligations can occur, and the different forms of 
obligatory relationships one can have. This is not the 
same as distinguishing between types of obligation on the 
basis of their moral force, such that certain types of 
obligation would be seen as in some sense superior to 
others. It also allows for the possibility of a common 
strand linking types of obligation that, ostensibly at
least, appear quite different.
It is one thing to state that "clearly, political 
obligation exists only within a political context" 65 but
to add the following, as D'Entreves does, is to go much
further:
If we really want to get rid of political obligation, 
we must get rid of the state altogether, or at any 
rate, deny it any positive value, unmask its
pretences, denounce it as an instrument of oppression, 
as the embodiment of the civitas diaboli parading as 
the civitas dei 66
Such statements suggest that obligations are a constitutive 
element of political society, government or the state. For 
any of these institutions to properly exist it must entail 
the existence of political obligations.
65 A. D'Entreves 'On the Nature of Political 
Obligation', Philosophy, Vol XLIII, No 166, October 1968, 
p .316 .
66 Ibid. , p. 320 .
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That social man has obligations is not an empirical 
fact (which might have been otherwise) that calls for 
explanation or justification. That social man has 
obligations is an analytic, not a synthetic, 
proposition. Thus any general question of the form 
'Why should one accept obligations?' is misconceived. 
'Why should I (a member) accept the rules of the 
club?' is an absurd question. We have not understood 
what it means to be a member of political society if 
we suppose that political obligation is something that 
we might not have had and that therefore needs to be 
justified. 67
To seek a general justification of political 
obligation - a justification of our being obliged at 
all in political society- is to pursue a meaningless 
question. It is to mistake something which is 
analytically connected with the concept of political 
society for something which is a purely empirical fact 
about political societies. 68
McPherson is strongly opposed to this view and claims that 
'a political philosophy can be constructed that neither
i'-
makes explicit use of this concept (obligation) Nor requires  ^
it. '69 But if we accept the assumption for the time being, 
it would appear that an important forerunner to the 
commonly accepted questions concerning political 
obligation, is the question of whether or not a 
state/government/ political society is desirable.
This move is reminiscent of the earlier discussions 
concerning ought-statements, where the sense of a 
prudential ought X depends upon one wanting to achieve Y, 
and, as some would argue, the motivating force of a moral
67 McPherson, op cit., p. 64.
68 Ibid. , p. 65.
69 Ibid., pp. 84-85.
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ought depends upon one wanting to be moral. In this 
context, it is only appropriate to assume that political 
obligations will have to exist if there is a desire for 
political society to exist, and (in order to accommodate 
McPherson's objection), if the existence of political 
obligations is a constitutive element of such a society.
If we were to question, as an anarchist indeed might, the 
desirability of a formalised political state then we would 
need to enquire no further as to the subject of political 
obligations. If, however, we believe political
organisation to be desirable, then we are by D'Entreve's 
account, committed to accepting the existence of such 
obligations as a necessary constituent of the desired 
system. This would render senseless any generalised 
questions about, or demands for justifications of 
political obligation.
To ask why should I obey any laws is to ask whether 
there might be a political society without political 
obligations, which is absurd. For we mean by 
political society, groups of people organized 
according to rules enforced by some of their number.70
While the charge of absurdity may be questionable, the 
message is clear - if we are to accept, and indeed support 
the existence of political society, then we should not 
waste time asking why it is required of me that I obey the
70 M. Macdonald 'The Language of Political Theory' 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, xli, 1940-41, 
p . 92.
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laws. It is absurd to do so in the same way as it is 
absurd to ask why I should aim to score goals if I want my 
team to win at football.
However, this is not generally the form that questions of 
political obligation take, so to dismiss this question as 
senseless does little to solve 'the problem of political 
obligation'.
The answer to 'Why should I obey any law, acknowledge 
the authority of any state or support any government? ' 
is that it is a senseless question. Therefore, any 
attempted reply to it is bound to be senseless.... no 
general criterion applies to every instance. 71
Rather, we are concerned with asking why we should feel 
obliged to obey the particular laws the government 
legislates, and even more fundamentally, why we are obliged 
to obey that particular government? When Flathman states 
that the question most commonly discussed under the rubric 
of political obligation is "should I obey the law?" he 
means the particular law or laws of a particular government 
or state.72 This more specific question cannot be 
dismissed as easily and is indeed at the heart of what any 
theory of political obligation should explain.
71 Ibid., p. 184.
72 Flathman, op cit., p.46.
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For this reason Simmons demands certain special features of 
a theory of political obligation, such that it ensures the 
following points are addressed.73
1. It should explain why an individual has obligations to 
a particular state above all others, rather than seeking to 
establish obligations to a particular type of state.74
2. There need not be only one ground for explaining such 
obligations. As McPherson points out 'obligation to obey 
the government is in reality only a useful shorthand'.75 
As well as explicit agreements of obligation one can be 
seen to create obligations for oneself by for example 
accepting benefits or services.76
3. There need not be universality of political obligation 
over some range of people. What we want to know is what 
class of person is obligated and why/how.77
..a good practical reason for not demanding 
universality is that with this demand in mind, the 
theorist too easily finds grounds of obligation where 
there are none, believing that he must account for 
everyone or despair of accounting for anyone."78
73 Simmons, op cit., pp.29-38.
74 In this Simmons agrees with McPherson's basic 
thesis, cf. MacPherson op cit., Ch 7.
75 Ibid. , p.51.
76 Simmons cites the Crito in which Plato offers three 
distinct groundings for Socrates' obligations to the state 
- an argument from desert because the state was a just 
state, an argument from gratitude for the benefits bestowed 
by the state, and an argument based on Socrates' tacit 
consent to obey the laws. Of course another famous example 
is that offered by Locke in his theory of tacit consent. 
Simmons op cit., p.35.
77 Cf. C. Pateman The Problem of Political Obligation, 
Cambridge, Polity Press, 1985, and C. B. MacPherson The 
Political Theory of Possessive Individualism, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 1962, for two interesting 
discussions of this aspect of the theory.
78 Simmons, op cit., p. 37.
Having listed Simmons's requirements it is worth testing 
the extent to which his demands are met in standard 
discussions of political obligation. Flathman immediately 
alerts us to an abuse of language that all too readily 
occurs when he observes that:
the state assigns a substantial number of 
obligations to all of its citizens, obligations that 
many of the citizens would not undertake if left to 
their own devices.79
Certain commentators feel that political obligations are
taken on by citizens relative to their position as such, in
many ways they seem to make them parallel with positional
duties. By becoming a citizen you take on a number of
duties the content of which is determined by the state.
D'Entreves for example defines the content of one's
political obligation as 'a duty to be a good citizen and to
*respect the laws of ones country or state'. 1
f.
When the obligation is political and takes the bond of 
me as a citizen, and the governing authority as such,
I am tied as a citizen to perform an act, or rather a
number of acts, for the governing authority.81
A number of points arise here. In the light of the 
preceding discussion it is surely only permissible to speak
of positional duties attached to citizenship if the
79 Flathman op cit., p.44. (my emphasis)
80 D'Entreves op cit., p. 312.
81 Ibid.
individual chose in some real sense to become a citizen. 
If it is the case that an individual chose to become a 
citizen, knowing that this committed him or her to 
fulfilling duties X, Y and Z, then initially at least there 
is not a problem.
However, if the state can simply ascribe duties and assign 
obligations, there is little protection in the fact that 
one initially chose freely to become a citizen and accept 
duties X,Y,& Z, as the state appears to be free to add 
further duties A, B & C - some of which the individual may 
not have been prepared to accept. Unlike most forms of 
obligation there is a generality and non-specificity, both 
in terms of whether a particular commitment was made (does 
one explicitly agree to be citizen or understand the 
implications of receiving benefits), and in terms of what 
the commitment entails. Membership of a state is not 
really analogous to membership of a club as is sometimes 
suggested. 82 In fact, one could claim that they only way 
to make the analogy work in most cases is to say that it is 
like being given (without requesting it) irrevocable life 
membership of the dangerous sports club.
Returning to Simmons's second requirement vis positional 
duties, ie. that they do not conflict with what one would 
morally be required to do in the situation. If the state
82 Cf. P. Singer Democracy and Disobedience, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 1973.
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rather than the individual defines the content of political 
obligations, it is at least possible that someone's 
obligations as a citizen will conflict with his or her 
personal moral values. When this occurs the individual may 
feel split between two identities, each of which demands a 
different response to the situation. They may, as a 
citizen, accept a general obligation to obey the laws of 
their government, but as a moral agent they may feel that 
a particular law is unworthy of their allegiance. The 
conflict is therefore one between political obligation and 
moral duty which can only be resolved in terms of deciding 
whether to act morally or prudentially, and how best to do 
so.
Political obligation may and very often does override 
moral scruples whilst moral duty requires us (to use 
the celebrated phrase) never go to sleep, political 
obligation may be a powerful soporific'83
As was the case for obligations in general, being told of 
our political obligations does not necessarily inform us of 
how we ought to behave, nor do our positional duties as 
citizens necessarily exert moral force. As discussed
earlier, moral oughts are the trump card, and the fact that 
our political obligations may be determined for us 
potentially increases the likelihood of there being a 
conflict between what we are obligated to do politically, 
and what we feel we ought to do morally.
83 D'Entreves, op cit., p. 317-8
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Having said this, there is still an expectation of 
performance on the part of the obligee that goes beyond 
that common to most cases of obligation. Unlike an 
obligation to repay a favour which can be easily 
discharged, the obligation to obey a government is seen as 
ongoing. The statement: "I have done my bit I have
fulfilled my obligations" will rarely serve to discharge 
this type of obligation, if as claimed the very existence 
of the political society depends upon the continual 
recognition that such obligations exist.
The only basis for overturning a political obligation seems 
to be to question the manner in which the obligation was 
created or extracted, or alternatively to show that it has 
been overridden by a stronger moral consideration. In 
considering this 'stronger moral consideration' many would 
argue that weight must be given to the thought that 
weakening the force of political obligations ultimately 
weakens the foundations of political society.
The proper form of the question 'Why ought I, a 
subject, to obey his ruler? must at least be: 'Why is 
there a claim on the subject to obey his ruler?' and 
unless we put the question in this form we shall only 
find ourselves in a state of confusion when 
considering whether he ought to obey in instances when 
obedience involves the failure to satisfy certain 
other claims- the question then really being; 'Does 
the claim to obey outweigh the other claims?'84
84 H. A. Prichard 'Moral Obligation' in Moral 
Obligation and Duty and Interest, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 1968, p.86.
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At this point we should perhaps take heed of McPherson's 
warning against 'moralizing' politics.85 The claim to obey 
may outweigh other claims for profoundly prudential 
reasons. Maybe what one ought to do morally is not the 
issue. Political obligations are precisely obligations 
created in order to facilitate the performance of political 
tasks which make life easier in the society one lives in. 
This may on occasion entail accepting obligations to do 
things which one would not be able to justify doing in 
purely moral terms.
It is at least possible that a political society could 
exist in which only a small minority could be shown to have 
political obligations in the sense demanded by an ideal 
type theory - that is self assumed obligations to obey the 
laws of a particular government. It is also possible that 
the vast majority of citizens would be prepared to be 
guided by the duties they are told they have as citizens. 
Political obligations concern the effective management of 
society by government; only in special cases do they 
concern the moral welfare of individual citizens. If we 
leave the picture like this their role will be limited, and 
in terms of a moral hierarchy of demands they are placed 
well below considerations of what one ought to morally 
although of course they may coincide on occasion.
85 MacPherson, op cit., pp. 79-83.
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Political Obligation and Consent
Having established the special nature of political 
obligations, and having admitted the frequent gap between 
the paradigm case of obligation and more ordinary usage 
within a political context, the next task is to attempt to 
close that gap. In order to explain how a political 
obligation may be acquired by a citizen in an active sense, 
as opposed to being merely assumed or imputed by 
government, we must show that the obligation has been 
acquired through some act of will on the part of the 
citizen. Many philosophers attempt to do this by utilising 
the concept of consent or, as Steinberg calls it, 'the 
classic commitment model'86
Consent is frequently offered as the most adequate basis 
for political obligation, especially in the case of non 
trivial obligations which begin to approach the status of 
moral oughts. As a mechanism, consent offers the 
possibility of demonstrating how political obligations are, 
in line with other forms of obligation, the product of 
individual acts of will on the part of those obligated. 
And that the content and extent of ones obligations can, to 
some extent at least, be personally determined, thus 
reducing the likelihood of their conflicting with private 
moral beliefs.
86 J. Steinberg, Locke, Rousseau, and the Idea of 
Consent, Westport & London, Greenwood Press, 1978, p.11.
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The Oxford English Dictionary defines the verb consent as 
'to express willingness, give permission, agree'.87 
However, for consent to play the morally significant role 
demanded here it must display certain basic 
characteristics, not referred to in this definition. Even 
Plamenatz who offers one of the best definitions of consent 
available fails to highlight sufficiently certain basic 
requirements:
The expression of desire which constitutes a proper 
case of consent must be a real grant of permission, 
that is to say it must be made with the intention of 
informing another or others that they have been 
endowed with the right to perform a certain action.88
Plamenatz correctly emphasises the intentionality that must 
be proven in a real case of consent, and this will be 
discussed below. His definition is also helpful in 
indicating what is actually achieved through the giving of 
consent, ie. the creation of rights in another party and 
presumably, an obligation on the part of the consenter to 
allow those rights to be exercised. He at least begins to 
separate consent from mere agreement or acquiescence. 
However, his definition fails to capture the further 
features required for a 'proper case of consent'.
87 Concise Oxford Dictionary, p. 200.
88 J. Plamenatz, Consent, Freedom and Political 
Obligation, Oxford, Oxford University Press, (Second 
Edition) 1968, p.9.
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For reasons which will be discussed below a true act of 
consent will be understood here as:
an intentional grant of permission given freely by an 
autonomous rational agent, on the basis of full and 
accurate information.
This is the paradigm case of consent, and included within 
this definition of consent are the demands that it be:
a) freely given,
b ) autonomous,
c) intentional and,
d) informed.
These features are frequently offered as extra descriptions 
- freely given consent, fully informed consent - but here 
they are taken to be constitutive elements of the concept. 
This immediately makes the definition much stricter than it 
might otherwise have been, and restricts both the class of 
people capable of giving consent, the class of actions 
correctly interpreted as acts of consent, and, it will be 
argued, the situations in which it is appropriate to 
request consent. By adhering to this strict definition one 
is forced to acknowledge Plamenatz's warning that
If then the final definition appears so narrow as to 
make it appear that no actual government ever acts 
with the consent of even a majority of them (it's
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citizens), it is not permissible, for that reason to 
conclude that the definition is wrong.89
To fill out the definition of consent and construct a more 
accurate picture of the paradigm case these defining 
features must be further explained.
Freedom and Consent
The demand that a proper case of consent is freely given 
may be interpreted in a number of ways, and immediately 
raises at least two interesting questions:
1. Does freely-given consent imply freedom of the will?90
Freedom of the individual operates at two levels - at the 
level of the will and at the level of actions proceeding 
from the will. The agent may be free in the sense that he 
has free will, or it may be that the actions he wills have 
been causally determined. This second scenario raises the 
metaphysical question as to whether someone can be 
determined, and at the same time act freely. And, most 
interestingly within this context, whether a voluntarist
89 Ibid. , p. 1.
90 This issue will be explored in Chapter 3, in which 
I shall consider whether Hobbes' determinism is compatible 
with a theory of political obligation based on free choice 
and individual consent.
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based explanation of obligations can operate successfully 
within a deterministic framework.
2. Putting aside for a moment questions concerned with the 
freedom of the will, the question remains as to what extent 
someone is free to do as they will, whether that will is 
determined or not. The agent may not be. free in the sense 
that there are external or internal obstacles in the way of 
his acting as he chooses/wills. This is a particularly 
important issue within a political context where power and 
coercion appear to be largely unavoidable realities.
This second aspect of individual freedom must be approached 
from two angles-
First, we must assess the freedom of the individuals asked 
to give consent, essentially looking to identify any 
internal obstacles to their free choice. Secondly, we must 
investigate the particular circumstances/context within 
which consent has been requested, in order to establish 
whether they are conducive to a free choice being made.
The first form of enquiry would assess the ability of the 
individual to give, or withhold, consent freely in a normal 
situation. This requires an assessment of the extent to 
which they are naturally able, or may be assisted towards
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becoming able, to make free and rational choices.91 The 
second form of enquiry would look at when, where and how 
the consent was requested, in order to establish whether 
the circumstances in any way diminish the ability of the 
individual to choose freely.92
Freedom, Autonomy, and Consent
Essentially the first form of enquiry outlined above is 
concerned with the relationship between freedom and 
individual autonomy. It must be established that an act of 
consent - if it is really such - is purely the result of an 
individual free choice and not of coercion, be it subtle or 
blatant. One way of diminishing the risk of coercion or 
undue influence is to request consent only from those who 
are thought to be sufficiently rational and autonomous to 
resist undue influence, and to do so only in situations 
where they have - or can be equipped with - the information 
and means required to make a rational judgement and a free 
choice.
Thus the first step in establishing whether an individual 
is free in the sense of being able to give or withhold
91 This issue will be explored further in Chapter 2 of 
the thesis where I shall look at the status of men emerging 
from an Hobbesian state of nature and ask whether they can 
be considered free in the sense required here.
92 This issue arises again in the discussions in 
Chapter 3 of the thesis.
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consent on the basis of their own will, is to find out 
whether or not that person is equipped to make a rational 
choice. While the problems associated with requesting and 
acquiring consent from those who cannot be classified as 
conscious or rational are obvious, it cannot be assumed 
that acquiring consent from apparently rational individuals 
will be unproblematic. There may still be less obvious 
problems in terms of assessing autonomy and individual 
rational capabilities, which will inevitably vary 
enormously between individuals and across issues.
It would appear however that a minimum level of rationality 
is a necessary prerequisite to an individual's ability to 
participate in any consenting process. An interesting 
question then arises concerning the level at which this 
minimum requirement should be set. One's intuitions surely 
suggest that the level will vary given the importance and 
complexity of the issues involved, but that unless an 
appropriate level of rationality can be shown to exist it 
is improper to construct situations which depend on 
individual consent. So for example a child may be given 
complete autonomy in terms of deciding between two 
children's videos selected in advance, but would not be 
thought sufficiently rational to choose between the whole 
range of adult and children's films offered in a video 
store.
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Nonetheless, in setting limits one could assume a very 
liberal attitude towards the question of autonomy, and 
state that anyone who in neither a child nor an idiot 
should be regarded as autonomous, and be afforded freedom 
to choose accordingly. The test of autonomy might then be 
the ability to give reasons for one's choices (even if the 
reasons don't seem very good), or the ability to act 
independently of others.
Definitions of autonomy have often stressed the idea of 
substantive independence, particularly when individual 
autonomy is pitched against control or influence by others. 
For example a frequently cited article on the subject 
states that being autonomous is equivalent to being 
"independent minded" and, that autonomy exists when "what 
he (the autonomous agent) thinks and does cannot be 
explained without reference to his own activity of mind."93 
Such definitions of autonomy seem initially appropriate to 
discussions of consent, the problems arise when one goes on 
to consider the obligations to which the consent gives 
rise.
What is essential to the person's remaining autonomous 
is that in any given case his mere recognition that a 
certain action is required by a law does not settle 
the question of whether he will do it.94
93 R.S. Downie & E. Telfer "Autonomy" Philosophy 46, 
1971, p.301.
94 T. Scanlon, "A Theory of Freedom of Expression", 
Philosophy and Public Affairs 1, Winter 1972, p.215.
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The problem with this view is that if it is taken to its 
logical extreme it prevents the concepts of autonomy and 
obligation ever working successfully together. To quote 
Robert Wolff 'a promise to abide by the will of the 
majority creates an obligation, but it does so precisely by 
giving up one's autonomy'.95 It should be possible to make 
the idea of obligation and autonomy work together, but to 
do so we have to separate the notions of independence and 
autonomy, and say something about autonomy that 
distinguishes it more clearly from individual liberty.
For this purpose Gerald Dworkin's discussion of autonomy is 
invaluable. For Dworkin,
.... autonomy is conceived of as a second-order 
capacity of persons to reflect critically upon their 
first-order preferences, desires, wishes, and so forth 
and the capacity to accept or attempt to change these 
in light of higher order preferences and values. By 
exercising such a capacity, persons define their 
nature, give meaning and coherence to their lives and 
take responsibility for the kind of person they are.96
The distinction between first and second-order desires is 
frequently employed in moral philosophy, first-order 
desires being those which spring most obviously from an 
agent's impulsive basic beliefs about what he or she wants. 
So for example someone may have a persistent first-order
95 R. Wolff, In Defence of Anarchism, New York, Harper 
& Row, 1970 pp.14,41.
96 G. Dworkin The Theory and Practice of Autonomy, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989, p.20.
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desire to smoke twenty cigarettes a day. However, he or 
she may also have a more rational second-order desire to 
give up smoking because it is bad for his or her health. 
Dworkin claims that an autonomous individual will be aware 
of this second level of desires, and will refer to them 
when making choices.97
Dworkin's concept of autonomy thus has the advantage of 
allowing an autonomous person to choose to give up their 
independence in certain areas, as long as they do so for 
what can be shown to be appropriate/rational reasons. So 
for example a citizen may autonomously choose to give up 
specific aspects of his own independence in the hope of 
promoting a general good which goes beyond his particular 
interests. Or, to use a different kind of example, a 
patient may rationally choose to give up a certain degree 
of independence and control to a physician because he feels 
that the expert will be better able to satisfy his needs.
This definition of autonomy is particularly useful in the 
present context because it focuses on the nature of 
choices, as well as the agent's ability to choose 
appropriately. Rather than pronouncing an individual 
autonomous in a very general sense 98 and assuming such a
97 Ibid. , p. 15.
98 Dworkin utilises the concept of 'personhood' in his 
definition, and attributes autonomy to persons only to 
beings with this status. Given that some humans will not 
be persons (and some animals may be persons) it is not 
possible to say all humans are autonomous, or even capable
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capacity from there on, it demands that we establish 
whether the particular choices of individuals or groups are 
autonomous in the sense given here."
So, in terms of political obligations, individuals do not 
forfeit their autonomy if they consent to accept particular 
obligations for what can generally be accepted as rational 
reasons. This is true even if we have to accept that their 
level of independence or individual liberty may have be 
reduced as a result of doing so. Of course we must then 
enter a debate concerning what we will allow to count as 
rational reasons, but we shall leave this question aside 
for the time being.
Freedom, Coercion and Consent
Moving to the second form of consideration, the situation 
or circumstances within which consent is requested are 
significant to questions of freedom because they can do 
much to explain why an individual decides to give or 
withhold consent. It maybe sufficient to pronounce a
of being so. First we need to establish their personhood, 
and then we must evaluate their autonomy.
99 As previously stated, this issue will be explored in 
Chapter 2 in which Hobbes's state of nature will be 
discussed. Some commentators claim that it is impossible 
to assume that men of the type Hobbes describes in this 
account will be able - let alone willing - to come together 
and form the original contract. In order to argue that 
they will, they must be shown to be - to some extent at 
least - autonomous, free and able to understand the 
consequences of their actions.
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choice autonomous to show that the chooser has referred to 
an appropriate second-order desire, but it does not 
necessarily ensure that the choice was also free in the 
sense of uncoerced. To establish this fact we have to 
explore the concept of motive.
Some contemporary theorists take their cue from Hobbes and 
claim that motives are irrelevant to the validity of 
consent, and to a certain extent this is true. For example 
it is irrelevant to the fact that I consented to my 
daughter eating a chocolate bar that I did so because I 
wanted her to feel sick. My rather strange motive in this 
instance being prompted by a desire to teach her a lesson 
about greed. However, in a situation where the motive for 
consenting to something is to avoid death or torture, the 
validity of my consent may surely come into question if my 
motives became known.100
For consent to be valid, there must be a real opportunity 
for choice. The existence of such an opportunity is 
dependent upon the status of the consenter as discussed 
above and the situation in which they find themselves. The 
situation must afford circumstances conducive to a free 
choice being made between reasonable alternatives. If one 
of the alternatives is necessarily overriding the 'choice' 
may not have been free in a real sense.
100 Hence Hart's dissatisfaction with the Austinian 
style command theory.
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Motive becomes relevant if my consent is determined by a 
motive from which I can not reasonably be expected to fail 
to act. This may be the case either because it is a motive 
that cannot rationally be ignored, or because it is a 
motive imposed upon me by a condition such as addiction or 
psychosis. For consent to be real an individual must be 
able to refuse or accept a proposition, and in such cases 
this opportunity does not in practice exist.
Intentionality and Consent
Having discussed the requirements relating to freedom as an 
integral component of consent we must now consider 
intentionality. All adequate definitions of consent 
require that the consenter must know that his or her action 
will be understood as a sign of consent, and that the 
consenter should intend the (predictable) consequences that 
follow on from his or her consent.
Questions of intentionality become particularly important 
if one acknowledges the possibility of tacit as well as 
express consent. If consent is to be based on anything 
other than an express act of consenting, then the agent 
must still be aware of the significance of his or her act, 
and should understand it as a signal of his or her consent, 
given for that express purpose. The tacit 'expression' of 
a wish does not exclude the need for intentionality.
To what extent we are willing to assert that A (some action 
other than an express case of consent) implies C (that one 
has consented to accept certain obligations) is a very 
important question, particularly given Locke's theory of 
tacit consent, which appears to abandon the requirement of 
intentionality.
Simmons states that if one is to allow for the existence of 
tacit consent, then the individual consenter must:
a. be aware of the significance attached to his/her acts
b. be in a position to act otherwise without too much 
hardship - so for example if I stay in my own country 
instead of emigrating, we must consider the cost to me of 
leaving before deciding that I have thereby consented to 
accept the obligations attached to my remaining.
c . have some personal involvement with the consenting 
process 101
If any of these conditions are not met, then consent as 
properly understood has not been given. For tacit consent 
to perform the same function as express consent the only 
permissible difference must be in terms of expression.102
One could at this point return to the example of the dinner 
party invitations discussed above, and test it against 
Simmons's requirements. It could be argued that whether or
101 Simmons, op cit., pp.95-100.
102 For a useful (though not necessarily correct) 
discussion of what might count as tacit consent see 
Plamenatz, op cit.
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not accepting an invitation entails accepting an obligation 
to reciprocate is culturally determined. If this is the 
case and my partner is not of my culture we could conclude 
that he did not know he was creating an obligation for 
himself, and should not therefore be assumed to have done 
so. I accepted the invitation on his behalf, thus 
excluding him from the consenting process as far as it 
exists, another of Simmons's requirements would fall by the 
way. My partner's position would be particularly 
lamentable if he had not wanted to go in the first place, 
and had only done so because of the serious repercussions 
I threatened.
Plamenatz argues enthusiastically that voting in an 
election constitutes tacit consent,103 but once again the 
question of intentionality is surely important, especially 
given the idea that voting can on occasions be used as a 
form of protest.104
103 Plamenatz, op cit., pp. 1-26.
11)4 There are many examples one could choose to 
illustrate this point, one of the most powerful being the 
support given to IRA hunger striker Bobby Sands when he 
stood for the British Parliament he was committed to 
overthrowing. It is difficult to argue that a vote cast 
for such a candidate was in fact a vote of support for the 
British Government that was elected, and for the values it 
stood for.
Information and Consent
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Finally a very practical question. To be in a position to 
consent one must first of all be aware of the existence of 
a choice where one exists. This may begin by sounding 
rather obvious, but it raises interesting questions within 
a political context, where those with power can effectively 
silence those who are offering a radically alternative 
agenda. We have to ask whether an individual has truly 
consented to be governed within a closely specified 
political ideology and system if that system has 
effectively deprived them of any accurate information 
concerning alternative options. Unless we are satisfied 
with the idea of the happy (ignorant) slave we must surely 
demand that consent be closely associated with choice, and 
that choice be facilitated by free, full and accurate 
information.
Appropriate information is also crucial to my deliberations 
over whether or not to consent. In a medical context my 
consent to an operation is invalidated if I have not been 
adequately informed of the risks attached to the procedure. 
Similarly, my consent to be governed could be invalidated 
if the government in question has been dishonest about 
their intentions once in power. In practice governments 
are given considerable leeway in terms of reinterpreting 
political manifestos, excused in part by the contingencies
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of political life, but certain standards do have to be set.
It is also worth noting that the manner in which 
information is given can do much to facilitate or obstruct 
the consenting process. As will be shown below, 
information can be presented in such a way as to make its 
message irresistible, thus calling into question whether 
choices made on the basis of such information are motivated 
by rational autonomous deliberation, or determined by the 
force of rhetoric.105
Consenting
Some of the examples already given suggest that consent may 
award a person or institution other than the consenter 
rights they did not previously have. For example, by 
consenting to medical treatment we grant the doctor the 
right to do things which, in the absence of consent, would 
be interpreted as battery or assault. However, in some 
cases this is only one side of the story. Once consent 
has been given the consenter may also acquire certain 
obligations which are necessary to enable the other person 
or institution to exercise their newly acquired rights. In
105 All these points will be taken up in Chapter Three, 
and are therefore only dealt with briefly here.
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the present context these obligations and the conditions in 
which they arise are of particular interest.
In discussions of consent and obligation the idea of a 
'promise' is frequently invoked. In practical terms 
consenting is taken to be equivalent to promising, a 
practice which is often interpreted in a profoundly Kantian 
manner.1116 If one makes a promise (consents) one is then 
obligated to do that which one has promised to do. If one 
consents to accept an obligation, or if one consents to 
something which indirectly entails certain obligations, one 
is required to fulfil them. You are obligated precisely 
because you have consented.
This interpretation of consent is fraught with 
difficulties, and indeed reveals some of the limitations of 
the concept.
To explain. If consent is understood as analogous to 
making a promise, then we have to establish why it is 
thought that promises should be kept before we can 
understand how consent works. We may well share Hume's 
scepticism on this question.107 If however we follow the
1(16 Kant uses the example of 'lying promises' to 
illustrate the working of the categorical imperative, cf. 
Kant op cit., p.92.
107 Cf. D. Hume 'Of the Original Contract' in C.W. 
Hendel (ed) Political Essays, Library of Liberal Arts, New 
York, Bobs-Merrill, 1953.
It
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Kantian line and state that the categorical imperative 
demands that one does not 'make lying promises', it becomes 
impossible to universalise the maxim that one should make 
lying promises. This is in itself uncontroversial. 
However, we would then have to universalise the maxim that 
promises must be kept, irrespective of the consequences of 
doing so, and, presumably, irrespective of the content of 
the promise. The justification is presented as purely 
deontological, but cannot remain so for long, as Kant's 
discussion of his example illustrates.108
It is much easier to explain why one should not make a 
promise knowing that one cannot fulfil it, than it is to 
explain why, once made all promises should be kept. Carole 
Pateman warns against over-philosophising the problem.109 
Promising, she argues, is a social practice in which the 
idea that once made, promises (generally) ought to be kept 
is implicit. It is only difficult to understand why 
promises ought to be kept if one does not recognise them as 
social practices. Indeed, the social practice of promising 
can only continue to exist so long as promissees can be 
fairly confident that promisers will remain true to their 
word. Given that it is a useful social practice, good
reasons exist for seeking to ensure that this is the case.
Pateman's analysis is not dissimilar to that offered by
108 Kant op cit., p. 92.
109 Pateman, The Problem of Political Obligation, p.
14 f f.
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rule-utilitarians who would point to the social utility of 
promising to argue that in most cases promises should be 
kept.
However, Pateman still doubts whether it is really 
appropriate to see consent and promises as analogous. She 
believes that a promise is the purest form of a 
self-assumed obligation because one actually determines the 
content of one's promises. Ostensibly this seems to be an 
accurate observation, many promises are voluntarily offered 
and the terms are clearly set by the promiser - 'If you go 
to bed now I will read you a story'. However, promises can 
also be extracted - 'If I go to bed now, will you promise 
to read me a story?' Unless the parent renegotiates, in 
the second example the terms of the promise have been set 
by the promisee. Similarly, certain organisations make 
particular promises a condition of membership - 'I promise 
that I will do my best, do my duty to God, serve the Queen, 
help other people and keep the Brownie guide law.'
Just as we may consent to conditions or obligations which 
someone else poses, so we may promise to fulfil other 
people's requests or demands. Perhaps what worries Pateman 
is an issue more specific to consent within a political 
context than consent per se. Some acts of consent create 
very specific rights and obligations. For example, as 
argued above, consenting to become the coach for a netball 
team creates obligations tied to the training of the team.
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Again, one frequently consents to a pre-existing list of 
duties, so although the obligation is freely accepted, it 
is not freely created because the content of what one is 
obligated to do has been set by someone else. The netball 
coach could of course make her consent conditional upon 
altering the received duties of the coach in some way, for 
example by getting rid of the requirement that she attend 
all post-match social events. Or, if she was in a 
particularly strong position she might entirely rewrite the 
job description, but this need not be the case. One way or 
another it is fairly easy to discover exactly what one is 
obligated to do, and it may also be possible to make 
changes.
Consenting to political rule is generally seen to entail 
acceptance of a much more general obligation to obey the 
laws of a particular government, and the dictates that make 
political rule effective. Furthermore, the rights acquired 
by government are wide-ranging and open to vast 
interpretation. Only at the establishment of a new 
political order might the consenters be able to determine 
the specific content of their obligations. And only when 
they are asked to renew their consent do they have a formal 
opportunity to demand change. In the worst-case scenario, 
consenting to obey a government appears to be as open-ended 
as promising to do whatever that government asks of you (so 
long as it is necessary to enable them to do their job) .
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However, there is much that can be done to modify this 
position.
Leaving these doubts behind for the present, we must still 
consider the ways in which promising and consenting are or 
can be similar. Making a promise is a rational process, by 
which an agent chooses to commit herself to the performance 
of certain actions, or to fulfilling a goal which will 
necessitate certain as yet unspecified actions. By
consenting the agent is also rationally considering whether 
to accept a proposition or list of commitments set down by 
someone else. It is the fact that he or she has consented 
or promised which explains why he or she is bound to 
perform the action promised, or fulfil the obligations 
consented to. In both cases understanding the link between 
promising/consenting and commitment is an integral part of 
the rational process involved.
So far the binding nature of consent has been discussed 
purely by analogy to the binding effect of promising. 
Nothing has yet been said of how the content of what one
consents to do might effect the situation. It is only
because one has consented to do so that one is required to 
do X, nothing has been said of the nature of the act X, 
whether one ought to do this thing in itself, and indeed 
whether one might not have a duty not to do it. To speak
of consent in this way is to utilise it as a purely
abstract concept.
91
[
i
Unless one clings to the strict Kantian position outlined 
above, it is generally accepted that although one must 
intend to fulfil one's commitment at the moment of 
promising, one is sometimes free to reassess at a later 
point whether one ought to follow it through. Individuals 
differ concerning the extent to which they feel it is ever 
right to break a promise, even if it is generally thought 
to be intrinsically bad to do so. All would agree that the 
action of breaking a promise requires justification, and 
that the reasons given for failing to fulfil a commitment 
must be powerful. One should be able to show that the new 
course of action is morally preferable rather than simply 
a more convenient option. An act-utilitarian would have 
little difficulty with the idea of breaking a promise so 
long as the consequences of doing so brought about more 
utility than pursuing the option of keeping the promise. 
But even a non-utilitarian can have some leeway.
We have so far argued that consent creates obligations, and 
obligations generally ought to be fulfilled. However, if 
the content of those obligations does not coincide with 
what an agent ought to do morally, the fact that the agent 
has consented is not in itself a good enough reason to 
upset the moral hierarchy established above. The 
obligations taken on may be trumped by other more demanding 
obligations, or by the discovery of other decisive reasons 
dictating how one ought to behave. Thus the content of
92
what the agent has consented to do is relevant to the 
binding force of that consent.
This is not to say that the object of consent always has a 
moral content - indeed many issues of consent will be 
profoundly pragmatic and prudential. In these cases the 
fact that the agent has consented, or promised, to do X 
should ordinarily be taken as a decisive reason for doing 
X. The subsequent discovery of prudential reasons for not 
doing X is not usually sufficient to override the moral 
force of having promised to do so (unless of course one is 
an act utilitarian). So for example if a mother promises 
to take her children to the park, and then realises there 
is a play on the radio that she would like to listen to,
this does not seem a good enough reason in itself to renege
on her promise (despite the utilitarian's claims).
However, there may be cases in which a change of
circumstances after a promise has been made can make it 
unreasonable to demand that the promise be kept. Consider, 
for example, a case in which a woman offers her kidney for 
transplant so that her daughter can come off dialysis 
treatment. If in the time between consenting to be a donor 
and the actual operation one of the woman's own kidneys 
fails, then it would seem unreasonable to insist that she 
donate her healthy kidney simply because she had promised 
to do so. In other words, one might have to ask 'did A
consent to X, and now given change of circumstance C, is it 
still reasonable to expect her to do X?'
Similarly, the mere fact that the agent has consented to do 
certain things does not in itself make them morally 
acceptable* "i his point has already been raised but now it 
must be explored further. Most liberal consent theories 
restrict the extent to which one is free to consent by 
making certain rights inalienable, and certain actions 
impermissible, irrespective of consent. Beyond certain 
limits moral acceptability must be determined by something
f
other than the individuals willingness to consent. 
Questions then arise over the extent to which such 
restrictions can be built in without threatening the basic 
individualistic features of the theory.
Recently in Britain academic and press attention has 
focused on the issues surrounding sado-masochistic sexual 
acts between consenting adults, but one could also consider 
the issues of surrogacy and euthanasia. In each of these 
areas the state has decreed certain acts unacceptable, and 
the fact that autonomous rational adults willingly choose 
to participate in them does not effect their official 
status as illegal and/or immoral.
These examples suggest that two quite separate questions 
should be asked. First, has A consented to X, and then, is
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X morally acceptable/legal?110 If the answer to the second 
question is no, then consent becomes irrelevant or maybe 
even incriminating.
Steinberg represents this issue as a conflict between the 
deontological and teleological models of consent.111 In 
other words, between the belief that when we consent we 
should be free to do as we choose (or conversely bound to 
do what one has consented to do) , and the belief that 
consent should facilitate moral outcomes, thus making the 
fact of what one consents to relevant. By adhering to the 
strict definition of consent offered here it is possible 
that this conflict will be rendered less problematic .
To explain, if consent is understood as 'an intentional 
granting of permission given freely on the basis of full 
and accurate information by an autonomous and rational 
agent' (p. 71), then it could be argued that consent has
only been given if the individual in question rationally 
considers both the content of what she is consenting to, 
and the consequences of giving or withholding consent. The 
process of deliberation that must precede a proper case of 
consent may not always establish whether what the agent is
110 This question raises interesting issues concerning 
the nature and appropriate status of public morality, but 
they are unfortunately beyond the scope of the present 
enquiry.
111 Steinberg op cit., p. 13.
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consenting to is also what he or she ought to do, but at 
least there is the opportunity to decide.
A proper case of consent will be accompanied by reasons 
that the consenter can provide as a justification for 
making their decision. These reasons should refer to 
either the prudential or moral rectitude of doing that 
which is proposed. There should therefore be two bases for 
accepting obligations arising out of consent. First an 
active appreciation that one's consent is a committing 
action, and second the holding of good independent reasons 
for doing that which one has consented to do.
To pull all these strands together. Consent is by its very 
nature a committing action. By consenting the agent 
commits herself either to allow certain rights to be 
exercised or to fulfil certain obligations. However, the 
fact that an agent has consented is not sufficient in 
itself to determine that the thing consented to is morally 
right. The agent might become obligated to perform morally 
unacceptable acts, or might consent to engage in 
illegal/immoral practices. Even in situations where that 
which one has consented to is not of dubious character, 
because consent creates obligations as opposed to moral 
duties or oughts, reasons could emerge which determine that 
the agent ought not to do that which she has consented to 
do.
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To make the fact of consent decisive the agent must find a 
way of making what she consents to do and what she ought to 
do coincide. This would be particularly difficult in a 
political context where immediate pre-occupations would 
more often be pragmatic rather than ethical. We might 
therefore have to accept that consent and the obligations 
arising from it might have a less fundamental role within 
an ethical political system than might initially be 
assumed.112 Our consent creates our political obligations 
but these obligations may have little to do with the 
broader ethical, as opposed to political, welfare of the 
society in question.
Given the potentially limited effect ascribed to consent 
here, we arrive at the question of why it has proved so 
popular a concept, and why in the face of adversity, 
political philosophers continue to work with this 
'attractive but difficult theory'.
Consent as Ideology
It has been suggested by some commentators that 
consent-based theories are highly ideological and 
attractive only within a very particular philosophical/ 
political context. Carole Pateman for example believes
112 This idea will be developed further in Chapter 4 
when I re-evaluate the role of consent within Locke's 
political theory.
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that the advent of consent is a profoundly modern 
phenomena, and that theorists are mistaken when they try to 
discuss classical equivalents.113 Consent, as a primarily 
political concept, was born alongside a particular 
political ideology - the market-oriented liberal view of 
society, which presents man in terms of abstract 
individualism, characterised by C.B. Macpherson as 
"possessive individualism".114
It is not difficult to see why consent is favoured within 
the liberal democratic tradition, especially considering 
the fundamental assumptions of the liberal democratic 
model.
Simmons offers the following list of assumptions as 
integral to the classic model of a liberal democratic 
state. It is of course a simplified approach, but it will 
suffice in this context:115
1. Man in his natural (pre-governmental) state is free, and 
is the bearer of certain natural rights.116
2. Man's natural freedom is a good unto himself.
113 Pateman, op cit., p. 2.
114 Macpherson, op cit..
115 Simmons, op cit., pp. 62-70.
116 Natural rights will give rise to correlative duties 
which will be the moral duties discussed above.
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3. Given the assumption that man's natural freedom is a 
good unto himself, man only gives up this freedom by 
clearly signalling that he wishes to do so.
4. The state is an instrument for serving the interests of 
its citizens.
According to the classic liberal accounts man in the state 
of nature is born free, although this freedom is 
'naturally' restricted by his having been born under the 
laws of nature. The extent to which these laws are 
effective varies between accounts. In terms of the 
preceding discussion, these natural restrictions can be 
interpreted as the moral oughts (and natural moral duties) 
which form the bottom line in terms of moral reasons for 
action. Any further restrictions on man's liberty 
(including special duties and obligations) are artificially 
created and therefore their origin and legitimacy have to 
be explained. Man is also taken to have certain rights of 
which he cannot later be rightly denied - natural 
inalienable rights.
As previously indicated, opinions differ as to whether the 
notion of inalienable rights sits happily within a liberal 
framework which stresses the importance of voluntarism and 
of individual (negative) liberty. Allowing for their 
existence means that autonomous individuals find themselves 
barred from certain choices even with respect to 
self-regarding actions. Effectively the framework ensures 
that consent is made redundant in certain important areas 
of life.
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Naturally these liberal assumptions are open to criticism. 
Concerning the first, that man is naturally free, some 
might wish to question the degree to which it is possible 
to make accurate statements about man in his natural 
state.117 Nevertheless, this aside it is at least possible 
to interpret the assumption that man is naturally free as 
a value-free statement of fact. However, the assumption 
that this freedom is necessarily a good thing is profoundly 
ideological, more so because of the way in which freedom is 
usually defined in this context.
Freedom/liberty is a positive 'buzz word' in all 
ideologies, and it is not therefore surprising that man's 
original liberty is presented as 'a good thing'. However, 
one cannot deduce from this that all restrictions of that 
liberty are necessarily a 'bad thing', nor can one make 
simple assumptions about what such liberty entails. As 
stated in the classic liberal model the laws of nature 
ensure that we do not start from a position of complete 
licence, and there is the possibility at least that further 
restrictions might also be justifiable.
However, the liberal democratic model also assumes that up 
to a certain point, more freedom is better than less. One 
has to ensure that movements away from the acceptable 
starting point of equal natural liberty are similarly
117 Such objections will be dealt with in more detail in 
Chapter 2.
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acceptable. If x is good, attempts to diminish A's 
enjoyment of x can only be justified
1. in the interests of promoting other goods for A,
2. if A's enjoyment of x substantially threatens B's 
enjoyment of x, or B's enjoyment of other substantial 
goods, or,
3. if it can be shown that beyond a certain point x fails 
to be good.
Consent is introduced in an attempt to ensure that each 
individual is amenable to the restrictions placed upon his 
or her natural liberty. If the strict definition 
introduced above is utilised consent will be given to a 
restriction only if any of 1, 2, and 3 can be shown to
hold.
Within a social context competing freedoms can produce 
negative results for some or maybe even all. Individuals 
will therefore be able to accept rationally that - at a 
certain level at least - their freedom must be restricted. 
However, interesting and ideological questions then arise 
about which it may not be as easy to gain agreement. For 
example what can be taken to compete with liberty as a good 
on equal terms? At what point does individual liberty stop 
being a good thing? To what extent can individuals be 
expected to sacrifice some of their liberty in the 
interests of others? To what extent can an individual be 
required to sacrifice his or her liberty in the interests
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of goods that they do not initially prize more highly? 
Indeed what does one mean by liberty?
Some of these questions are subsidiary to the current 
enquiry, however the final one concerning the actual 
meaning of liberty is of great importance. According to 
MacCallum 118, all meaningful statements concerning freedom 
take the following form:
Freedom of A from B to do or be C.
In the interpretation most commonly employed within a 
liberal framework A, the agent, is most simply individual 
man as governed by his desires etc., Bs are external (less 
often internal) obstacles placed in the way of the agent 
doing as he desires, and C is an end state that the agent 
wishes to achieve - usually something as straightforward as 
being happy.
Within a political context it might be read as thus: Agent 
A's (a citizen's) freedom depends on his being unhindered 
by obstacles B (Taxes, laws, paternalistic interference) 
placed by government in the path of C (living life in the 
way he wishes).
118 G. MacCallum, 'Negative and Positive Freedom', 
Philosophical Review, LXXVI, 1967.
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A man will judge himself free to the extent to which the 
government allows him to look after himself - which 
includes making his own mistakes - and seeks to govern his 
behaviour only to an extent which he accepts as reasonable 
and beneficial. Restrictions which seek to enforce 
fundamental moral oughts are non-controversial and 
non-negotiable, beyond that restrictions have to be 
justified and accepted. If one interprets freedom in this 
way, then there is a very obvious and important place for 
consent.
It is of course possible to interpret this triadic 
relationship from another perspective and come up with what 
has been called a positive notion of liberty.119 By this 
interpretation, A the agent is not simply a man subject to 
his desires, but a free autonomous man governed by reason. 
The image of a divided self is often invoked and the free 
agent (A) is the one governed by 'his rational or real 
self'. The obstacles (B) to his freedom could in fact be 
products of the type of negative freedom discussed above. 
Finally, the end state to be achieved is not necessarily 
what the agent desires, but rather has more to do with 
achieving states of rationality and virtue - how one ought 
to be. As such, freedom will not be as naturally opposed 
to law, obligation and duty as the negative libertarians 
assume. Indeed freedom in this positive sense may be
119 I. Berlin, 'Two Concepts of Liberty', in Four Essays 
on Liberty, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1969.
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enhanced by restrictions upon negative liberty. 
Furthermore, the role for individual consent may be 
severely restricted given that individuals may not be in a 
position to understand how best to promote their liberty. 
There is even the possibility of forcing people to be free.
As mentioned above, if one adopts a negative interpretation 
of liberty, laws and obligations necessarily limit 
individual freedom, so where they exist it must be the case 
that one or more of the reasons stated above can be offered 
in justification. Furthermore, the individualism inherent 
in the liberal model dictates that it is not enough that 
the citizens be told that such reasons exist. Rather, 
individuals must give a clear sign that they acknowledge 
the need for the restrictions and wish them to exist.
Voluntarism is therefore a necessary component of the 
liberal position, bringing together freedom and commitment. 
For an individual's freedom to be restricted it must be 
shown to be done for reasons that he is willing to accept. 
This is achieved by stressing the voluntarist nature of 
individual obligations and commitments, whereby any 
restrictions and obstacles to his liberty which take this 
form are consistent with the overall freedom of the 
individual.
Government as a significant source of constraint upon 
individual freedom must be voluntarily instituted by the
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people, and the form and remit of that government must be 
consistent with man's fundamental liberties. The state is 
an instrument for serving the interests of its citizens, 
and for as long as it remains so, then its citizens are 
obligated to obey its laws. If the state neglects or 
deliberately ignores its duties, or misinterprets its role 
in relation to its citizens, then the binding nature of its 
citizen's obligations to it may be called into question. 
Judgements as to whether or not this is the case rest with 
the citizens.
Sovereigns are no longer accepted as ruling by divine right 
or natural order, and political rule is seen as an 
artificial imposition upon the lives of previously free 
men. It must be willed by those men to be acceptable, and 
the form and extent of government must be clearly 
demarcated to make it legitimate. Indeed, at least one 
contemporary theorist has chosen to characterise the entire 
body of liberal social contract theory in terms of the 
relationship between will and legitimacy.120
Given this basic model it is easy to see how consent fits 
the bill. Consent is the 'clear sign' that must be given 
when individual freedom is restricted, and the process of 
consent must protect the individual from possible injury by 
those who require such restrictions, ie. the government.
120 Cf. P. Riley, Will and Political Legitimacy, 
Boston, Cambridge Mass., Harvard University Press, 1982.
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It also sets the tone for the relationship between citizen 
and state whereby the citizen consciously consents to the 
rule of the sovereign body, instead of simply obeying or 
acquiescing. By making rule dependent on consent, the 
government is forced to recognise its citizenry as 
autonomous individuals.
A paradigm case of consent in a liberal political framework 
would be profoundly individualistic and would attempt to 
reconcile individual freedom and political rule. Unlike 
earlier theories of political obligation, a theory based on 
consent would logically lead to a contractual arrangement 
between ruler and ruled, with duties and obligations on 
both sides being clearly stated. A greater emphasis on 
legitimacy and accountability is also assumed, and 
frequently though not necessarily, the preferred model of 
government would be a representative form of democracy. 
That is one which ensures a continuing, although not 
necessarily direct role for the individual citizen in the 
process of government. Plamenatz concludes that:
'. . .it may be true that government with the consent of
the governed is the best form humanly possible.'m
121 Plamenatz, op cit., p. 24.
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Conclusion
In short the conclusions of this chapter can be presented 
thus:
Despite a traditional assumption of similitude there are 
important distinctions to be made between statements of 
obligation, duty-statements, and statements concerning what 
we ought to do morally. Basically the concepts are defined 
here in terms of the contexts within which they are most 
appropriately employed, the extent to which they place 
moral constraints upon individual agents, and the manner in 
which they are created.
In terms of a moral hierarchy what we ought to do is the 
trump card, and imposes a stronger requirement or 
constraint upon action than either obligations or duties 
(unless you speak of moral duties). This is because a 
decision concerning what one ought to do signals conclusive 
reasons for acting in the manner proposed, whereas 
obligations and positional/legal duties provide only prima 
facie reasons for doing X rather than Y. In establishing 
what we ought to do we make reference to duties and 
obligations, but it is possible that they will be 
overridden by other moral demands.
Having discussed obligation in general terms we looked at 
political obligation and found that ordinary usage of the
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term political obligation differs rather alarmingly from 
the paradigm case. Whilst it was argued that forms of 
obligation are different only because of the contexts 
within which they arise, in practice political obligations 
fail to meet many of the defining features of the ideal 
type model. In some respects political obligations are 
more like positional duties attached to citizenship.
One way of attempting to rectify the situation is to employ 
the concept of consent. Consent is most usually utilised 
with reference to obligations, such that we become 
obligated to do X because we have consented to do so. This 
relationship is not unproblematic. First one can question 
the analogy between promising and consenting which is so 
often utilised, and even if this is taken to hold one can 
ask why it is assumed that promises create obligations. 
Furthermore, it was argued that even if we construct an 
adequate definition of consent, the moral scope of the 
concept is necessarily restricted, as it cannot in itself 
ensure that what we consent to do is the same as what we 
ought to do. The content of what we consent to, and our 
motives for consenting can both mean that from an 'all 
things considered' moral point of view we ought not to do 
that which we have consented to do.
There are still further limitations upon the concept's 
usefulness if one accepts certain of the presuppositions 
about the liberal democratic model within which it most
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comfortably fits. For example, it is possible that certain 
individual human rights are, or should be, considered 
inalienable. If this is so, being politically obligated 
cannot entail consenting to give them up. So, in some 
areas of political discourse consent will be irrelevant.
Even if we can explain how and to what extent a person has 
political obligations on the basis of their consent, we 
still have to show whether these obligations are 
significant in a moral sense. If consent is interpreted in 
the way in which it is presented here it is at least 
possible that it will be given or withheld on the basis of 
a rational evaluation of what ought (prudentially and 
morally) to happen. However, it is also possible that 
consent will be so bound up with the individual's selfish 
will that prudential considerations of what it is best for 
the individual to do will override moral considerations of 
what the individual ought to do. For this reason there 
have to be motives offered for consenting to do what is 
right as opposed to what is merely advantageous. If such 
motives can be found politics and ethics will be joined 
together.
It has been suggested here that the most appropriate 
ideological context for consent is a liberal democratic 
model which emphasises individualism, voluntarism and 
individual negative liberty. In such a system the place 
for consent is clear, and the infrastructure within which
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it can operate most effectively is obviously present. 
However, it is also worth asking whether consent can 
operate in systems which lack some of the defining features 
of this model, and even more interestingly perhaps, whether 
a different type of model removes or at least diminishes 
the role of consent. In other words we need to enquire 
whether the value of consent is contextually determined.
In the following chapters the definitions offered here will 
be used as a standard against which to judge the ways in 
which Hobbes and Locke employed the same concepts. Both 
thinkers are assumed to be members, indeed founders, of the 
tradition within which consent is most conspicuously 
embraced. It remains to be seen whether consent is a 
central support to the systems they construct, or whether 
the limitations of the concept and the nature of the 
systems constructed combine to make consent far less 
important than commonly assumed.
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Hobbesian Man, The State of Nature and Consent.
5 f
the definition of consent outlined in the previous 
er questions immediately arise concerning Hoboes'e 
?al contract theory. Some of the doubts concerr his 
icular version the theory, others become obvious when 
tries to accommodate the covenant within his overall 
JLosophical framework.
re forced to enquire whether, given Hobbes's account of
town nature and his explanation of how men behave in the
._te of nature, it is feasible to assume that they shall, 
autonomous agents, freely and willingly choose to make 
^covenant. Also, given that Hobbes is committed to a 
:erministic perspective, it must be established whether 
meaningful notion of consent can exist without a 
commitment to the idea of freedom of will.WR
■
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These problems fall broadly under two headings-
(A) those concerning the likelihood of the contract beina 
der and kept, at the initial stage of leaving the state 
of nature.
(B) those concerning the moral status of the agreement and 
its effectiveness as a political mechanism.
^chapter is an attempt to address questions of the 
%sort, and as such offers a detailed study of 
b's account of man in his natural state, and his 
ions of existence prior to the formation of the
W->wealth.
§
ral commentators have expressed doubts about the
F
sibility of a covenant arising out of the pre-political 
te Hobbes describes.1 If men are as antisocial, proud 
)warlike as Hobbes suggests the argument runs, then the 
V of them coming together to make a contract is 
fetched. Conversely, if we accept that such a covenant 
tbeen made, then the question arises as to whether or 
pre-political men actually were as Hobbes described 
Neither of these conclusions are inevitable. It is
ssible to assume instead that:
<?< jjjjf
.) men were (or could have been) at some point of the 
-ture Hobbes describes, and living in the way his state of
ft'.
^ture account suggests, and
M i '
m  that men would reach the point where they were willing,
m
d able, to form a covenant and establish political 
society.
1 Cf. Michael Oakeshott, 'Introduction' to Leviathan, 
Oxford, Blackwell, 1947: T.H. Green, Lectures on the
Principles of Political Obligation, London, Longmans, 1941: 
George Sabine 'Thomas Hobbes' Ch.XXIII in his A History of 
Political Theory, New York and London, Henry Holt & Co., 
1937 .
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y to this interpretation lies in a rigorous and 
te reading of Hobbes's account of man and his social 
g, prior to the formation of the commonwealth. In 
an this is found in his account of the "condition of
ature", in Philosophical Rudiments he adopts the more
} -
used term "state of nature", which for simplicity's 
be used here.
P*
mm
itate of nature - Introductory remarks
jfe-
©re investigating Hobbes's particular version of the
ft •
e of nature something has to be said about the concept 
general, and also about the way in which such accounts 
mid be read. In its purest form a state of nature 
Count should be no more than a collecting point for the 
materials of political argument, the principles upon
,ch a philosopher's later theorising will be based. The
$1,
Count should be seen as a literary device for assembling 
ts that could just as easily have been presented in list 
>rm under such headings as - 'the nature of man', 'the 
iginal moral position' or 'social behaviour outside 
litical society'. There is no need to prove - or even 
maintain - that such a state ever existed, but only that 
given the facts as they are taken to be, such a scenario
m
i
ij,could have arisen, and might still do so.
mm-
i state of nature is to be seen as an hypgrn*r- 1 
as this last statement suggests, the quest_oi men. 
B as to the purpose of such description. Giver trst 
;ount need not be presenting historical real_m mri 
 ^therefore claim to be satisfying our curiosutT aaort 
rbearers, or facilitating any desire to 'lean rrrm 
ast', how do we then use the information provmer ?
Ilh* ■
Hue lies in understanding the state of nature as irjzh 
.criptive and prescriptive device. When a phuitmoniier 
|yes how things are, or might have been in a saara of 
iatrte, he is implicitly providing the basis for nus
Mint of how he thinks things ought to be in prl  ai
Haty.
wSs.
itical society is generally understood as an a m  — —  =, 1 
truct which can either enhance or subdue wnaa us 
ural. By providing a picture of what is natural uae 
iate of nature informs the philosopher of what ne Must 
hieve through artificial means. A philosopher's v_ews r-n 
's nature, man's original moral position amu k i ' s  
tural sociability will feed into his prescriptions for 
society. If he chooses to equate what us natural 
what is good, then he may well see his task as __r_tad 
to creating a system which will preserve or enhance s e t's 
natural condition. If he sees in the natural mu:: #t_rt is 
tad, he must construct an artificial reality vuuct vill
••4
I the possibilities revealed by his account of ~i*e 
et of nature.
m
Lesire to persuade as well as to prove is an integre_ 
Cteristic of political philosophy, and Ksr 
osophers have seen in the concept of a state of nat.nre 
jwerful persuasive tool. Yet, once a significair, 
liasive angle is built in to such an account there os e 
:r that the descriptive element will be overshadowec, 
iscured. When discussing Hobbes's use of a state of 
re device the complexities of the enterprise bectwe 
Ibus, as does the propensity for conflict between own 
‘;te different aims.
e pages in Leviathan where Hobbes gives his account of 
state of Nature contain some of the most evocative 
guage and persistent imagery of political philosoprn*. 
ry undergraduate learns at least this - that (accordrirc 
1 Mr.Hobbes) if left in his natural state, "the life of 
is solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short*',
initial reactions to the text are emotive, and the lets
liscerning reader might not think to ask too many questions
ir
ncerning the first causes and principles from which one 
count springs. Hobbes however is concerned precisely
2 Leviathan Ch. 13 p.186. Unless otherwise state' 
references to Leviathan refer to the edition edited by 
Macpherson, Harmondsworth, Pelican, 1968.
causes3 and a close reading of these pages reveal far 
%than a dispassionate list of factual characteristics.
.s instead treated to a detailed picture of a way of 
LW., a terrifying existence characterised by war and 
Ovation, and underlying this picture one should be able 
Lscover its causes.
tated above, a state of nature is rarely used simply 
escribe, a prescriptive aspect is invariably built 
i)f> the account, such that one can argue 'because of 
tditions A, B, and C, the policy or form of government
KB/’!.,
ired is X, Y, or Z. This may be acceptable so long as 
philosopher's commitment to any one or all of X,Y, and 
es not override his desire to give an accurate picture 
A f B, and C. Similarly, the normative nature of such 
ommendations should be borne in mind. Rarely if ever 
it be demonstrated that conditions A, B and C 
ssarily require solutions X, Y and Z. In fact, given 
same factual evidence, another commentator may well 
er a completely different prescription.
JSfrto
has been suggested that Hobbes uses the state of nature 
support and promote his governmental proposals, without 
essarily being able to justify those proposals in terms 
the scientifically factual information offered in that
3 cf. M. Oakeshott 'Introduction to Leviathan' (1937) 
his Hobbes on Civil Association, Oxford, Blackwell, 
P975, P .23.
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JH;'
nt.4 The state of nature account is then, if not 
ucted, at least tailored to complement his preferred 
al recommendations. In other words, because of a 
ing commitment to political recommendations X, Y, and 
presents man's natural condition in terms of A, B, 
1 This is a serious accusation from which Hobbes 
fully escape, but it will be shown that rather than 
6ally employing the state of nature to support his 
erred form of government, Hobbes attempted, but failed 
ine two distinct though interrelated purposes within 
body of the text.
'tfwr t.
he one hand, Hobbes used the state of nature to help
mfit.
ntify and analyse the causes of the formation - and
lately the breakdown - of political society This
II
W
•PI
g the most obvious purpose of such an account. On the 
hand 'its status was that of an ever-present 
sibility inherent in any organised political society, a 
quitous threat which, like some macabre companion 
ompanied society in every stage of its journey.' One 
ght, for convenience sake, label these two uses of the 
te of nature as the scientific and the political 
oses. The question arises as to whether the
proaches, and perhaps more importantly the difference in
4 Such views are propounded by those writers cited in 
Footnote 1 of this Chapter as well as by others such as 
"•B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive 
Individualism, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1962 and L. 
Strauss The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: Its Basis and 
Genesis, Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1963.
lie, required to fulfil these two purposes are 
atible. In order to fairly assess Hobbes's argument at
ientific level, one must first strip away the stylistic
l&V •
nts of the more political account. Similarly, the
m
sibility that certain implicit features of the
$1j' «
fitific account might become obscured in the interests 
I €he text operating as a political tract cannot be 
bunted.
Mf-
jpe is no denying that as a political tract, Leviathan
created with the purpose of persuading through the
nstration of truths re. through scientific method. The
. . .
ger lies in the possibility that the need or desire to
IBSwhy,
suade, might have resulted in the selective 
nstration of particular truths, and the suppression of 
hers. To enable an accurate reading of the state of
Hi
lire, and to justify the political recommendations made,
must search out all the facts, and their logical 
sequences, which will necessitate getting behind the 
oquent veneer of the text. Leviathan has an obvious and 
scoverable normative/persuasive purpose as a treatise 
osing anarchy and enthusiastically supporting undivided 
..archical rule. It will be suggested that in pursuing 
is purpose Hobbes willingly sacrifices clarity and 
herence in terms of what should, in the context of his 
philosophy, be a more important purpose, that is 
onstrating the logical necessity of a social contract, 
the inevitability of its emergence.
it is unclear
.tics does more
R*/■
iciples upon which
K
social contract to
,nnings of a pre
ion, doubt Hobbes's
lount - it would be
lentify, any other 
Lthin the text.
be read as a work of
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 whether Hobbes's undoubted mastery of
Inglish language, and his talent for the rhetoric of
jC  his political theory is based. For
lithe covenant a feasible and morally significant
SP"Position. Similarly he must provide at least the
Ft-
L -social moral framework which enables
f t  • . . .Icreation of obligations which are both binding, and
R ,  ■
irstood as such. For the Leviathan to succeed as a 
ttical tract, the state of nature account must exist as
irk spectre, a warning to those who, for whatever
ren the suggestion that the state of nature operates at
t;
ist two levels - as a scientific and as a political
:  advisable to eliminate, or at least
t  to highlight or to obscure the
!§' ■
 succeed he must offer an account of
irlL • •rs nature and pre-social state which makes the emergence
 message.
Hent possible levels of discourse existing
suggested above, Hobbes himself would expect Leviathan
Mr
*0  philosophy in it's strictest sense, 
mat is as a scientific manuscript. However, as has
been mentioned, the tone of the work is not that of
re obviously scientific efforts such as the Elements 
i losophy .5
Bi. Taylor points out,
'v
i
The Leviathan is far the most readable and amusing of 
his works, and it was written in a time of revolution 
^nd unsettlement as a persuasive to cessation from 
fruitless civil strife. For its immediate purpose, as 
an exhortation to peace, it was right and proper that 
the author should develop the contention that peace is 
the real interest of his fellow- countrymen as 
persuasively as he could; it is not surprising, 
therefore, that it attains dimensions in his book as 
to give the impression that it is all or really all, 
that he has to say.6
&
tf|
lor' s comments suggest a way in which history and the
are, or could be, intertwined. Even if Hobbes was not 
erned in relating historical reality, there are those 
,r,„Ould argue that his text is unavoidably the product of 
’I such reality, in this case 17th century England, 
lor goes as far as calling the work 'a popular 
itscrift' to be contrasted with the 'more calmly argued 
tements of the same doctrine'7 contained in the Elements
■mv
De Cive. For this reason Taylor prefers to use De Cive 
the basis for his commentary on Hobbes's work, the
5 The Elements of Philosophy, (1656), The English Works 
Thomas Hobbes, Vol 1, ed W. Molesworth, London,
CXXXIX. Hereafter volumes from the Molesworth edition 
1 be identified in terms of English Works and volume 
Ler.
6 A.E. Taylor, 'The Ethical Doctrine of Hobbes' 
losophy Vol. 8, 1938, p 406 also in K. Brown (ed), 
bes Studies, Oxford, Blackwell, 1965.
7 Ibid.
Jt
estion being that certain texts owe less to the
I§d)
rical urgencies of the age than others, or perhaps
■ nyj S t I .
certain ages are in themselves more conducive to the
jPin
ition of purely philosophical as opposed to political
Murse, for those who uphold the maxim 'for every text 
htext' no text can be read accurately or profitably
mjT
~Ut reference to the historical context within which it 
created. Context denotes not only the strictly
®v
rical - that is the age during which the text emerged 
also the tradition, or debate of which it forms a
f t ,
MN As well as looking back to the influences working
At
js the author prior to and during the writing and 
ication of the text, a complete analysis would involve 
king at the subsequent influence exerted by the text, 
the writer is both 'philosopher and pamphleteer'8, and
jjphy;
1 text both treatise and tract, the reader must be both
jmM
torian and philosophical commentator.
y ;
i
^quote Quentin Skinner on the need for a strong 
orical framework,
"...where such a framework is lacking the classic text 
%, itself may be 'understood' by philosophers in ways 
that are historically absurd, the aim has been to show
4#------------------
8 I borrow this term from Professor Maurice Cranston, 
° aPplied it to the writers of the French Enlightenment 
his work entitled Philosophers and Pamphleteers' 
Utical Theorists of the French Enlightenment, Oxford, 
ford University Press, 1986.
that the historian's task of understanding climates of 
opinion is not disconnected from the philosopher's 
attempts to interpret texts. It is still for the 
historian to point out that even the philosopher's 
most plausible interpretations must still be tested, 
and might even have to be abandoned, in the light of 
ihistorical evidence.9
ifc
m*'QFf Ifv
,tf there rs a great deal to be learnt from the form of 
larship advocated by such figures as Skinner, Pocock 
Dunn,10 their methods shall not be followed in thisw
Ls. To deny the importance of historical context would
m
foolhardy, but to deny completely the possibility of 
^ing a self contained philosophical text is similarly 
One consequence of adopting their approach would be 
deny to Hobbes the timelessness he strived to achieve.11
bBv
^ing made reference to contextual evidence in order to 
ermine, as far as possible an author's intentions when 
ting a text and his position within any particular
H •
________________
I
pi 9 Q. Skinner 'The Ideological Context of Hobbes's 
ought', Historical Journal 9, 1966 pp. 286-317. A later 
rsion of the paper appeared as 'The Context of Hobbes's 
eory of Political Obligation' in Hobbes and Rousseau: A 
Election of Critical Essays, M. Cranston and R. Peters 
eds.), New York, Anchor-Doubleday, 1972.
J p T O l ;
10 Often referred to as the Cambridge School these 
■•torians of philosophy have published widely on both 
bbes and Locke, always stressing the importance of
8torical context to an accurate reading of the text. See 
| examples Q. Skinner 'Hobbes' Leviathan' The Historical 
Urnal 8, 1964; J.G.A. Pocock 'Time, History and
•chatology in the Thought of Thomas Hobbes' in The 
versity of History, J. H. Elliot and H. G. Koenisberger 
®ds), London, Routledge Kegan Paul, 1970; and J. Dunn, 
litical Obligation in its Historical Context, Cambridge, 
•ridge University Press, 1980 .
II Cf. C.C.S. Farsides 'Hobbes en Grand-Bretagne'
chivs de Philosophie, Bulletin Hobbes I, Paris, Avril- 
in 1988, pp.233-239.
tion of argument, it must be possible to focus in on 
ext, and judge its merits solely in terms of the 
ia set by the writer's own philosophical framework.
^an identify with Howard Warrender, author of one of 
Dst influential works of Hobbes scholarship of the 
lecades, who claimed to have " a very limited purpose:
■IlKamine theoretical structure and the way in which 
is concepts Hobbes employed fitted together in terms 
“ir inner logic and cohesion."12 The word "limited" 
, to be read as an apology or admission of a greater 
;e ignored, as he wrote in the same article,
pP
the classic texts in political philosophy are more 
than tracts of their time. However much they are 
involved with and illuminate the author's immediate 
context, they continue to be studied for what insight 
if they offer in new and changing situations. To consign 
H them to their contemporary milieu with whatever 
^honours, is to bury them. Hobbes more than most has 
preserved his relevance and justified his own claim to 
be regarded as writing for all time.13
1st the political focus of the work is inevitably 
ermined by the author's perception of his contemporary 
i.eu, a political theory built upon sound philosophical 
ndations should be worthy of study as a theory, not as 
historical relic. The Leviathan is a work of philosophy 
science, as well as a political tract, and it has to be
12 H. Warrender, 'Political Theory and Historiography: 
Reply to Professor Skinner on Hobbes', The Historical 
rnal, 22, 4, 1979, p. 940.
13 Ibid. p. 939 .
sidered good or bad at all levels. Ultimately, its 
cess as a 'text for all time' depends on the 
errelation of all these elements, but most importantly 
its inner coherence as a philosophical system. It is in 
e terms that the work shall be judged here.
far it has been claimed that Leviathan is an attempt at 
ilosophical or scientific presentation of an overtly 
„itical theory. The author's intention was to employ the
hodology of science in the service of politics.
Ikver, one soon discovers that the unsuitability of this 
of discourse for the political task at hand led to the
ilirring of that methodology at certain points, and, less
K
“ceptably, to the concealment of some of the conclusions
t1
:own up by the scientific method. The reason for this 
eB with the distinction to be made between proof and 
rSuasion, and the author's desire to be both philosopher 
polemicist.
W ? ' -
»e first thing to stress about Thomas Hobbes's account of 
e state of nature is that in common with other such 
Counts, it need not be tested for historical accuracy, 
leed it need not be seen as 'historical' in any real 
ense. Robert Nozick prefers that a state of nature be 
defined as a 'fundamental potential explanation', 14 
-intaining that:
14 R. Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, Oxford, Basil
Blackwell 1974, p.8.
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«A theory of a State of Nature that begins with 
fundamental general descriptions of morally 
>ermissible and impermissible actions, and of deeply 
>ased reasons why some people violate these moral 
constraints, and goes on to describe how a state would 
arise from that State of Nature will serve our 
explanatory purposes, even if no actual state ever 
arose that way."15
lid
sfi ■
if Hobbes's contemporaries nonetheless chose to attack 
account of men in their natural state on the grounds 
it was 'bad history'. Bishop Bramhall said of 
s's state of nature
SP
m
There never was any such time when man was without 
govourners and laws...there might be sometimes a root 
of such Barbarous, Theevish, Brigants in some rocks or 
desarts or odd corners of the world, but it was an 
abuse and a degeneration from the nature of man, who 
is a political creature.16
m,
Wmv
)}!, ■
bes was in fact anxious to stress that his account was 
historical, and felt he could easily dismiss attacks 
Hed on the argument of historical inaccuracy. Yet, he is
Lso careful to state of the conditions he describes in
wt <■
iViathan that, ' I believe it was never generally so all
Ml
over the world, but there are many places where they live
now. r 17 Whilst he does not wish to rely on historical
ridence or proof, he has to maintain that such a state was 
-d is logically possible, and in order to support this
15 Ibid. p. 7.
16 Bishop J. Bramhall, A Defence of True Liberty from 
Antecedent and Extrinsicall Necessity, (1655) published by 
Garland, New York, 1977, references here relate to T. 
Hobbes, The Questions Concerning Liberty, Necessity and
nance, English Works Vol V, p 107.
17 Leviathan, Ch.13, p.187.
Jie maintains that comparable states did exist in his
Elements of Law Hobbes explains that history has a 
! role in the area of ethics and politics because it 
Secerned only with "experience" which can "concludeth 
ng universally".18 Science on the other hand, is the 
Ledge of the truth of propositions",19 thereby capable
M-establishing universal conclusions. Given the
«
• • • • 'oundly political purpose behind Leviathan, the promise
l i p f
liversalisability is a valuable asset.
f i; For he that hath seen by what courses and degrees, a
m' flourishing State hath first come into civil warre,
j$ and then to ruine; upon the sights of the ruines of
ijji any other State, will guesse, the like warre, and the
like course:Wo have been there also. But thisconjecture has the same incertainty almost with the 
conjecture of the Future; both being grounded onelyjwfSr  __________ __
upon experience.20
r the time Hobbes writes Leviathan, his preference for the
mA
essons of philosophy (often used interchangeably with
i#.' ■
:ience, although strictly separate disciplines) over those 
>f history, both in terms of reliability and 
liversalisability, is obvious. He asserts:
W 18 T. Hobbes, The Elements of Law, Natural and Politic, 
! (1640) F. Tonnies (ed.) London, Simkin, Marshall & Co., 
IHDCCCLXXXIX Part 1, Ch.6, pp.25-26.
19 Ibid
20 Leviathan, Ch.3, p.98
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When for the doing of anything there be Infallible 
rules, (as in Engines, and Edifices, the rules of 
Geometry,) all the experience of the world cannot 
equall his Counsell, that has learnt, or found out the 
rule. 21
■tially, Hobbes's views on the role of history and the
orian move towards the position held by contemporary
m
osopher and historian Michael Oakeshott. In describing
BV
^/historical past' Oakeshott speaks of
. . . ...a complrcated world, wrthout unrty of feelrng or
;;^ !Clear outline: in it events have no overall pattern
or purpose, lead nowhere, point to no favoured
condition of the world, and support no practical
conclusions. It is a world composed of contingencies
and in which contingencies are intelligible, not
because they have been resolved, but on account of the
circumstantial relations which have been established
between them; the historians concern is not with
causes but with occasions 22
unlike Oakeshott's historian, was dedicated to the
puit of causes, and history's role was to provide
. . .:casrons' whrch could rlluminate and enliven an account
It upon ahistorical scientific foundations. It is
obably safest to concur with the commentator who suggests
t Hobbes's account has
m  ■
'an ambivalent relationship with the time-dimension of 
history' .23
21 Leviathan, Ch. 25, p. 308 .
22 M. Oakeshott, 'The Activity of Being an Historian' 
Rationalism and Politics, London, Methuen, 1962, p. 166.
23
586, p.4.
T. Sorrel, Hobbes, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul,
pmX
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s wanted to offer a 'timeless model built on the 
s and consequences of political breakdown. It's 
ng remain[ing] eternally contemporary and urgent'.24 
this reason his state of nature account had to be 
ted outside history, but in order to convince his 
ence of its possible existence, history was 
ionally called forward as witness. History stands on 
side lines, to offer help when the persuasive power of 
ce is felt to be lacking. At a scientific level a 
1 proof is sufficient; for political purposes
Leal evidence is sometimes desirable.
toan of course be argued that it is pointless to remove 
.scussion of man from an historical context in the way 
jested. Just as Skinner's coterie would demand that the 
it be read as the product of a particular historical era, 
IlMarxist might demand that the facts offered in a state of 
:ure account be understood as facts specific to a 
rticular society and pattern of production.25
might agree that the state of nature account is useless 
sause it assumes in an abstract fashion precisely what 
liust be proven with reference to historical facts. The
24 S. Wolin, Politics and Vision, Boston, Little, Brown 
Co., 1960, p.264.
25 This line has most famously been pursued by 
cpherson who places both Hobbes' and Locke's accounts of
•he state of nature within a very particular form of 
iconomic and social structure - the possessive market 
jociety. cf. C. B. Macpherson op. cit. Part II (iv) pp.53- 
* 1.
-list of factual evidence which makes up the 
olitical state has, a Marxist would claim, to be 
Wstood as the product of some historical epoch. More 
$ be said concerning this point of view during the
:
sion of human nature.
.
jHK.
remarked by Taylor, establishing Hobbes's avowed 
.prence for the lessons of science over history does not 
the way for a reading of the Leviathan as a purely
* { • ;
ntific work. It is immediately obvious to the reader
m
$the prose of Leviathan has little in common with the 
dry discourse of science. Indeed, it has been 
lined that its literary qualities are such as to make it“W:Jp
parable to many of the most esteemed works in English 
^rature.
in this assessment, one must address the extent to which 
bes employed literary techniques in the presentation of 
argument. In his earlier works, notably The Elements 
Law (1640), Hobbes discredits eloquence and persuasive 
ech, and distinguishes clearly between the power to 
suade and the power to demonstrate the truth.26 In De 
vef he allows that eloquence might serve to demonstrate 
e truth, this being the art of "logic", but still warns 
amst its use for persuasive purposes, which is
6 Elements of Law Pt. 2, ch. 8, sections 12-14,
• 17 5-8 esp. p.177 .
27,ric" . In Leviathan however, he is far more hopeful 
eloquence might be put to good, that is non-seditious 
;ssibly scientific, use. Whilst still acknowledging 
^lict between reason and eloquence, he now allows that 
be resolved, at least in the service of morals and
In all deliberations, and in all pleadings the faculty 
solid reasoning is n e c e s s a r y a n d  yet if there 
not be powerful eloquence, which procureth attention 
and consent, the effect of reason will be little.28
Reason and eloquence, though not in the natural 
sciences, yet in the moral, may stand very well
together.29
mi
totle claimed that poetry is of graver import than 
pry since its statements are of the nature of 
fTersals, whereas those of history are singulars. If 
toes were to accept this analysis there would presumably 
a possibility of employing poetic form in the 
sentation of scientific fact. An enterprise implicitly
Vj*
ommended by Sir Phillip Sidney in his work A Defence of 
try, where he claims the philosophers method of teaching 
deficient because it 'bestoweth but a wordish
27 De Cive, (1642), English Works Vol.II, Ch. 12, xii 
161-2.
28
29
Leviathan, A Review and Conclusion, p.717. 
Ibid., p .718.
■ ■WrvK>
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jjription, which doth neither strike, pierce, nor possess
k
►eight of the soul so much as that other doth.'30
teviathan Hobbes gives the purpose of Poetry as 
l'ifying and vilifying etc.'31, and warns that although 
food poetry 'both Judgement and Fancy are required: 
the fancy must be more eminent; because they {poems} 
lee for the Extravagance.32 Within Hobbes's account of
IJp.V
in his natural state, the images evoked do much to
&ke, pierce, [and] possess the sight of the soul', the
|1
Ition is whether they do so by means of excessive fancy.
Let Hobbes is confident of the persuasive power of the 
itic form he is still less than convinced of the 
>atibility of poetic and scientific treatments of the 
subject.
But the subject of a Poeme is the manners of men, not 
naturall causes; manners presented not dictated; and 
manners feyned (as the name of Posey importes) not 
found in men. They that give entrance to Fictions 
writ in Prose, erre not so much, but they erre. For 
Poesy requireth delightfulnesse, not onely of fiction, 
but of stile; in which if prose contend with Verse it 
is with disadvantage and (as it were) on foot against 
the strength and winges of Pegasus.33
30 P. Sidney, 'A Defence of Poetry' ( 1579-80), two 
itions of the work appeared posthumously in 1595; the 
feferred version is that published by Ponsonby bearing the 
tie The Defence of Poesie. In the work Sidney attempts
demonstrate the superiority of poetry over either 
story or philosophy as a means of teaching virtue.
31 Leviathan p. 149.
32 Leviathan Ch. 8, p. 136.
33 ibid.
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P
hermore, there are dangers inherent in presenting the 
of nature in poetic form, as to attain a magnified
it
f one generally has to forgo the benefits of a
If; . .
jete image. This is particularly dangerous because, as
„s himself admits, 'Eloquence is power because it is
*ng Prudence'34, and thus the persuasive power of an
“7*ent account will be considerable.
>11 be suggested that Hobbes's state of nature is just 
r a magnified but incomplete image, particularly in
j§r
of the account of human nature offered therein. In 
~r to 'magnify and vilify' certain features of man's 
e and his consequent predicament, Hobbes overlooked 
*rs less crucial to the story he wished to tell, but 
l! to a complete and faithful account of man's natural
m
dition.
wing these strands together, and acknowledging the 
fferent levels of discourse present, one cannot fail to
predate the complexity of Hobbes's state of nature. It
Vf.
■^“nds to be read as a moment in (or outside) time ,jtV
ozen, magnified, and presented in poetic form, yet 
aiming to be based on scientifically verifiable truths. 
M it is to operate successfully as both a scientific and 
Political tool, Hobbes's account must be 'poetic' in more 
•enses than one. At a political level his account must
m*
 ^Leviathan, Ch.10, p.151.
i
t-
an image which is capable of moving the reader in 
that only good poetry can. For it to operate at 
iBntific level Hobbes must demonstrate that given 
setting, another time, another place, certain 
features of the account would remain unchanged, 
requiring the universality Aristotle ascribes to 
At least some of the information, and all the 
pies presented must be of the nature of universal 
On the first count the account of the State of 
given in Leviathan is an undoubted success, on the 
count its success is more questionable.
•receding discussion suggests that one must guard 
1st confusions arising out of the presentation of the 
te of nature in two distinct guises - that of a 
ual/scientific account of first principles, and that of 
rhetorical/persuasive device. In the service of the 
8t aim Hobbes employs the tools of science, geometry and 
ics. In the interests of the second he occasionally 
es on history, poetry, and more often, rhetoric. An
t •eness of this duality can only serve to help the reader 
over the logical conclusions of Hobbes's theorising, 
~ys allowing for the possibility that these will not 
cide with the intended political message of the work, 
ng issued this warning it remains only to offer a 
ing of the account which, as far as possible unravels 
two strands whilst remaining true to what Hobbes 
Uaily wrote, as opposed to what one would have wished
>o write. It will be argued that the way to ensure a 
ful reading of the text is to follow through the 
ifcific reasoning from first principles, always allowing 
;he fact that certain avenues might become obscured in 
interests of the political mechanics of the text.
ries of human nature.
r 1
a|theoretical purpose of the state of nature is 
ptively straightforward. It must be used to show:
’
man's basic nature, as determined by biology and 
:hology, as opposed to society or history. And,
the way in which men deprived of government will 
•ract with one another, given their nature.
e this data has been supplied, a third step would be to 
how 1 and 2 necessitate
ih;
a particular origin and form of government - this being 
i element of the enguiry most relevant to the present 
8cussion.
wever, this apparently simple process of fact gathering 
id recommendation raises a number of important and complex
BV
134
it, what is actually meant by human nature, what facts 
•haracteristics come together to form such a concept, 
how valid is it to speak in terms of human nature as 
»ed to individual behaviour ?
pL'f
idly, how are the facts about human nature to be
mlovered?
#
i
what further theorising is one entitled to derive 
such an account?
X
Pr
(ifirst and third points must be discussed first in 
teral terms, the second point will be dealt with through 
Sific reference to Hobbes's analysis.
concept of human nature is a difficult one, the first
lem being one of definition. When writing about
Sts
bes, Gregory S. Kavka states that a theory of human 
lire should 'pick out those features that are unalterably 
8essed by (nearly) all human beings and are together 
>sse ssed by them alone.'35
m
I,
Itft i
s understanding of the concept has the advantage of 
'racing a broad range of outlooks on the subject. One 
t choose to identify any number of 'features', and 
Wild up a detailed picture of man's basic nature, or on
35 G. Kavka, Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory, 
rinceton, Princeton University Press, 1986, p.29.
mv
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>ther hand one might identify only a very limited 
sr of features as shared by all men, and reject the
jequently limited knowledge of man's 'nature' as
IBS, or nearly so. However, before adopting Kavka's 
ij/tion more needs to be said concerning the type of
ires which should be allowed to count, and the idea
|$they should be 'unalterably possessed'.
P</.; Hampton introduces a useful scheme when she 
Anguishes those human properties which are either 
rinsic', 'functional' or 'interactive'.36 Intrinsic 
.ities she describes as those possessed by an object 
respective of its relations to a larger whole, 
itional properties are more or less role-determined, and 
llate to one's position as part of a larger whole, whilst
rvP
Iteractive properties are those which develop over time as
result of one's interaction with external objects.
m!h\
P ’
m i '
this is a fair representation of Hampton's distinctions,
Lt appears that properties of a functional type are of no
m: <
litial interest to someone seeking to define human nature.
I^c: -
iteractive properties are of some concern, as long as it 
be shown that they are distinct from functional 
properties, and not the product of a specific form of 
interaction, as opposed to human interaction per se. What 
of most interest as a starting point are intrinsic
36 J. Hampton, Hobbes and the Social Contract, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1986, p. 96.
ties - basic human characteristics, capacities and
fi ’
;:s that are born with us. Agreement must be reached
K
feet of intrinsic properties so that one can go on to 
itigate interactive properties, and the extent to which
%  these are 'natural'. Such properties must be shown
jf.*% shared by all (normal) human beings so that they can 
‘stinguished from individual characteristics.
S'5fv1 •
g established a list of intrinsic properties one then
Hrv^ 6 decide which, if any, are significant determinants
aJjp'}
uman nature. Under Kavka's original definition, the
Jsv;
of universal unalterable properties could be endless, 
uring such irrelevancies as 'it is in man's nature to 
two legs and no feathers'. As one contemporary writer
m
S* it
w
Mp:
There is - and this is a key point - an important 
of ^distinction to be made between statements that happen 
refer to human beings and those that articulate a 
J t h e o r y  of human nature. These do not necessarily 
coincide.37
SKlx, •
f_ce there is a need to attach importance or significance
w certain characteristics. So while it is an important
3r ■Ct about human beings that their average body temperature
TO'
98.4 F, it is not an aspect of human nature.
ere is of course a danger that people's understanding of 
ich are, and which are not, important features of human
C. Berry, Human Nature, London, Macmillan, 1986,
ire will differ to the extent that they will be unable 
work with one another's definitions. To the
ifiobiologist a chromosome count (which is the example 
chooses) is important because there is a vital 
sction between human genes and human actions and 
fcitutions. For a devout Catholic the reality of 
^inal sin holds a significance never to be afforded to 
biological facts. Each may choose to dismiss as 
Oflevant, factual evidence the other considers 
ficant.
Serning the type of fact one would wish to establish,
■El
istopher Berry identifies four main areas of dispute and 
lent concerning human nature.38 To be of use a theory 
human nature needs to address the following issues:
The extent to which man is a solitary or communitarian 
ing.
Hr
(V'
The extent to which man is a political or apolitical 
ing.
The extent to which a man is a free rational or 
termined rational being.
;y
The extent to which a man is a perfectible or 
erfectible being.
fesumably therefore the features relevant to an account of 
n nature would be the features whrch help determine any 
these characteristics. Suffice to say this does little 
clarify the issue, and arguments will continue to arise
m
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lat is and what is not a significant feature of human
of unalterability is no less difficult. It is 
ilbt wise to question whether certain characteristics 
considers 'natural' are in fact products of 
isation, that is a socially specific form of human 
laction. Rousseau was not the last to criticise Hobbes 
iling to strip away social features in his search for 
al man, the question is whether or not it is possible 
ing aside at present the question of whether it is 
itable) to do so? Even if one does succeed in 
ating features which have apparently proved impervious 
Changes in social environment, one might still have to
pt the possibility of a radical change in social life
jgjU
r yet experienced - or at least not yet recorded - which 
id render even these features susceptible to change.
IP;
t give an example, consider the assumption of utopian 
ialists and anarchists that man is benevolent to a 
gree considered unrealistic and even unnatural by their 
itics. It might be the case that certain characteristics 
take to be unalterable appear so simply because the 
•ocial arrangements capable of altering them have not yet 
Sxisted in a pure form. Thus, man's 'natural' selfishness, 
competitiveness etc., might prove to be perfectly alterable 
Under a new, and as yet untried system. This would mean 
that they no longer counted as features of human nature,
m) 139
E l* ■ • •l^ere instead products of particular forms of social 
em-
Is
ne remains true to the demand for unalterability one 
; be reduced to explaining human nature simply in terms 
rtain fundamental motives determining human behaviour, 
ample pain avoiding/pleasure seeking. Even if you 
eve that all men share the basic instincts which 
|yate them you leave the way open for infinitely 
Kerable forms of outward behaviour and character.
W C[
i^ is the starting point for the most basic utilitarian 
ijries of ethics and politics. Bentham held that human
i # #
re is tied to two twin thrones, pleasure and pain, and 
't>\all human action is reducible to the desire to pursue 
i and avoid the other.39 However observation of such 
n action need not necessarily imply adherence to 
tham's assumptions. One might choose to point to one 
of outward behaviour common to all men, but 
^knowledge the possibility of it arising from a variety of 
tives, so, for example, one might decide that men are 
iturally sociable without identifying one common motive 
this.
Bv.
Mi.
ie requirement of unalterability acts as a severe
%
restriction upon the list of features one can justifiably
39 J. Bentham, Introduction to the Principles of Morals 
Legislation (1789) (ed.) W. Harrison, with A Fragment
on Government, Oxford, 194 8.
^de within an account of human nature. Ultimately one 
be forced to agree with Marx, who was unwilling to 
le a list of features common to all men. As far as he
W:"
filing to commit himself to a concept of human nature, 
"essed that it was social in origin and kind; 'the
TO
nature of man is the totality of social relations'40,
arly 'it is not the consciousness of men that
I,
rmines their being, but on the contrary, their social
n . . .
that determines their consciousness.'41
„d certain biological similarities the only shared 
jfeteristic he seems to acknowledge in humans, outside 
particular historical context, is the fact that they
“i, active, by which he means that they produce their means
Pf
subsistence. In the Early Writings he states that man
n . .
§'equipped with natural powers, with vital powers, he is 
active natural being; these powers exist in him as 
positions and capacities or drives.'42 By speaking in
.s way of potentialities and capacities, the Marxist
mv
% . ■ :
vids speaking in terms of immutable givens (thus allowing
Wf.
dynamic role to the forces of production), and similarly 
rids a commitment to wholesale relativism. From here he 
on to say that the proper (as in morally right?) life
4(1 K. Marx: Selected Writings in Sociology & Social
ilosophy translated by T. Bottomore & edited by T. 
ttomore & M. Rubel, Harmondsworth, Penguin, London 1963, 
t83.
41 Ibid. p.67.
42 K. Marx Early Writings (1893/4) trans. G- Benton 
urniondsworth, Penguin, 197 5.
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man is one of productive activity, and from here it is 
jyto trace the beginnings of his theory of alienation, 
ithe prescriptions that follow on from it. So although 
•fehe most part Marx rejects a full blown abstract theory
Ej'.yv
human nature, even he places what he sees as an
ITliisively human and natural characteristic at an
Octant position in his theory.
here on we shall adopt Kavka's definition of human
,4 An account of human nature is a list of significant
I| features shared by all normal human beings, these 
features are essentially unalterable and together they 
determine how men will interact with one another.
lowledge of human nature helps answer the fundamental 
lestions raised by Berry and quoted above. So far the 
ITpose of such an account has been presented as purely a 
lecriptive one, but this is seldom the case.
Berry states, reaching a decision on any of these
'a conception of human nature is inseparable from a
account of human nature is intrinsic to moral and
:e aware of the issues raised.
Lestions has practical and overtly political consequences
Conception of what constitutes human life and activity' and
,j.cal argument'.43 Having established a set of 
cteristics, one can work negatively: that is, identify 
e systems which are not conducive to human nature, or 
simply unworkable, given your theory. Or, one can use 
information positively, and determine which is the
■ life' - that is the life most conducive to the
fp£,v
table elements of man's nature.
0  •
Inp J •
m
er, to accept the possibility of such exercises is to
J-
kei a long runnrng dispute over facts and values, and
JpW
§ question of whether it is advisable, or indeed
t
Able, to derive an "ought" from an "is". Even if we
■ is
right about human nature does it necessarily mean that
p
|t concept of political society is necessarily the only 
rnative? It is apparent that Hobbes wishes to uphold 
]bi an entailment. The question remains as to whether he
sj$J. ,
entitled to do so.
ft
is adamant that in the case of human nature 'the 
ts descriptively are so and so and that these facts 
ecriptively are significant or normatively authoritative
I
comprehending human conduct'.44 In other words the 
ts about human nature are inextricably linked with the 
isions we make about human conduct. In certain 
cumstances they unavoidably determine what we do, in
43 Berry, op cit., p. 31.
44 Ibid. , p.37.
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:S they provide us with the basis for deciding what we 
to do.
The concept of human nature provides a criterion for 
acting or not acting in the world. This means that 
the conceptual context within which the facts of human 
nature are identified is oriented towards practice. 
Such facts establish a context within which it is 
possible to identify what is appropriate for humans to 
do...this factual establishment of what is appropriate 
is thus also the establishment of a context of 
| normative significance. However, there is here just 
|, one context. It is not a question of having the facts 
of human nature on one side and the values or norms on 
the other, but rather that the facts and values are 
best understood as dual elements, like the warp and 
weft of fabric, that constitute a conceptual whole. 
The concept of human nature is, therefore, a whole 
that enjoys a duality; it is at once descriptive and 
-prescriptive. 45
.8 demands that we say something further about our 
lerstanding of the features of human nature. For each 
!t(that is established, one has to establish whether or 
Hfeftithis is regarded as a positive feature by those who
it ,Isplay it. This is a very different exercise to deciding 
fbm a position outside the contextual framework whether or 
Hot specif ic features should be seen as positive or 
negative. Once again there is significant room for
Lsagreement. It is quite possible that men willW\
[e a shared characteristic of human nature but be 
ible to agree whether it is a desirable trait or not. 
ich disagreements often lay at the very root of political 
or ideological difference, and are seldom resolved.
Ibid., p .36
-ry's terms the political purpose of a human nature 
t is identical in structure to the scientific 
lation of the state of nature offered above.
if,
1|
j | i i  share a basic nature.
Ijbleft ungoverned, men will behave in certain manner, 
ierefore, men need a certain form of government,
it
mf
coherent theory (2) must be a logical consequence of
to
and (1) and (2) must be shown to necessitate (3). 
,d Berry goes further and states that (3) is a 
isary part of true (1) and (2). For Hobbes's account 
>rk he must show that the facts and characteristics he
p f *  ers under (1) and (2) are, to borrow Berry's analogy, of 
I' same cloth as the recommendations he makes under (3). 
be scientifically valid the argument must flow smoothly 
(1) to (3) through (2).
discussed, albeit briefly, the nature of the facts
mm:,'
pbout human nature that need to be uncovered and the 
sefulness of such facts, a further question arises as to 
ow to discover the facts about human nature. To describe 
|§fc|lman nature is to describe a set of characteristics common 
all 'normal' human beings, by virtue of their status as 
•Uch, yet, these characteristics need not be observable in 
©very instance, although their existence must be provable 
in some real sense. Moreover, the widespread existence of
L« property is not sufficient to suggest it is natural, as
%  wishes to dispute the fact that certain significant
u\
res of human behaviour are societal in origin.
%
„e is prepared to accept that socialisation is capable 
tering man's behaviour if not his fundamental nature, 
ical observation can only be offered as corroborating 
nee, not as the basis for knowledge. To ensure that
dgr/.'
'tores identified are innate as opposed to products of 
icular social systems, some way must be found of 
ng how man is in his most basic form, and any features 
are shown to be products of human interrelations must 
lown to be non-specific with respect to such things as 
iure, ideology and religion. Stories of the state of 
Hfe are attempts to present a vision of such 
-specific social relations, but as has already been 
gested, such attempts are not without difficulties.
bes appreciated many of the issues raised here, and 
ght to protect himself from those who had different 
as concerning what is intrinsic, unalterable and 
gnificant, by demonstrating as opposed to purely 
scribing human nature. By explaining the causes of human
m ■
aracteristics and behaviour he sought to separate his 
count from historical record or personal experience, and 
ove these properties to be unalterable in the full sense 
f the word. He sought to prove that to be human entailed 
ng certain clearly defined properties, some of which 
Ife important/significant in the sense adopted here. This
T>t to say that natural characteristics cannot be 
ted or held in check, they can, but the underlying 
5' of these characteristics can never be considered to 
tered. Just as Kant argued against looking for 
ty by looking at the world, Hobbes cannot find human
II
% solely through observing the present, or studying
•1
past. Introspection may teach certain lessons, but 
n its results are not universalisable.
;der to discover what count as immutable facts about 
nature man must be entirely stripped back to his most 
form, and the characteristics evident at this stage 
“hstrated. Even more importantly one must seek to 
lirstand the causes of these characteristics. The laws
■SP-'■Bflvi
physics are the true starting point for this enquiry as 
will explain the nature of causation. From there oneW%‘- ~
go on to establish the laws to which human beings are 
' ject, and thus one will not have to choose or decide 
ch of the characteristics men display are intrinsic, 
,is will be demonstrated scientifically. In order to do 
is he embraces the methodology of the new science.
mf11!
obbes's State of Nature - A First Reading.
jfr
Hobbes asks that the Leviathan be read within the context 
°f the new science, but contemporary critics are divided as 
bo how useful or possibly misleading this advice is.
-tes still rage concerning the possibility of carrying 
itific or geometric methods over into social or 
tical analysis. And given what is now known of the 
,ings and inadequacies of basic Euclidian geometry, 
:s's enterprise would certainly not be repeated by a 
{temporary philosopher. As a philosophy of science his 
-xy was at best confused, but as an attempt to systemise 
itics his work stands at the start of a tradition that
since achieved at least some of the goals he setm  * *
telf.
ver, criticisms of this type should not be confused 
those which upbraid Hobbes for failing to achieve a 
he did not in fact attempt. Many commentators have in 
past spent considerable intellectual energy either 
fending or refuting the idea that Hobbes set out to 
sent a unified science, such that the findings of
I .
pics could be, and should be, directly carried over into 
e political realm. It is more productive however to adopt 
IB attitude of one recent commentator who states, that 
he (Hobbes) acknowledged the connections between 
Jfrtural philosophy and politics, it was not on account of 
these links that politics was supposed to be a science. He 
thought politics had an independent claim to be a science, 
deed a better claim to be a science than physics'.46 It 
on the basis of this independent claim that Hobbes feels
46 Sorrel, op cit.f p. 4.
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ufident in applying the methodology of science to the 
^itical sphere.
I  is easy to find evidence of Hobbes's desire to use the 
■ I  approaches of science :
||He attempted to adopt a scientific methodology such that
attempted to apply Galileo's compositive resolutive
Pjli He placed his conception of motion at the centre of a
t having been said, opinions differ concerning both the 
ent to which he attempted any of these tasks, and his
cess or failure in doing so. It will be argued here,
ure must take account of his commitment to scientific
hod, as well as his interest in conveying a profoundly
fretted and fought against the dominance of the
conclusions were based on carefully defined terms and 
instrable on the basis of these.
within the framework of his political philosophy .
erialist theory.
ever, that an adequate reading of Hobbes's state of
itical message.
'bes's antipathy towards scolasticism is well known. He
|scholastic philosophers in the universities, accusing them
Kvi
of two major methodological failings.
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a over reliance on appeals to earlier authorities, 
tad of employing reasoned argument from firmly
in the nature of his criticism, and his dislike of the 
.
jlusions the schoolmen continued to reach on the basis 
such theorising, it is not surprising that scientific 
ictive reasoning appealed to him.
is not without good cause that later generations of 
Litical scientists have seen in Hobbes the birth of their
p*cipline.47 Hobbes felt the new science and particularly 
frometry, offered him the clarity, definition and structure 
Itich philosophy presently lacked, yet could acquire. His 
p»covery of Euclidian geometry is famously and appealingly 
•corded by Aubrey.48 We learn that Hobbes 'fell in love' 
Ath the discipline after falling upon an open copy of the 
Iiclldr and reading in it the proof of a proposition he at 
Arst took to be false and impossible. The methodological
plications of this were immense, and the political 
.gnificance no less so. Geometry offered him a method
47 Cf. D.D. Raphael, Hobbes; Morals and Politics, 
London, Allen Unwin, 1977, p.l.
J. Aubrey, Brief Lives, (ed) O.L. Dick, London, 
Seeker & Warburg, 195 8
dished first principles.
, lack of clarity and definitional consistency of terms
£jral to their philosophical arguments.
iich could not only discover the truth, but could
f.'
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nstrate truths by which one was convinced, and possibly
f i i j .
- the assent of those who were originally unwilling to 
t your claims. In Chapter Four of Leviathan he
Jm;, ■
t
^Seeing then that truth consisteth in the right 
'ordering of names in our affirmations, a man that 
Iseeketh precise truth, had need to remember what 
everyname he uses stands for; and to place it 
accordingly; or else he will find himself entangled in 
words, as a bird in lime twigs; the more he struggles 
j^ vthe more be limed.49
the nature of the 'truths' about political society
M'
Hobbes wishes to present to an audience he expected to 
lostile, Galileo's method promises to be a useful tool 
“ronce transported into the social sciences, it can 
’eve the same success.
M
If '4 '
X
n those who criticise Hobbes's other scientific leanings 
i happy with the way in which he has embraced Galileo's 
ositive resolutive method. The principle is simple and
t
s adoption obvious from page one of Leviathan. To 
derstand a body, one must break it down in to its 
jUstituent parts, explain those parts, reassemble them, 
thereby explain the whole.
T,
r
his method is clearly reflected in the structure of the 
ext. The entity which has to be explained is the 
ommonwealth, the full title of the work being Leviathan,
f< __________________
49 Leviathan Ch. 4, p. 105.
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f/ie Matter, Forme and Power of a Commonwealth 
|pxasticall and Civill. The work opens with an account
K 1IHf the first few chapters explaining the workings of
|p
human body, and then progressing to the nature of man
rgence of the commonwealth is the process complete. By 
laining the commonwealth's most basic constituent part, 
I placing that man in an incomplete or inadequate form
>bes aims to explain the 'matter, forme, and power' of
I political society best suited to man. Similarly, by 
1wing man in his most basic form, he aims to show how any 
ler form of political organisation would necessarily be 
>med to failure and ultimate dissolution.
,s particular approach to the explanation of social and
heory of methodological individualism as propounded by 
Hr
iriters such as Karl Popper, Freidrich Hayek, and J.W.N.
5U K. Popper The Open Society and Its Enemies & The 
| Poverty of Historicism; A. von Hayek The Counter Revolution 
of Science, Glencoe 111., The Free Press, 1965; 
I; J.W.N.Watkins 'Ideal Types and Historical Explanation' in 
I Readings in the Philosophy of Science, ed. H. Feigl & M. 
IBrodbeck, New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts Inc., 1953
ar. The state of nature is a stage in the
instruction, during which men are brought together, but
rived of a Sovereign; only with his appearance and the
lociety, and then moving him into the commonwealth,
olitical institutions has its modern day equivalent in the
fatkins.50 The latter provided what has become a
ifinitive statement of the methodological approach their
teory implies:
Efe
S',
IV
m
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According to this principle, the ultimate constituents 
o f  the social world are individual people who act more 
o r  less appropriately in the light of their 
dispositions and understandings of their situation. 
Every complex social situation or event is the result 
I o f  a particular configuration of individuals, their 
[/dispositions, situations, beliefs, and physical 
i resources and environment.51
similarities with Hobbes are obvious, the state of 
re, as just another social (albeit pre-political) 
titution has to be explained in terms of the individuals 
comprise it. We are compelled to explain, in detailed 
individual human behaviour.52
m
S c i e n t i f i c  E x p l a n a t i o n  o f  H u m a n  N a t u r e
Kb/
S'.'
>bes ' s adoption of a resolutive compositive approach
iff*-'
termines the starting point of Leviathan, and his 
;achment to mechanics determines the way in which that
irting point is analysed. Part One of Leviathan is
Ititled Of Man, Chapter One , " Of Sense". Here he
b |^ l
IXplains how men come to understand the world through the
51 J.W.N. Watkins 'Historical Explanation in the Social 
giences' in P. Gardiner ed Theories of History, Illinoisf 
le Free Press, 1959
Bar,
52 Sorrel claims that in his civil philosophy as 
•pposed to his philosophy in general Hobbes rejects the 
lethod of 'dissolution and explanation' in favour of a 
thod of 'dissolution and innovation'. He states 'Very 
e that Hobbes actually does in civil society conforms 
the pattern of decomposing things in thought and putting 
em back together again. Instead, things as experienced 
afe dissolved in thought, and something new is constituted 
out of the residue of dissolution, something not as yet 
ffxperienced. . . ' Sorrel, op cit. p. 21.
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'
of their sensory organs, and goes on to suggest how 
understanding determines man's psychological make-up,
I ultimately his social relations.
ft
m
soon becomes apparent that for Hobbes man in his most 
lc form is no more and no less than matter in motion,
" that his basic nature is determined by the laws of
B
‘ion. Having decided on the importance of definition and 
st principles in philosophy, Hobbes as a monist had to 
^ide to give one term primary importance - he chose 
ion. A new view of motion was central to the
Wr
ellectual revolution of the 17th century, and Hobbes was 
cinated - perhaps even obsessed - with the subject, as 
I evidenced by the inclusion of a discussion of motion in 
1 his major works. Rather like the sociology student who 
scovers Marx for the first time, no area of his life 
Id remain untouched by the experience.
t is easy to identify with Hobbes's enthusiasm to some 
ent at least. Motion was not of course a novel subject 
or debate, but for many years the Aristotelian model had 
eigned supreme. Certain aspects of the theory had been in
, estion since the 14th century, but no alternative had yet
Mi
been considered strong enough to replace the model as a 
Whole. However, by 1683 a fatal blow had been struck at 
the Achilles ' heel of Aristotle's theory. Galileo played 
Paris to Aristotle's Achilles, and his chosen weapon was 
5;Mathematics. Convinced 'that the book of nature was
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ten in mathematical signs', Galileo transported the 
olem of motion into the world of geometry.
Ike Descartes who accepted Galileo's theory, but chose 
estrict its role to that of a useful methodology, 
es came to see motion as comprising the whole of 
ity. In his opinion Galileo had provided the basis for 
entire cosmology.
f
jelieving that motion holds the key to nature, Hobbes 
in fact as close to Aristotle as he was to Galileo, for 
fas the former who claimed that knowledge of the nature 
movement was the 'gate of natural philosophy'.53 
iver, in terms of what they took to be the nature of 
It movement Hobbes owed very little to his Ancient 
ecessor. In Aristotelian physics the very existence of 
on requires explanation, to Galileo and later Hobbes 
on is a given, and only its changes are problematic.
I "
stotle presented movement as finite, a case of from 
.to Y, with every change having a definite beginning and 
r with the end or telos being an irreducible cause of 
change. Motion is teleological, and as such is a form 
fulfilment. It can be interpreted as a tension between
xl Aristotle Physics 3. 1. 200b
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trting point and a goal, with the latter giving its 
i to the particular process of change.54
f understanding led Aristotle to equate inertia with 
Movement terminates itself by achieving its telos 
completing the actualization process. A physical 
:t therefore, comes to rest when it reaches its proper 
ir and rest can be seen as an impetus to movement, with 
jts continuing to move only under the application of 
:nal force ie. the final goal. All motion requires 
:y, and only constant force can result in constant 
iron.
is's theory is strikingly different. In the
rlstotelian tradition the distinction between movement and
i- .it is central, for Hobbes it is the distinction between 
:ion and acceleration which holds most allure. He sees 
:ion as 'infinite, endless and aimless'55, and abandons 
ie notion of potentiality or fulfilment completely. The 
lise of the telos is clearly illustrated by Hobbes's 
Jcount of causation.
54 'It is the goal rather than the starting point which 
Lves its name to the particular process of change.' 
ristotle Physics 5. 1. 225a
55 T. Spragens, The Politics of Motion: The World of 
Thomas Hobbes, Kentucky, University Press of Kentucky, 
1 9 7 3 ,  p . 6 3 .
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'Universal things have all one cause which is 
motion...and motion cannot be understood to have any 
cause besides motion.56
>ffers the example of heat generated by a fire passing 
mgh the objects around it, a similar instance being the 
\ at the football match, pushing the supporter in front 
him and so on until there is a great surge forward.
B|
llise leads to effect and thence to further effect, and 
are reducible to something in process which must be 
•ion. For Hobbes it is the heat passing through the 
Ject, the football fan pushing his neighbour or a 
tiiard cue hitting the ball which is decisive, one does 
profit from thinking in terms of a final resting place 
it football pitch, or billiard pocket.
N'-» There can be no cause of motion except in a body 
contiguous and moved. For let there be any two bodies 
which are not contiguous and betwixt which the 
intermediate space is empty or filled with another 
body which is at rest; I say it shall always be at 
rest. For if it shall be moved the cause of that 
motion will be the same external body and therefore 
between it and that external body there can be nothing 
but empty space then whatsoever the disposition be of 
that external body, or of the patient itself, yet if 
it be supposed to be now at rest, we may conceive it
will continue 'til it be touched by some other body.57
|v
lobbes believes that the only cause of mutation or change
r
.n a body will be the motion of a neighbouring moving body.
I
f any body contained within itself the complete power to
56 Elements of Philosophy, English Works Vol. I pp. 69-
0.
57 Ibid., p . 124
it would always be in motion; as this is not generally 
rent, the cause (as every cause must have an effect)Wi
V be external. Agency is therefore a feature of 
es's account, but it is reduced to the sum of external
es exerted by bodies 'contiguous and moved'.
■Kr
Vcontent with abandoning the Aristotelian equation of 
t with inertia, Hobbes goes on to deny that there is 
h a thing as rest, instead there are motions and counter 
ions. He sees no impetus in rest, and therefore removes
IjV;-
p  it any ontological significance. Hobbes's world is 
;ntially 'rest-less', movement reigns throughout reality
iP)
Vis the basic principle of the universe.
m'
t r should not be surprising therefore when Hobbes
m: .ansports his theory of motion into the field of
S I
logical, psychological and ultimately social analysis, 
'ever, commentators remain unhappy with the shift, and it
§:
important to assess not only how successful Hobbes is in 
1 s attempts, but also how useful it is to his larger 
litical enterprise. Specifically in this context the 
question arises at to whether mechanistic analysis helps us
Jr-ws\
O construct an accurate picture of human nature. I shall 
gin by assuming an adherence to the methodology outlined 
above, and then question to what extent Hobbes remains true
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ting a monistic approach, and a belief that everything 
rhe world is subject to a mechanistic interpretation, 
»s has to offer such an explanation of man. He was 
junate that in 1628 Harvey had made significant 
•overies concerning the circulation of the blood and the 
pciple of internal movement.''8 The human body seemed 
for explanation in mechanistic terms, the circulatory 
■em could be regarded as a mechanical system, and from 
one could logically identify the mechanism of 
filiation with life itself. Life becomes a form of 
irnal movement of matter: specifically the movement of
and oxygen through the veins and arteries. The 
jigin of life is the heart, which acts as a pump for the 
, and life itself becomes "but a motion of limbs7. To 
j&end the analogy, if the universe is restless, the 
itural state for man to be in is in motion, and this 
^tion will continue until blocked by counter motion. Life 
continue until death, death is not seen as a final 
JSting place but rather as an end of motion, and as such 
bad thing.
lumans (and other animals) are however different in an 
important respect from inanimate objects. Although a stone 
11 continue to roll down a hill until blocked by a 
boulder, or halted by a change in the gradient, it is
m-
58. In the Epistle Dedicatory to the Elements of 
Philosophy Hobbes credits Harvey with the discovery of 7the 
science of man7s body7, English Works Vol. I, p. viii. 
For a discussion of Hobbes7 regard for Harvey. Cf. 
Spragens, op cit., p.13.
rficult to say that it intends to do so. A human being 
he other hand will understand the value of staying in, 
indeed accelerating motion, and this will have 
rtant psychological consequences. Every body (animate 
^inanimate) will stay in motion until impeded, the human 
will attempt to avoid impediments and at the same time 
their appearance.
difference may be explained by the fact that man will
lise that life is the necessary prerequisite for all
iti
her (earthly) goods, and that death is the necessary 
Bation thereof, and will therefore be motivated to do 
which is also biologically determined. The natural 
in instinct to avoid death will be accompanied by a real 
&r of that state. Furthermore, man's concerns will not 
simply with the immediate avoidance of death, but also 
th future security, and 'commodious living'.
ft
Jr '
n Continuall success in obtaining those things which a 
man from time to time desireth, that is to say 
continuall prospering, is that men call Felicity; I 
mean the Felicity of this life. For there is no such 
thing as perpetuall Tranquillity of mind, while we 
live here; because life it selfe is but motion, and 
can never be without Desire, nor without Feare, no 
more than without Sense.*’9
though the teleological elements of an Aristotelian 
theory cannot be rehabilitated into Hobbes's account, it 
does appear that the desire to stay in motion will operate
<i9 Leviathan Ch. 6, pp. 129-30.
similar motivating fashion to the desire to reach a 
1 resting point. If man is biologically programmed to 
I alive at all costs, he will be further programmed to
re the means to that end.
]
M  i
most fundamental, indisputable and unalterable fact 
teeming human nature is easily established, yet its 
rtance cannot be overemphasised. Man as a form of
ier in motion will stay in motion until halted by
%rnal forces. Furthermore men will desire to stay in
on, and an aversion to death will be an intrinsic and 
Iterable feature shared by all (normal) human beings.
Wr-
e question then arises as to whether further features may 
built upon this basic assumption.
*9 life is simply a form of motion, then everything man 
6 in life must be - and is - explicable in terms of 
tion. According to Hobbes, every form of human action is 
pi icable in terms of one of two forms of motion - vital 
pr voluntary.6(1 Vital motion concerns the very basics of 
ife, and is analogous with the functions a machine
performs the minute it is turned on - breathing, eating,
1|;
Bleeping etc. It is easy to accommodate this basic form of
. Js s
Motion within a simple materialistic framework. The other
Sf/'
form of motion is immediately more complex 'as to go, to
6(1 The term 'vital motion' is first introduced in the 
Elements of Law, Part One, Ch 7, section 1 and is developed 
in De Homine, Chapters 1, 2-4, 11, & 15 see also Leviathan, 
Ch.6, p.118.
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ak, to move any of our limbs in such a manner as is
[5.
st fancied in our brains'.61 This distinction is very 
ortant, but if both forms of motion are to fit into the 
hanistic framework, they must both be explicable within 
terms of the theory.
.al motions continue for as long as we live, although
jfch our medical knowledge we need not agree with Hobbes
t they will be uninterrupted. Voluntary motion on the
ier hand 'needs the help of imagination', 62 and it is by
lldying this form of motion that we will be able to 
% ,
_entify further features of man's nature beyond the fact 
B|& his aversion to death.
Hobbes is to be consistent he must argue that the 
>eginnings of such voluntary motions lie in our sensory 
irceptions. As he explains on the very first page of
yg>,v
Leviathan, things external to a person radiate motion 
lich,
...presseth the organ proper to each Sense, either 
immediately, as in the Tast and Touch; or mediately, 
as in Seeing, Hearing and Smelling: which by pressure, 
by the mediation of Nerves, and other strings and 
membranes of the body, continued inwards to the Brain 
and Heart, causeth there a resistance, or counter 
pressure or endeavour of the heart, to deliver itself: 
which endeavour because outward, seemeth to be some 
matter without. And this seeming or fancy is that 
which men call sense.. 6.1
61 Leviathan, ibid. .
62 Ibid.
63 Leviathan, Ch.l, p.85
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defines sense as 'nothing else but original fancy, 
ed ( as I have said) by the pressure, that is by the 
ion, of external things upon our eyes, ears and other 
ans thereunto ordained.'M
■Ip *
tained in this way, it appears that voluntary motions 
I* simply caused by the motion of external bodies, but as 
riously mentioned there is an extra dimension to 
‘-"itary motion, such that:
going, speaking, and the like voluntary motions, 
depend always upon the precedent thought of whither, 
I: which way and what; it is evident that the Imagination
I is the first internail beginning of all voluntary 
motion.65
goes on to say
These small beginnings of Motion within the body of 
Man, before they appear in walking, speaking, 
striking, and other visible actions, are commonly
called ENDEAVOUR. 66
f the endeavour is directed towards an external object it 
s called a desire or appetite, if it is away from it an
t&v
aversion. Men are born with certain appetites and
BP'
diversions, but others develop alongside experience, thus
SP'1'
there is an opportunity to adopt Hampton's distinctions 
between intrinsic and interactive properties.
Eh 64 Leviathan, Ch. 1, p . 86.
i-
65 Leviathan, C h . 6, p. 118.
66 Leviathan, Ch. 6 , p . 119.
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anguage of mechanics has to this point been
isfully carried through, but it must go on to explain
iy the origin of those appetites we are born with,
tlso those which we develop as life progresses.
P of our physical movement towards and away from
ile external objects, but also in terms of our
lip As in sense that which is really within us, is (as I 
H'have said before) onely motion, caused by the action 
jp*?of external objects, but in appearance; to the Sight, 
if!' Light and Colour: to the ear sound ; to the Nostrill, 
Odour &c: so, when the action of the same object is
|i continued from the Eyes, Eares, and other organs to 
I the Heart; the reall effect there is nothing but 
W Motion, or Endeavour; which consisteth in Appetite, or 
tt Aversion, to ,or from the object moving. But the 
apparence, or sense of that motion, is that we either
ire we come across a distinction between appearance and 
lality, and Hobbes's acknowledgement of this distinction 
fefatal to the survival of a mechanistic analysis in its 
ire form. Hobbes has introduced a distinction between the 
iy in which things really are and the way in which we
ceive them. For example, when we come across a pig,
are experiencing is motions of the type described above,
jermore, it must explain our endeavours not only in
ition to particular states of mind and well being.
i* call Delight or Trouble of Mind.67
iich feels rough, looks unappealing, and smells foul, all
however we do not understand our experience in this way, 
nor do we interpret our reaction to the pig as being the
67 Leviathan, Ch.6, p.121.
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lit of internal motions based upon our sensory 
options.
IP dichotomy between reality and appearance forces Hobbes
>andon to a large degree the discourse of motion, once
Ft'
is established it at the root of the analysis. For the 
^to operate persuasively he must adopt the language of 
rarance, as opposed to the drier and somewhat alien 
Course of reality. However, the reader should not 
jet the fact that it is there at the root, even if, as 
>es believes, ordinary people will fail to acknowledge
MW
IV
I
ill reality of any encounter consists in a process of
f iilly motions. As McNeilly explains, perception, thought 
ad desire are physical motions, this is what they really 
Ire, but not necessarily how they appear to us.68 Given 
l±s distinction we have a choice between two levels of 
iflcourse, that which deals with reality, ie. a discourse 
Pt,' the language of physical existence, matter and motion, 
Jr a discourse of appearance, which is always reducible to 
the first type of discourse. From the point in Leviathan
fhere he begins to discuss the nature of human endeavour
Hf:
lobbes abandons the language of reality and uses that of 
Ippearance, a short cut that threatens the purity of the 
■echanistic explanation he has offered up to that point.
68 F.S. McNeilly, The Anatomy of Leviathan, London, 
Macmillan, 1968.
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his analysis progresses Hobbes necessarily loses 
erest in the question of endeavours stimulated by
Isent external objects, thus, the mechanistic image of 
avour as a physical movement towards or away from that 
ect 1 oses its force. Instead he interprets endeavour as 
jnply the concept of some state of a person, such that, 
nchecked, it will result in an overt action towards or
Ik < ' • M •y from some preconceived objective'. y Hobbes is 
ately forced to abandon his purely physical 
lerpretation of endeavour precisely because of the nature 
the endeavours that concern him as a political 
pntist. As opposed to the physical scientist's interest 
endeavours towards or away from physical objects, the
:ial scientist has to investigate the way in which our
}Y.
deavours result from thought of a possible action.
I 
1
is said, one need not concur with McNeilly's assessment
!•Set 'the best thing one can do with Hobbes's mechanistic
iterialism is to dismiss it from mind as quickly as Hobbes
r
smisses it from his argument'. 70 Elements of mechanism 
unain to important effect, and the implications of his 
ichanistic foundations cannot be discounted.
jb order to construct a theory of human nature which goes 
|yond the fact that man has an innate desire to stay 
ive, we have to ask whether any further features are
r~
69 Ibid. , p. 106.
70 Ibid.
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red by (normal) men on a more or less constant basis.
.
also have to ask whether any objects of endeavour are
rlistently pursued by men qua men. It wrll be argued 
b that a relatively short list of features can be 
ilished, and the picture one can form on the basis of 
list is open to more than one interpretation. The 
it identifiable feature is man's insatiability.
i tiability
I'h
>es is certain that man's appetites will be insatiable, 
'to have no desire is to be Dead'71, and as soon as one 
lire is satisfied it will be replaced by another.
Nor can a man any more live, whose Desires are at an 
end, than he, whose Senses and Imaginations are at a 
stand. Felicity is a continuall progresse of the 
desire, from one object to another; the attaining of 
the former, being still but the way to the later. The 
cause whereof is, That the object of mans desire, is 
not to enjoy once onely, and for one instant of time; 
but to assure for ever, the way of his future desire. 
And therefore the voluntary actions, and inclinations 
of all men, tend not only to the procuring, but also 
to the assuring of a contented life; and differ onely 
in the way: which ariseth from diversity of the
passions, in divers men; and partly from the 
difference of the knowledge, or opinion each one has 
of the causes, which produce the effect desired.72
Men do not simply desire to stay alive, rather they wish to
W
fee 1 secure in that end and therefore desire a life
71 Leviathan, Ch.8., p. 139.
72 Leviathan, Ch. 11, pp. 160-161.
acterised by felicity™ and satisfaction. In Chapter
K
of Leviathan, Hobbes states that
«
This motion which is called Appetite, and for the 
apparence of it Delight, and Pleasure, SEEMETH TO BE, 
W  a corroboration of Vitall motion, and a help 
thereunto; and therefore such things as causeth 
Delight, were not improperly called jucunda, (a 
* Juvando,) from helping or fortifying; and the contrary 
molesta, Offensive, from hindering, and troubling the 
motion vitall.74
already discussed, the ordinary man is more inclined to 
nk in terms of appearances; in this case it will involve
understanding a link between those things for which he
jk; •
s an appetite, and pleasure. He may feel drawn towards
Jr
~©thing because it causes him pleasure, but, more
i
operly he should understand his desires as relating to 
e 'corroboration of vitall motion; and pleasure as
fi'X
mething he experiences because of this effect.™
jk
he distinction between appearance and reality is 
ignificant in a further sense, given the observable fact
hat men often desire things which threaten their
%
elf-preservation or well-being. If someone chooses to do
73 Defined in Leviathan, Ch.6, p. 130, as 'continuall 
successe in obtaining those things which a man from time to 
time desireth'.
74 Leviathan, Ch. 6, pp. 121-122.
™ In this he is very similar to Locke who argues that 
pleasure is a consequence of doing what is right rather 
than a reason for doing it.
thing detrimental to his or her self-preservation, in 
es' s terms it must be argued either,
he person is mad and has been caused by 'mechanical 
'unction' to abandon the desire for self preservation,
I'-the individual is mistaken concerning the effect a 
posed action will have on his self preservation.
£■
jjistances of the second type raise a number of interesting
I*’'
“ues. Misunderstandings may arise for a variety of 
isons - false information being a prime example. As
jt'
ntioned above, Hobbes's anti-scolasticism was in part due 
the dangers he saw in individuals accepting false 
trines on authority.76 If individuals are given false 
formation - unintentionally or otherwise - which they do
w :
t test in a scientific manner, they may unknowingly act 
gainst their own self-interest. Responsibility therefore 
ies with those in positions of influence to deal in the 
ruth, and those happy to receive doctrines from others to 
,est their truth value. Hobbes is most insistent on this
a?/?, •
cint confident in the assumption that his own theories
ill pass the test, it remains to be seen whether his
3p
Confidence was well founded.
k
76 There are many warnings in Leviathan, including the 
observation that 'it is evident , that whatsoever we 
belive, upon no other reason, than what is drawn from 
authority of men onely, and their writings; whether they be 
sent from god or not, is faith in men onely. Ch.8, p.134.
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pXi due to the unreliability of the senses instances 
e second type will not be uncommon, even where the 
is rigorously sought. This raises some interesting 
lilities. If men can go against their interests due 
unreliability of their own thought processes, it 
d appear that the way is left open for a Rousseaian 
of forcing men to be free, by forcing them to pursue 
'course of action that is genuinely in their interest,
-Vv 1
pposed to apparently so.
(if something sounds good a man will choose it and if 
evil will shun it. It is the following of ones hopes 
it and fears that constitute the nature of election.] So 
that a man may both choose this and cannot but choose 
this. And consequently choosing and necessity are 
joined together.77
M-n when men are not mistaken as to the correct manner in
eh to pursue their self interested desire to stay alive
dpt-t
re is room for diversity. It is undeniable that man's 
petites and aversions are determined by his status as
tter in motion, and his necessary and unavoidable desire
M ■*
stay in motion. But, as Hobbes stresses this shared
tivation is not enough to tell us how each individual
ft
ill interpret the means to that end. Although Hobbes is 
lling to assert objectively and categorically that men 
ill seek to stay alive, or conversely, avoid death, he is
I f ) ;
Less willing than one might assume to build further 
objective statements into his account. Having laid this
11 The Questions Concerning Liberty, Necessity and 
Chance, p.75, section in parentheses is paraphrased.
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»ctive foundation to his theory of human nature, his 
>unt becomes far more committed to a subjectivist view. 
Icause it is in the nature of matter to be constantly in 
||p.on, man as a form of matter in motion will be subject 
^Constantly changing desires alongside the constant and 
(Changing desire to stay alive.
pi
Hobbes's view to call something 'good' is to say nothing 
ire than that one has an appetite for it, similarly to
Hbel something as bad is to state that one has an aversion 
it.78 As has been established, these in turn mean
I
Lttle more than 'conducive to' and 'detrimental to' vitall 
>tion. What now has to be established is whether this 
lubjectivism will result in men pursuing an infinite amount 
hroutes to their shared goal, or whether the apparent 
fttbjectivism of Hobbes's ethics might still allow some sort 
R  consensus and uniformity in the way men behave.
rojLsm
1 that can be said so far is that all men will seek to 
atisfy their present desires, and will attempt to secure 
ihe enjoyment of future desires. This has been taken by 
lome commentators to provide the basis for a thorough going
78 As such his meta-ethics might be assumed to precede 
•hat of the twentieth century emotivists such as C.L. 
tevenson, Ethics and Language, New Haven, Yale University 
fress, 1944 .
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»sm, but one must not attempt to say more on this score 
h Hobbes's theory actually allows.79
hV
!sm in its simplest form may be described as 'systematic ishness ' . In more sophisticated terms, it can be seen 
[the placing of self interest at the basis of a moral 
ory.y
Egoism holds that each individual's reasons for 
In acting, and possible motivations, must arise from his 
own interests and desires, however, those interests 
p  may be defined. The interests of one person can on 
; this view motivate another or provide him with a 
s reason only if they are connected with some sentiment 
of his like sympathy, pity or benevolence.80
ie argue that no causal/mechanistic explanation of human 
aviour can bring forth an account of psychological 
ism, precisely because it renders useless the concept of 
otive. More commonly however, commentators seem willing 
present - and usually condemn - Hobbes as a
1
Iroughgoing egoist. Before this dispute can be decided must present a more thorough definition of the| ■
'chological egoism of which Hobbes is accused.
79 For an excellent discussion of the debate concerning 
ibes and psychological egoism see Kavka, op cit., Section 
I, pp. 35-4 4.
80 T. Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism, Oxford, 
irendon Press, 1970, p.84.
ton identifies three forms of psychological egoism:
the position that all of my actions are caused by my 
res.
5 the position that all of my actions are caused by my 
Ires and that they are in pursuit of a self-regarding 
ct of desire.
!'• \
: the position that all of my actions are caused by my 
ires and that my desires are produced in me by a "self- 
erested" bodily mechanism .81
»es's account of the will leaves one in no doubt that 
esian man is a psychological egoist in sense PEI, but 
in itself is fairly uncontroversial. What we have is
basic Humean position which excludes the possibility of
■
laining actions purely in relation to belief requiring 
Itotead an accompanying desire. Hampton is unwilling to 
.use Hobbes of egoism type PE2 and although one might 
msider her interpretation generous, it is possible to 
iept that PE3 is at least a more appropriate version in 
respect of Hobbes. Hobbes does allow in Leviathan for the 
:ssibility of other-regarding actions, 82 but he never 
abandons the claim that any desires I have are caused by a 
elf -interested biological mechanism.
81
82
Hampton, op cit., p.23.
However, as Kavka points out his definitions of 
-erms such as 'pity' and 'free' gift are always couched in 
*9°istic terms. Kavka op cit., pp.46-47.
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8 line with the points raised above,81 Hampton says of 
Itpes,
(p He never characterizes pleasure as something we 
H  desire; instead he presents it as an experience we are 
h  biologically programmed to pursue and which the 
attainment of certain desires will cause. Hence the 
;i/ biological pursuit of pleasures is for Hobbes part of 
the causal story explaining why we have desires for 
certain object, but is not itself a desire.84
‘bly confirms what has been established on the basis of
fi
lechanistic explanation of man. All desires will stem
lose which successfully promote this fundamental desire 
til in turn promote pleasure.
more interesting perhaps are the claims that Hobbes
itement has both moral and practical force. He believes
'final men, is a great equaliser. This is because, in the
I; even if one calls Hobbes an egoist in this sense, one
!bm the biologically determined desire to avoid death, and
;es concerning man's natural equality.
ality
•bbes states that all men are naturally equal, and this
hat the desire to remain alive, which is common to all
81 Cf. p. 154 above.
84 Hampton, op cit., p. 23.
resort, all men (and women) have an equal chance of 
ess in defending themselves when their life is
eatened. In terms of actual equality amongst men it 
Id be said that his is a negative account of equality.
use each individual is, in the last resort, able to
<end their life from attack - be it by brain or brawn -
single individual is sufficiently superior to naturally 
ome master over another. In other words, rather than 
ing that all men are all equal in real terms, he seems 
te saying that they are not sufficiently unequal for 
, to be significant. This is not to rule out the
of one man becoming master of another, in fact 
es allows for this possibility in the state of nature, 
ifically in terms of the relations between men and
ken. The point is that the relationship will have to 
artificial - that is, based on a consenting agreement 
;ween the two parties. This is of course an extremely 
>rtant point in terms of explaining Hobbes's preference 
the social contract model.
f allowing that all men share the basic desire to stay 
|&ve, Hobbes also allows for more substantial forms of 
lality to develop. Just as all men desire the same end, 
men will desire the means to that end. Hobbes not only 
Sknowledges this as fact but elevates it to a moral issue
85 Cf. Hobbes, De Corpore Politico, Ch.Ill, p.149-50 
also R.W.K. Hinton, 'Husbands, Fathers and Conauerers', 
Political Studies, XVI, 1, 1968; C. Pateman, The Sexual
|p°ntract, Oxford, Polity Press,1908, Ch.3.
iving men what he calls a natural right to do whatever 
consider necessary for their self preservation.
The Right of Nature, which Writers commonly call Jus 
Naturale is the Liberty each man hath, to use his own 
power, as he will himselfe, for the preservation of 
his own Nature; that is to say, of his own Life; and 
consequently, of doing anything, which in his own
Judgement and Reason, he shall conceive to be the 
aptest means thereunto.86
m
pi
^effect of this equal right to self preservation and the
|»». *1 i •*»s thereto, has generally been taken to be disastrous, 
ough the subjectivism inherent in Hobbes's theory will
HEf' >!vent all men desiring the same things, or even the same
». desiring the same things over time, there will be a
sic coincidence of wants, which, combined with a natural 
arcity of the means to satisfy those wants, will result
conflict. Hobbes further states that man's appreciation
• . . .  his basic equality with others will give him hope of
Squiring what he desires, and thus he will be encouraged
I;,face up to conflict if and when it arises, and will see
potential benefit in competing with others for those
ings he feels are essential to his well-being - that is
things for which he has an appetite. Thus the
H •
ipetitiveness so unquestioningly attributed to Hobbesian 
n is not pursued for its own sake, rather it is the 
product of equality combined with perceived scarcity. 
However, there is one thing which Hobbes believes all men
176
;'i desire as a means to self preservation and this is 
sr.
>bes believes that men not only share a desire for power,
i5 that life can be characterised as a constant pursuit of
K
per. He defines the power of an individual as 'his 
•sent means, to obtain some future apparent good'.87 As 
ih it is an essentially contentless concept, although he 
!ers numerous examples of different forms it may take.
ter may be understood in the traditional sense of a 
Niral faculty of mind or body, or it may be
instrumental!' by which Hobbes means an ability to
fluade others to harness their natural powers to you. 
s explains the full title of the chapter in Leviathan 
roted to the subject of power which is 'Of Power [Worth,
fer is not, Hobbes tells us, desired for its own sake,
or to ensure 'more intensive delight', but because 'heMi,
man) cannot assure the power and means to live well, which 
ie hath present without the acquisition of more.'88 It is
•r
rnity, Honour and Worthiness]'.
| in the nature of power to be inf lationary/cumulative. 'Like
Hi
the motion of heavy bodies, which the further they go make
87 Leviathan, Ch.10, p.150.
88 Leviathan, Ch. 11, p. 161.
1 more haste'89, the desire for power increases over
!*•
This argument bears striking similarities to 
hronistic Cold War rhetoric in defence of the continued 
k piling of nuclear weapons, such that the only way to 
fleet what we had, it was argued, was to acquire ever 
weaponry.
%■
ft
es's notorious statement 'I put for a generall
1
ination of all mankind, a perpetuall and restlesse
„ 'W-
re of Power after power, that ceaseth only in death/,90
%lt.
often caused alarm, not least because it is usually
A 1
ented on a plate with other Hobbesian cliches of an 
list variety. However, it deserves more detached
p*
sideration.
J$r
power is simply a means to ensure future felicity, it is
W :
t to each individual to add content to the notion of
Tpo
er, and acquire it in the way he or she feels most 
ropriate. The distinction Hobbes introduces between 
trumentall and natural power is relevant here, and 
lows for the introduction of the more contemporary
It ’
tinction between power and authority. Whilst some men
I t .
ensure their survival and happiness by sheer personal 
ength or intellectual ability, winning every battle of 
t or muscle, others will ensure their own safety by
178
show convincing other men to use their power on their 
llf •
W
What quality whatsoever maketh a man beloved, or 
feared of many; or the reputation of such quality, is 
power: because it is the means to have the assistance 
r and service of many.91
£V'
si
U
.larly, 'to have servants is to have power; to have
Lends, is power: for they are strengths united'. 92 As
jviously stated Hobbes allows for the emergence of the 
iter-servant relationship within the state of nature, and 
his account of power it would seem that he allows for 
possibility of men co-operating, and combining 
sorts of power. In fact it is essential that 
ley do so because 'there is no man who can hope by his own 
rength or wit, to defend himself from destruction, 
|thout the help of confederates'. 93 Such co-operation is
B' C
course an alien concept within the state of nature most
lentators attribute to Hobbes, but a closer reading of
$*;j!
ie text reveals that it is not ruled out.
IT:
I' •
11 would be useful at this stage to draw together the 
features of human nature so far established, and then move
r
91 Leviathan, Ch.10, p.151.
92 Leviathan, Ch.10, p.150.
93 Leviathan, Ch. 15, p. 204 . This would appear at first 
to contradict Hobbes's earlier statements which make man's 
fundamental equality rest upon each individual's equal 
ability to 'save themselves from destruction', unless of 
Course one reads it as an equal inability to do so unaided.
see how man in a state of nature behaves on the basis
e nature attributed to him. The features identified 
*r are
jfor
'biologically/mechanistically determined drive to stay 
and secure a felicitous existence, combined with a 
ng of life and a desire to avoid death.
insatiability of desires including the desire for
pi
In, egoistic psychology.
“ fundamental equality.
w
pi,
(the basis of these assumptions, the state of nature has
w'
ditionally been read in the following way. Hobbes opens 
V chapter 'Of the Natural1 Condition of Mankind, as
V
eerning their Felicity and Misery' with his statement of
m-
Coverall equality of man. Although, as stated above,
$
's desires will not be exactly the same as those of his 
ighbour, there will be a certain coincidence of wants, 
^ticularly concerning those things men understand as 
ting beneficial to their vital motion ie. personal 
urity, wealth, felicity, and the means to such ends.
ft will appear to each individual that he has a reasonable 
hance of securing his desired ends, and this equality of 
hope, when combined with a scarcity of the commodities 
necessary to commodious living, will lead men to become 
enemies in the pursuit of broadly common ends. Competition
ffidence emerge, and the popular picture of Hobbes's
#&'
;6f nature follows closely behind.
P
n e  wants the best for himself, and he therefore comeE
%conflict with his neighbours, who not only share 
X  objectives, but also have similar ideas about how 
iieve them. It seems unavoidable that at some stage 
st the state of nature will be as unpleasant as this
JT
»"io suggests. As suspicion and insecurity grow,
w
Hi
e will become a preemptive strike, and the "warre of 
man with every man" will be a terrifying reality.
JH
^ftiggested at the beginning of the chapter, this reading
If’
ifies the horrors of the state of nature whilst, it 
‘1 be argued, ignoring the evolutionary account of humar. 
u r e  that necessarily follows on from Hobbes's basic 
_chology. Given our definition, Hobbes's theory of humar
Ml-
u r e  must assemble a collection of characteristics which 
» together exclusive to humans, however it will be showr. 
at the single faculty which proves most beneficial to mar. 
o n e  he shares with 'Brute Beasts'. As stated above, mar. 
'ill not by virtue of Hobbes's theory live in a vacuum
ftfu
• V e n  in the state of nature he will confront sufficient 
external objects to stimulate his sensory perceptions. Mai 
Will be in touch with both animate and inanimate objects 
a n d  on the basis of his encounters will build up a body c: 
experience. This experience will allow all men to develo;
181
;ain interactive properties94 which will enrich the
Kip
l_c theory of human nature offered above.
important to remember that man as a form of matter in 
>n is subject to constant change in common with any 
|r form of matter. The most interesting changes in this 
sxt are psychological. Two particular mental
Lyities are exclusive to man, the search for causes of 
Ip^ved facts, and the pursuit of consequences of possible 
irses of action, of which the latter is called curiosity, 
lining these activities provides the ability to judge 
irences and similarities, to learn from experience and 
i^djust responses accordingly.
Ik 
mj
llltually, through his contact with the outside world, man 
tllds up a reservoir of experience. He will begin to link 
lyticular memories and phantasms, however simple, and work 
t for example that clouds mean rain to come, whilst rain 
s clouds past. This correlation is the very essence of 
tldence, the consideration of which is crucial to an 
tcurate interpretation of man in his natural state.
Cf. 135 above.
flence is not a faculty we are born with, but one that 
jjtssarily develops as a result of life experiences, 
ggp man acquires prudence and, says Hobbes, as his 
lining it depends on his experiences each man will 
rally attain an equal degree of prudence.95 Any 
ificant difference will be qualitative as opposed to
f
titative and therefore less threatening to the overall
§;■
iity of men in their natural state.96
es states:
%!:
'■ J 
mi
When the thoughts of a man that has a design in hand, 
running over a multitude of things, observes how they 
f conduce to that design; or what design they may 
conduce unto; if his observations be such as are not 
easie or usuall this wit is called Prudence; and 
| dependeth on much experience and memory of like things 
r and their consequences theretofore.97 
3:
...this wit of his is called PRUDENCE.... In which 
there is not so much difference of Men as there is in 
| their Fancies and Judgements; Because the experience 
of men equall in age, is not so much unequall, as to 
the quantity; but lyes in different occasions, every 
one having his private designes. To govern well a 
family, and a Kingdome are not different degrees of 
Prudence, but different sorts of business...98
95 Leviathan, Ch.8, p. 138.
96 Ibid.
ere are of course difficulties with this account of 
.dence. It is strange to think that qualitative 
fferences will be less important than quantitative 
ferences, and it is also strange to assume that at the
bKI' <■
of their lives the hermit, the soldier, the magistrate
Jfr
d the travelling minstrel will have acquired the same
jpi<
unt of prudence, as their experience of life will 
ibtless be different in quantitative as well as 
alitative terms. One can only assume that Hobbes onceW
j & i
ain employs what I have called a negative theory ofMr
uality, such that the differences or inequalities are not
at enough to be significant. Furthermore, men who have,
ved an equally long time will, up to that point, have
nl' f
splayed equal prudence in respect to the all important
j f j :
estion of self-preservation.
owever, one has to realise that prudential reckoning is 
ot a scientific activity, as its discoveries are not
“iversal or certain, neither is it philosophical. Hobbes
jfeu.
arefully distinguishes it from reason.
Swi
...it appears that reason is not a sense, and memory, 
borne with us; nor gotten by experience onely; as 
Prudence is; but attained by industry; first in apt 
imposing of names; and secondly by getting a good and 
orderly method in proceeding from the Elements which 
are Names, to assertions made by connexion of one of 
them to another; and so to syllogisms, which are the 
connexions of one assertion to another, till we come 
to knowledge of all the consequences of names 
appertaining to the subject in hand; and that is it, 
men call SCIENCE. And whereas Sense and Memory are but 
knowledge of fact, which is a thing past and
irrevocable; Science is the knowledge of consequences 
and dependence of one fact upon another.'"
P'.
ason is the pace, Encrease of Science, the way; and the 
'©fit of man-kind, the end'1,10 but given that the state 
nature is one in which there is no science, the faculty 
have to rely on is prudence.
But yet they that have no science, are in a better, 
and nobler condition with their natural Prudence; than 
men that by mis-reasoning, or by trusting them that 
j$. reason wrong, fall upon false and absurd general 
rules.1(11
J I
t we need to discover is how reliable it will prove in 
ding men's actions towards desirable ends.
r
~en the certain existence of at least a degree of 
dence in every man we have to ask what effect this will 
Ve on our assumptions about his behaviour in the state of 
ture. It would appear for a start that we can say 
;ething specific about the manner in which human 
haviour will be subject to change. As experience grows 
JD's behaviour will be tempered by prudence - especially 
ause, Hobbes says, bad experiences are the best 
achers.
w Leviathan, Ch.5, p.115. 
ltKI Leviathan, Ch.6, p.116.
101 Ibid.
ee basic features of man's nature accelerate the 
elopment of prudence in the state of nature, these are
(i
. . . . iosity, insatiable appetite, and suffering.
i
iosity, as mentioned above is a faculty which
inguishes man from animals, and is defined as the
IF
“.re to know how and why. It is a desire to know causes,
~<o 9 # a
! a delight in the generation of knowledge. Curiosity 
ances prudence because it causes men to become involved 
more experiences, to widen their horizons, and thereby 
discover more antecedents and precedents. The curious
;V, # a
will be forever following new paths, attempting new
pr-W'
tures, but as Hobbes informs us, many avenues of enquiry 
•i< be closed because,
J ...there is no place for industry; because the fruit 
l thereof is uncertain: and consequently no culture of
jC( the Earth; no Navigation, nor use of the commodities 
that may be imported by sea; no commodious Building; 
A no instruments of moving and removing such things as 
require much force; no knowledge of the face of the 
Earth; no account of time; no arts; no letters; no 
society;102
seems probable therefore, that when man exercises his
jftf
tural curiosity, he will direct it towards what he 
nsiders 'worst of all', that is he will enquire as to the 
Uses of the terrible situation within which he exists. 
U one way at least the state of war will be constructive, 
that -
Anxiety for the future time disposeth men to enquire 
into the causes of things; because the knowledge of 
them maketh men better able to order the present to 
their best advantage.'103
BO,
f e . '
previously discussed, man's insatiable appetite is
only seen as one of the most negative features of
Ite •
es's account of human nature, and a primary cause of
.
war like situation where it exists. However, if one
T
• •'ftres to Hobbes's own logic, and his strict use of 
nition, one has to accept that man's appetite will also
18ft '
tribute to the development of prudence.
Hr- *W x .
B'
•7
's insatiability, which manifests itself in a constant
suit of felicity, leads him to chase one object of
0  '
•ire after another. The adventures involved in doing so
11 be numerous, particularly as he will for the most part
pv
competing for scarce resources, with men of more or less
fe •'
al ability. As prudence grows alongside experience, the
If
tivity will be valuable, as long as it does not result in 
jth.
thermore, appetites and desires also contribute to the
I s  • •
elopment of wit and intelligence, although here Hobbes
h
andons the equality he assumes elsewhere.
The causes of this difference in wits, are in the 
Passions: and the differences in the Passions
proceedeth partly from the different constitution of 
the body and partly from different education.104
%  *
passions which contribute most to differences of wit 
desires for power, riches, knowledge and honour, which 
Hobbes can be reduced to a desire for power, 
jref ore,
f
1 A man who has no great passion for any of these 
things; but is as a man terms it indifferent, though 
he may be so far a good man as to be free from giving 
offence; yet he cannot possibly have either a great 
fancy or much judgement. For the thoughts are to the 
j  desires as scouts, and spies, to post abroad, and find
the way to things desired.105m 
W r
6,
n without desires is a colourless specimen, shallow and 
tless with little to recommend him. 'For as to have no
If •sire is to be dead; so to have weak passions is
IP
ness.'1(16 Desires alone give coherence to mental 
scourse, and help men to make better use of past 
erience. In the pursuit of their desires men become 
re prudent, and, if they have it in them, (as education
i
such is irrelevant in this context), more intelligent.
nally, one has to consider the role of suffering.
jt
nsistent with the general theory of matter in motion, 
ich states that once in motion a body will remain so
104 Leviathan, Ch.8, pp. 138-9.
105 Leviathan, Ch.8, p. 139.
106 Ibid.
hindered and eventually stopped, the internal motions 
ed by contact with an external body will continue until 
As man's major concern is the maintenance of 
1 motion, he will pay particular attention to those 
“iences which harm or threaten him. It is generally 
med that the classic response to attack will be counter 
ek, or indeed pre-emptive strike, but there is also the 
Von of avoidance. The question is whether men will come 
ecognise this option.
TSL'. 
p.',
M;
es allows that men will attempt to link antecedents and 
equences, and thereby establish what or who threatens 
life, and nowhere discounts the possibility of
s$
idance as an appropriate response. There is nothing to 
y that some men, if not all, will learn slowly, and 
Obably painfully what spells danger, and will then
up
tempt to avert it rather than meet it head on.
Pi
M'
f man's prudential powers develop in the manner Hobbes 
scribes, then his suffering will have an educative 
"feet. He will not tolerate continual suffering and he 
‘ll attempt (successfully or not) to alter his activities 
order to avoid suffering and ensure a felicitous 
existence. Life per se is the basic means to all ends, a 
life without suffering is an end as well as a means. 
Prudence allows each individual to determine as far as 
possible the best way for him to promote that end, but all 
individuals will come to recognise certain things as
gsary prerequisites - most obviously peace and 
ity.
s  S t a t e  o f  N a t u r e  - A  S e c o n d  R e a d i n g .
W :WL'
combining these intrinsic and interactive features of
m
n nature a new evolutionary account of human existence
H
rges, which in turn permits a re-reading of man's
Hr
*%tence in the state of nature, particularly in the
iH
i o d  immediately prior to the formation of the 
onwealth. Referring back to Berry's account of what a 
ory of human nature should be able to do, he wanted to 
able to answer four basic questions.
. ft ®j
Are men solitary or communitarian?
Are men political or apolitical?
Are men free rational or determined rational?
; Are men perfectible or imperfectible?
i
jfc
iat has been said so far clearly has important 
lications for at least the fourth question, and also 
b e a r s  on the others. Men will change during there time in 
t h e  state of nature, and the experiences of one generation 
will not be entirely lost on the next. Never a completely 
solitary being men will realise the benefits of some 
communal activity, they will speculate as to the merits of 
political rule, their prudence will compensate in part for
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\X lack of reason, in short they are perfectible even 
ore the institution of government.
illustrate more clearly how this will alter our standard 
ling of man's existence within the state of nature we 
only consider the effect these developments have on 
way in which different individuals seek to acquire 
»r.
ien become more experienced it would be unrealistic to 
le that they would remain convinced by the overall 
Ifclity ascribed to them. This equality is largely 
lal, and is only put to the test in life threatening 
trcumstances. Instead men will begin to recognise 
lequalities and some will be forced to investigate ways of 
jquiring power which do not necessarily depend solely upon 
ldividual strength or intelligence. Some will realise
ijijf'
lat their route to survival lies with allying themselves 
those who are naturally powerful, others will use their 
ifharm, intelligence, and worthiness to attract such 
idividuals towards them. However, it would be wrong to
tj
read on from here and resolve all conflict within the state
h
of nature. This process will necessarily be limited, and 
the natural arena for its existence would appear to be the 
family.
Just as obedience to the laws of nature is conditional upon 
the existence of sufficient security, contracts of power
|L1 only take place where individuals can be sure of the 
nefits that will emerge from them. Whilst the occasional 
liance of strangers might be possible, say in the face of 
ne natural disaster, co-operation will usually be 
nfined to situations in which men are tied together by 
mething more than necessity. The question then arises as 
whether Hobbes allows for the possibility of such 
lationships. What he has to say about family suggests
Hi
at he does, although he could be accused of deliberately 
scuring the fact.
s
bbes wrote in De Civez
i
jp 
it.
...to man by nature, or as man,that is, as soon as he 
is born, solitude is an enemy; for infants have need 
of others to help them live, and those of riper years 
to help them live well.'107
■5
During his long debate with Bramhall, he conceded that 'it 
is very likely that since the creation there never was a
H 7time when man was without society.'108 And in Chapter
m
Seventeen of Leviathan he explicitly states, that families 
existed in the pre-political state.1(W In fact he equates 
familial and political rule saying "Cities and Kingdoms are
107 De Cive, Ch. I, sect. 2. Hobbes makes this a 
statement in the footnote to this section in which he 
discusses the common claim "that man is a creature born fit 
for society".
108 Liberty, Necessity and Chance, English Works Vol. V, 
ed. W. Molesworth, London, John Bohn,MDCCCXXXIX, pp.183-4.
log Leviathan, Ch. 17, p. 228 .
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_■ Greater Families' and again, 'A Great family is a 
gdom and a little kingdom a family'110
ever, breaking sharply with the patriarchalism of his
", Hobbes insisted that paternal power was not derived
C
m fatherhood as such, because no status among men is 
ftural, subordination being due rather to convention and 
dividual consent. Furthermore, if sovereignty was seen 
a matter of procreation a mother would have as much 
ght to sovereignty over her child as a father. In fact, 
claim would be stronger as there is no mistaking who 
e birth to a child, whereas identifying the father is 
as clear cut. However, his views on the inadvisability 
divided power meant he had to adopt a principle upon
Jlich to decide between parents.
Tfor;
e power of the mother, Hobbes argued, is a reward for 
ieserving the lives of her children when she had the 
^ortunity and the right to destroy them. So, in the 
tate of nature
if the mother shall think fit to abandon or expose her 
child to death, whatsoever man or woman shall find the 
child so exposed shall have the same right which the 
mother had before; and for this reason, namely for the 
power not of generating, but preserving.,m
110 Cf. Leviathan, Ch.17, p.224, also Ch.20, p.257 .
111 De Cive Ch IX, Section IV, See also Leviathan Ch-20, 
p.254 .
g passage from De Cive is supported in Leviathan, where
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j b e s  states that paternal authority "is not so derived
||n the Generation as if therefore the Parent had dominion
P- '
his child because he begat him; but from the child's 
lusent, either express of by sufficient arguments 
Glared"112
(though it is the mother who originally possesses dominion
■K
^ a l s o  in the father's power. There is nothing natural to 
■ a t e  that this must be so, but in practice it will be the 
iase because 'for the most part commonwealths have been 
i r e c t e d  by the Fathers, not by the Mothers of Families.'113 
la Carol Pateman has argued the social contract is predated 
jp a  sexual contract which firmly places women under the
le father not only has dominion over the child, but also
IVer the child's children, and those childrens' children, 
'For he that hath dominion over the person of a man hath
lominion over all that is his; without which dominion were
ijr the child, if she is subject to the father the child
mtrol of men.114
nit a title without ef f ect' .11S
112 Leviathan, Ch.20 p.253.
113 Ibid.
114 C. Pateman, op cit., pp. 339-77 . 
113 Leviathan, Ch.20, p. 255 .
would appear therefore that within a family a power 
icture evolves, a parent nurtures its child, because 
though in the short run it might make all their 
^stences more precarious, in the long run the child will 
its power with the parent, as will future generations, 
J the power of the family unit will increase as required.
father will only retain power for as long as his 
^ural or instrumental power is sufficient to offer his 
sfolk protection from the power of other families.
Sever, as prudence increases with age and experience, the
W  " m
ads of families will be peculiarly well-suited to this 
**sk. Similarly they will understand more acutely than 
"dieir children the dangers of the state of nature, and it 
they who will begin to look for a way to avoid the state
war which is still a possibility between families.
Is
It
f
“d so a very different picture of the state of nature 
“gins to emerge, as the result of a re-reading of Hobbes's
V-
count of human nature. The only features of human nature
H.
at Hobbes can claim to be unchanging within the confines 
jK, his theory are the desire to avoid death, the 
-Satiability of appetites, the consequent desire for 
rer, and a very basic form of equality. It is a mistake 
o build upon this basis a static vision of man's nature 
md the situation it will result in. The features Hobbes 
stresses are, if we are to be generous, the result of 
observation and introspection, if we are to be cynical, 
they are features required by his political ideology.
en the inevitable development of prudence - an
I'
eractive human property - man's conception of the way to 
lire power will change. The fierce individualism of the
iy state of nature will be tempered, and things will
a
i°P gradually towards the point at which the heads of
JF
Jlies will be in a position to form the social contract, 
will desire to do so not only because they will be
%
e of their insecurity with respect to other family 
fcs, but also because the limited security they haveT ’
Oyed teaches them the advantages of living in a settledsn>\
|«1J.
te, developing their voluntary motions as opposed to 
.ply ensuring the continuance of vital motion.
as?/St
accepting an evolutionary account of man's psychology -
f-
d such an account is available to Hobbes - it can be 
own that man's motive for leaving the state of nature 
is beyond a fear of death. As in any situation avoidance
death is the fundamental motive for action, but men will
• • • • so see the pleasure attached to dorng so. Lrfe within
e family offers a valuable glimpse of 'commodious
Jving', and the knowledge of pleasures to be gained by
Eft ■
emaining safe spurs men into action. As men develop
§
SBrV
tudence they will begin to understand the benefits 
ttached to peaceful relations between individuals and
gj$<‘
roups. They will gain this insight through their 
Membership of families, which under the prudential guidance 
Of the patriarch will seek to protect the lives of their 
Members and ensure them felicity. Within the family
ortunities will arise for individuals to contract with
$5' another , and as Hobbes states simple contracts of
p
hange will occur prior to the commonwealth being 
ted. Thus, men will rehearse the moral actions
f l ­
ared by the consenting processes.
Jtime goes by the state of nature will become one in 
Ch the state of war is a vivid possibility as opposed to 
ever-present reality. Men will learn the advantages of
©e and security through experience, and will come to
m
ue the type of life these make possible.
%
I'-
elusion
Bfv 
I,
e purpose of this chapter was to show that men in a 
bbesian state of nature can reach a point at which they 
e willing and able to form a contract. This conclusion 
only feasible if one can show that the account of human 
‘ture Hobbes is committed to on the basis of his
In
chanistic first principles is not necessarily that which 
1 read at surface level in Leviathan.
m
-Ian cannot abandon the desire for self-preservation which 
is natural in the full sense of the word, nor can he fail 
to pursue those things he considers necessary to his 
survival. He can however change his conceptions of what is 
necessary, and thereby modify his actions. Similarly he
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:ome to see as equally important those things which are 
tsary to his well-being as opposed to his simple
I more sympathetic interpretation leads towards the 
fusion that the account of the state of nature given in
nstration. The political proposals Hobbes goes on to 
,( require the presence of a dark spectre in the past 
use the scientific method fails on its own to convince 
of the political 'truths' he propounds. To provide
r spectre Hobbes freezes a moment in the evolution of 
Pk<s character and presents it as human nature. If he had 
resented the evolutionary account outlined above, he would 
ive overcome criticisms concerning the unlikelihood of the
bsolute and arbitrary ruler'. In the end the achievement 
lit his political goals requires his disloyalty to a 
ientific method which failed to throw up the results he
r i v a l . .
\&than is ultimately a tool of rhetoric as opposed to
ial contract, but he would also have called into
istion the need for, and the justification of, the
iquired. In the following chapter of this thesis the 
iplications of this fact will be investigated further.
Chapter Three 
Hobbes, Determinism, and Consent
f;
S'il-respected commentator, Patrick Riley, has recently 
sed his attention upon the theory of volition 
rpinning Hobbes's consent-based structure, and claims
have found it lacking.1 Specifically he feels that the
m
Vuntarism implied by Hobbes's frequent use of consent is 
supported by a clear enough commitment to a notion of 
edom of the will. One would expect, Riley writes, that
ms'
bes would 'develop a theory of will as a moral faculty 
se free choice gives rise to authority and obligation.'2
tead, Hobbes is committed to - and insistent in - his
f|
fence of a deterministic understanding of volition.
£ this chapter I wish to examine Hobbes's determinism and 
fiess whether or not it should be taken to detract from 
*s consent-based explanation of obligation. Two
tegories of question arise.
H
wf‘
.. Those concerned with determinism in general, and its 
ompatibility or incompatibility with the concept of free
Will and / or any form of voluntarist theory of political
K
obligation.
|h----------------------
1 P. Riley 'Will and Legitimacy in the Philosophy of 
Hobbes: Is he a Consent theorist?' Political Studies, Vol
XXI No. 4, pp. 500 -522 . Riley develops his argument
further in Will and Political Legitimacy, Cambridge Mass., 
Harvard University Press, 1982, pp. 23-60
2 Riley, op cit., p.500.
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Chapter Three 
Hobbes, Determinism, and Consent
A well-respected commentator, Patrick Riley, has recently 
focused his attention upon the/ theory of volition 
underpinning Hobbes's consent-based structure, and claims 
to have found it lacking.1 Specifically he feels that the 
voluntarism implied by Hobbes's frequent use of consent is 
not supported by a clear enough commitment to a notion of 
freedom of the will. One would expect, Riley writes, that 
Hobbes would 'develop a theory of will as a moral faculty 
whose free choice gives rise to authority and obligation.'2 
Instead, Hobbes is committed to - and insistent in - his 
defence of a deterministic understanding of volition.
In this chapter I wish to examine Hobbes's determinism and 
assess whether or not it should be taken to detract from 
his consent-based explanation of obligation. Two
qategories of question arise.
1. J^Jiose concerned with determinism in general, and its
compatibility or incompatibility with the? concept of free
wil]< a$d / or any form of voluntarist theory of political 
v ’■ ' 
obligati,011 • " x /
f P. Riley 'Will and Legitimacy in th^ Philosophy of 
Hobbes: Is he a Consent theorist?' Politidal Studies, Vol 
XXI No. 4, pp. 500 -522 \ Riley develops his argument
further in Will and Political Legitimacy, Cambridge Mass.,1 
Harvard University Press, 1982, pp. 23-60
2 Riley, op cit., p.500.
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2. Those concerned with Hobbes's particular version of both 
determinism and consent.
Questions of the first type are notoriously difficult and 
it might be considered unwise, or at least unhelpful to 
stray too far into the metaphysics of freedom. As one 
philosopher has said in a passage unintentionally poignant 
in an Hobbesian context:
Most people- 99 per cent and more, no doubt- have 
always been too busy staying alive and fending for 
themselves in difficult circumstances to have any 
time or taste for the question of free will.
Political freedom, for many of them, has been a major 
concern, but metaphysical freedom has just not been 
worth worrying about.3
It remains to be seen whether a fully developed concept of 
free will is a necessary component of a consent-based
theory, but it does appear that the question is at least 
"worth worrying about", in this context. In a
consent-based theory of political obligation, the 
metaphysical and political aspects of freedom are closely 
linked. To be politically free, the individual must have 
given his consent to the government, which rules his 
actions through the laws it makes. It is part of the
concept of consent utilised here that this consent be 
freely given. The question then arises as to whether this
3 D. Dennett, Elbow Roomf Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, p.5.
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consent necessitates a prior form of freedom, that is 
freedom of the will.
Many would argue that an act of consent, as defined in the 
introductory chapter, must entail ideas of voluntariness, 
choice and control over one's actions, and that these are 
the very features of human action which are displaced by a 
deterministic explanation. If, as the determinist
maintains, my actions are caused in some tangible way by 
earlier events or states of mind which were themselves 
caused, how can I be said to be obligated on the basis of 
those actions, which were not chosen by me in any real 
sense, and indeed which I could not have avoided doing?
There are a number of ways of dealing with the issues 
surrounding determinism in the present context:
1. To deny the existence of determinism, and show how 
Hobbes was mistaken in his loyalty to such a system.
2. To underplay the importance of determinism in Hobbes's 
theory.
3. To evaluate the fears concerning determinism and assess 
Hobbes's particular version of the theory on the basis of 
the conclusions reached concerning determinism more 
generally.
Given that Hobbes was committed to a deterministic 
framework by virtue of both his mechanism and his theology, 
neither the first or the second option appear appropriate. 
The first option has already been pursued at great length 
by Bishop Bramhall of Derry, and although he raised many
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useful criticisms of Hobbes's theory, he did not succeed in 
shaking Hobbes's confidence in or commitment to a 
deterministic model.4 To deny the importance of
determinism would entail a rewriting as opposed to 
reinterpretation of Hobbes's work, and such an exercise 
would not be appropriate within the bounds of this enquiry. 
Which leaves only the third, and probably the most 
difficult option.
It is obvious that many of the concerns people express 
about determinism are acutely relevant to voluntarist 
theories. Without control, without responsibility, and 
without the real option of choice the consent mechanism is 
robbed of the moral infrastructure within which it has 
traditionally operated. If he is to permit the survival 
of his contract theory, Hobbes must show that his theory of 
determinism allows us to counter the critic's fear that 
these features will be absent from a deterministic 
framework. Furthermore, he must show that his peculiar 
brand of determinism can support a definition of consent 
appropriate to such a theory.
The ultimate aim in this chapter is to present an 
interpretation of Hobbes's determinism which allows for a 
politically and morally significant notion of consent. The
4 Cf. Bishop J. Bramhall A Defence of True Liberty from 
Antecedent and Extrinsicall Necessity and Liberty, 
Necessity and Chance, Volume V English Works of Thomas 
Hobbes ed. W. Molesworth, London, John Bohn, MDCCCXLI.
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deterministic elements of Hobbes's theory are essential to 
the logic of his system as a whole, and must not be 
abandoned. If consent cannot be accommodated within such 
a framework, Hobbes's theory is seriously flawed.
It will in fact be argued that Hobbes's theory allows for 
an adequate concept of consent to emerge, and that the 
nature of the determinism he proposes could serve to 
complement, rather than threaten, a contractual account of 
obligation.
The way forward lies in a thorough investigation of 
Hobbes's persistent claim that liberty, and necessity are 
compatible. First, however, we must look at determinism in 
more general terms, as it is popularly perceived and 
criticised.
Deterministic Bogeymen
Some of the problems that arise over understanding 
determinism can be cleared up by ensuring that it is not 
confused with the quite separate doctrines of fatalism and 
predestination. Indeed these theories must be seen as the 
products of fundamentally different ages and outlooks.
Fatalism is a rather mystical and superstitious view 
that at certain checkpoints in our lives, we will 
necessarily find ourselves in particular circumstances 
(the circumstances "fate" has decreed) no matter what
203
the intervening vagaries of our personal 
trajectories.5
Fatalism says that my morrows are determined no matter 
how I struggle. This is of course superstition. 
Determinism says that my morrow is determined by my 
struggle.6
Whilst definitions of fatalism tend to stress the 
superstitious and mystical, determinism at least claims to 
be scientific. Fatalism presents the individual as swept 
along by a predestined and unavoidable sequence of events, 
whilst determinism - in its softer forms at least - gives 
the individual a more positive, albeit determined, role.
Definitions of determinism vary but most share certain core 
characteristics. In the present context, determinism will 
be taken to be that doctrine which states that the human 
will is not free, because willing like any other physical 
event, is caused by the sum of all prior events. This 
definition is chosen because it stresses the materialism 
inherent in most deterministic accounts, and immediately 
invokes the vocabulary shared by the Hobbesian version of 
determinism to be considered later.
Accepting a deterministic framework has immediate 
implications for understanding human action at both a macro
5 Dennett, op cit., p.104.
6 R. E. Hobart 'Free Will as involving Determinism and 
Inconceivable without it' Mind, Vol XLIII No. 169, 1934, 
reprinted in B. Berofsky (ed-) Free Will and Determinism, 
New York, Harper and Row, 1966. p.82.
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and micro level. Some of which are particularly relevant 
to political philosophy. Critics of determinism consider 
these implications unwelcome, and although their worries 
vary in type, they tend to assume a similar list of 
negative features attaching to any deterministic framework. 
At present we shall consider only those criticisms which 
appear to have a special bearing within the present 
enquiry. For example, the assumption that causally 
determined events are necessarily predictable.
If human action is subject to causal explanations, it is 
possible that is will also be predictable, as it will be 
law-governed and ultimately understandable as such. This 
fact affords real opportunities for understanding the 
behaviour of individuals and societies in a way that is 
unavailable to the non-determinist. However, it must be 
said that in a world which usually welcomes the opportunity 
to explain phenomena in scientific terms, there is often a 
significant degree of intuitive resistance to interpreting 
human behaviour in this way.
Many see predictability as a negative and even dangerous 
trait. At an individual level it detracts from the sense 
of diversity and individuality ascribed to the human being, 
and at a macro level it offers possibilities for 
manipulation and control.
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Contract-based theories of political obligation are a 
defining feature of a profoundly individualistic tradition, 
hence the particular importance of assessing the impact of 
a deterministic approach upon our interpretation of the 
individual. Critics believe that the determinist's model 
immediately disarms those who wish to stress the diversity 
and individuality of the human agent. An individual whose 
behaviour is predictable is also, they claim unoriginal 
and uninteresting. Thus, in a world of causally determined 
beings, uniformity would be inevitable, and originality 
would be impossible.
However, this negative interpretation can be attacked on 
a number of points. In the first place determinism does 
not always lay itself bare, and many of the causes 
contributing to human nature and action will remain either 
obscured, or entirely inaccessible. The extent to which 
causal factors can be identified and in turn used to 
construct predictive forecasts will vary immensely, and a 
certain mystery is almost sure to remain, especially at the 
individual level. Having said this, the determinist would 
always stress that the fact we do not understand or know 
the nature of antecedent necessary causes is not in itself 
proof that they do not exist. Rather, it will be the case 
that not all causal links will be searched for, and some of 
those we do seek out will never be found. Due to the vast 
number of variables involved, individual human action is
unlikely to be entirely predictable, and the individual 
human being will remain capable of surprising us.
As to the accusation of uniformity, there is no good reason 
to believe that a world which can be explained in terms of 
scientifically verifiable relationships between cause and 
effect is necessarily one in which all human beings end up 
the same. This will become clear as we discuss the 
position of the human agent within the causal chain.
Finally, we should appreciate that where it does exist, 
predictability is not always a negative trait. Qualities 
such as trustworthiness, reliability, and steadfastness, 
which we attribute to individuals on the basis of our 
reliable predictions that they will behave in a certain 
manner in given situations are generally seen as positive 
qualities. Indeed much of moral education is geared 
towards ensuring a certain predictability of response when 
faced with moral decisions, and much of social interaction 
can only proceed on the basis of assumptions about how 
individuals and groups respond to stimuli.
Despite these reassurances a modern, and distinctly 
political worry, develops from concerns about
predictability at an individual level, and centres on the 
power determinism can afford to those who do come to 
understand the way in which individual acts, and even more 
importantly, group behaviour is determined. Psychologists,
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politicians, and sociologists assume a basic determinism in 
their explanations and predictions of human behaviour, and 
in turn may use what they learn about causal factors to 
modify that behaviour. The fear is that 'success in 
explaining and predicting can never be divorced from 
success in manipulating and controlling'.7 Whilst the 
psychoanalyst might use her understanding of causal 
relationships to liberate a patient from psychosis or 
hysteria, the ideologue may well have more sinister aims. 
The combination of a deterministic understanding of human 
nature, and a teleological approach to human development is 
often seen as particularly worrying. To coin the old 
adage, all power corrupts and absolute power corrupts 
absolutely. To fully understand the causes of fundamental 
human behaviour is to hold something akin to such absolute 
power.
These very general yet nonetheless pervasive fears which 
people harbour, provide a backdrop for the more specific 
criticisms we shall go on to explore. Those who attempt to 
dismiss determinism may well do so because they believe 
that it is incompatible with the ideological framework 
within which they choose to operate. Hobbes was prepared 
to go to great lengths to show that determinism was 
compatible with Christian belief, and obviously saw no 
reason to assume that it was not also compatible with a 
political system grounded upon a social contract. It is
7 A. MacIntyre, 'Determinism', Mind 66, 1957, p.29.
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this second hypothesis which shall be tested here, not 
forgetting earlier discussions concerning the ideological 
nature of social contract.
To return to Riley's particular complaint against Hobbes, 
his doubts stem from the incompatibility which he sees 
between determinism and voluntarism. To take this point 
further we must identify the hall-marks of a voluntary act, 
and ask whether similar characteristics can ever be 
ascribed to acts which are known to be causally determined.
The definition of consent offered in the first chapter 
contains certain key words, some of which do not figure 
highly within a deterministic discourse, but which might 
none-the-less be included without incongruity.
Consent was defined as:
an intentional grant of permission given freely by an 
autonomous rational agent, on the basis of full and 
accurate information.8
Later in this chapter it shall be shown that there are no 
good reasons to assume that a determined act cannot also be 
intentional, rational, and informed. This is not to say 
that it will necessarily be any of these, all we need to 
refute is the claim that it can be none of them. Our
8 Cf. p. 71 above.
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immediate attention however will focus on the issues of 
freedom and autonomy.
Although definitions of autonomy have been shown to vary, 
an assumption is made that an autonomous being is one who 
is in control of his actions, responsible for his choices 
and answerable for the effect he has on the world. Such an 
assumption seems particularly important within the context 
of a social contract where the individual will be bound by 
certain obligations because he, as an autonomous free agent 
has agreed to be so.
The missing key words that are implicitly contained within 
this description of an autonomous being, yet initially 
appear absent from deterministic discourse are control, 
choice, and responsibility. In order to make determinism 
compatible with voluntarism these words must be
rehabilitated, yet critics of determinism such as MacIntyre 
go to great lengths to exclude them.
The discovery of causal explanations for our actions, 
preferences, and decisions shows that we could not 
have done other than we have done, that 
responsibility is an illusion and the moral life as 
traditionally conceived a charade. It makes praise 
and blame irrelevant, except in so far as we discover 
them to be causally effective, and while the moral 
judgements of agents might therefore retain some 
point, those of spectators and critics would be 
pointless.9
9 MacIntyre op cit., p.29.
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On this interpretation, if I accept determinism as a fact, 
I must ask myself:
1. Can I still claim to have control over my own actions?
2. Have I been able to choose my actions if I have to admit 
that I could not have acted differently?
3. Can I be responsible for my actions?
4. Are my actions in any meaningful sense free?
By raising questions such as these we severely shake the 
moral foundations which underpin the consent based model. 
If I answer these questions in the negative the rational, 
autonomous agent is said to no longer exist, and the moral 
infrastructure necessary to make sense of consenting/ 
promising and obligation has disappeared. The critic of 
determinism has no doubt that I will be forced to these 
conclusions. It is therefore necessary before referring 
specifically to Hobbes's account of causation to do some 
preliminary work examining and hopefully dismantling these 
traditionally held fears concerning determinism. If these 
fears cannot be entirely disposed of, we will have to ask 
whether the infrastructure we end up with can do the same 
work as the structure which traditionally supports a 
voluntarist theory.
As has already been stated, the question Hobbes addresses 
most directly is the last which concerns the compatibility 
of freedom and necessity. For this reason we shall
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concentrate on the first three questions, and return to the 
fourth when we come to consider Hobbes's own theory of 
determinism in detail.
Individual Control in a Deterministic World
The imagery of determinism as presented by its critics, is 
often that of prisons, hypnosis, and puppet shows. 
Irrespective of what he or she might believe, if 
determinism is true the individual is no better than a 
puppet, a prisoner, or the victim of a showbiz hypnotist. 
In the worst of all possible worlds, the individual will be 
painfully aware of this fact, and the result will be 
resignation and apathy. To be any of these things 
mentioned above, is to lack control over one's actions in 
some significant sense, and critics would state that such 
lack is characteristic of anything subject to causal 
explanation.
One is in fact entirely controlled by external forces, 
locked into a life story that was written at the dawn 
of creation, like a puppet that was destined to play 
Punch and Judy even before its wooden face was carved 
and painted.10
In such a situation, it is argued, any feelings one might 
have of being in control are mere illusions, and what
10 Dennett, op cit., p. 50-51.
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happens is simply part of an enormous causal chain which 
began millions of years before one's birth. The point of 
taking the causal chain back 'to the dawn of creation' is 
to exclude, with as much certainty as possible, the idea 
that I might have some control over the causes in question. 
In fact what it does is deny the individual what Nozick 
calls 'originatory control', that is the ability to 
'initiate a new causal chain that was not already in 
progress'11. Instead I am a tiny link in a chain that 
stretches back millions of years before my birth and which 
may stretch even further, into my future and beyond.
However, if the denial of individual control largely 
depends upon adopting the 'dawn of creation' view of the 
causal chain, it would seem to depend upon adopting a 
perspective on the world which is divorced from ordinary 
understanding. In many respects we accept the way we act 
here and now has been affected by events which occurred in 
the past, or at a distance from us in the present. We 
often speak in a convenient shorthand which excludes 
unnecessary reference to causal factors and concentrates on 
making an event easily understandable within our present 
environment. As Nozick points out:
Even if I build, install, and set a thermostat, 
controlling it and controlling its controlling the 
temperature in my house, still, it does control the 
temperature in the house (No one has ever announced
11 R. Nozick, Philosophical Explanations, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 1981, p.315.
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that because determinism is true thermostats do not 
control temperature.)12
The point is really this, I created and set the thermostat, 
but from there on it determines when the heating comes on 
and goes off. The fact that it has some control is 
evidenced by the fact that if it goes wrong and 
malfunctions the heating will not come on at the 
temperature I chose. I made the causal chain pass through 
the thermostat, thus giving it some control over events 
from here on.
Human beings have a similar position within the causal 
chain. While he accepts that determinism denies the 
individual originatory control (that is other causal 
factors determine the point at which the causal chain 
passes through them) Nozick is prepared to search for other 
forms of control consistent with a causal explanation. He 
states 'the origin of the cause does not originate with 
her, but the fact that it causes her to act does.'13 The 
first step towards realising the possibility of self 
control is to take a realistic view of one's position 
within a deterministic universe.
We know perfectly well that causation can be entirely 
inscrutable- utterly lost in a tangled web of 
coincidence- and still be causation. What caused this
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
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grain of sand to be right where it is on the beach? 
Something did- or rather billions of things over 
billions of years did. We ignore cases like this. 
But if the grain of sand is part of a footprint on the 
beach we focus in on one cause- the cause of its 
being depressed from the position it would otherwise 
presumably be in. When we think of cases of causation 
we almost invariably think of cases where the 
relationships are laid bare, where the actuality or at 
least the practicality of control by an agent is 
manifest. After all we speak of "the" cause of an
event or phenomenon These are "good clear cases of
causation" . We tend to forget the equally good cases 
of causation that are virtually indescribable and 
utterly uncontrollable by us.14
Even if we live in a universe where everything could 
eventually be explained in terms of cause and effect, we 
only concern ourselves with those causal chains we have a 
chance of understanding, and those we understand as acting 
upon us, passing through us, or affecting our immediate 
environment. Even then we speak in terms of single causes, 
such as the foot pressing on the sand, rather than lengthy 
and complex chains. Thus we render the point at which we 
lock into the chain manageable, and afford ourselves the 
possibility of understanding it.
It is at least possible that we shall gain something 
valuable from learning more about the causal chain of which 
our future actions form a part. Even though we are locked 
into a causal chain, that chain has only so far determined 
our present, because we are now part of the chain we have 
some chance of helping to determine our future.
14 Dennett, op cit., p. 60.
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Although we are powerless to influence the causes which 
have had their effect before our existence, we can in some 
sense determine which causes are effective from now on. 
Suffice to say at the present moment, the way to understand 
the causal chain is not as running over us, picking us up 
and dropping us arbitrarily, but rather as running through 
us, such that the existence of causes is not under our 
control, but the fact that they cause us to act is.
Dennett's account^* often appears to equate control with ^  
knowledge of causes, which is particularly interesting 
given the importance of knowledge and information within 
the definition of consent used here.15 Just as knowledge 
of causes may afford power to others, self knowledge, in 
the sense of knowledge concerning what causes me to act, is 
empowering, and possibly even liberating. If I come to 
understand my position within the causal chain, and gain 
knowledge of the causes acting upon me I will not, to 
borrow Dennett's phrase, 'be at their mercy'. As 
previously stated I will not necessarily need to understand 
the chain of causation in its entirety, instead I must 
concentrate on local causes and the way in which the causal 
chain passes through me. If I can come to understand the 
process of cause and effect as it relates directly to me 
and my actions, then I will perhaps be able to exercise 
some control over it.
15 Ibid. , p. 65 .
Although more will be said on this subject below, we must 
at this stage acknowledge the accusation that what we are 
actually describing is a feeling of 'being in control' as 
opposed to real control. The indeterminist would argue 
that just as I, rather than the thermostat in Nozick's 
example, really control the heating in my house, in a
determined universe my actions are controlled by antecedent 
causes which I may or may not understand. All that
knowledge of causes can do is to reconcile me to the causal 
ancestry of my actions. Knowing what has caused me to do 
something will not necessarily confirm that I am in control 
of my actions, in fact it might have the opposite effect. 
It will only be possible to meet this accusation as a 
fuller picture of the agent emerges.
Responsibility
One reason for the non-determinist's preoccupation with 
control, is that seeJit as being inextricably linked
to the concept of responsibility. If I am not in control 
of my actions then I cannot really be said to be
responsible for them, and responsibility is important to
our account for a number of reasons.
V (/
Responsibility is a valuable social concept which forms an 
integral component of all moral systems. It is variously 
defined, but common to most accounts is the idea of being
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the primary cause and being accountable. This immediately 
alerts us to a double meaning - I am (causally) responsible 
for something if I made it happen, but (morally) 
responsible, that is accountable, only if I did so in a 
particular way. Being responsible involves acknowledging 
the causal efficacy of your actions, and ensuring that as 
far as possible you remain in control of what you do.
To say of an individual that he either 'refuses to take 
responsibility' or 'cannot cope with responsibility' is to 
criticise him quite severely. There is seen to be little 
merit in carelessness (in the sense of being unconcerned 
about the consequences of your actions), especially as very 
few acts are purely self-regarding, and what we do is 
almost certain to have an effect on others.
However, our approval of responsibility is taken to go 
further than this, such that we as individuals have a 
positive desire to take responsibility for who we are and 
what we do. We see the notion of responsibility as 
contributing to our feelings of self worth and individual 
value. If we are not responsible, then this has 
implications for our claim to the status of autonomous, 
rational individuals. Such status is a necessary
prerequisite to participation in the contract process 
outlined here, and more generally defines us as a full 
member of the human species. The social contract model 
seeks to make individuals responsible for fulfilling the
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obligations they acquire on the basis of their consent, it 
is important, therefore, to show that an individual can be 
properly assumed responsible for his actions (particularly 
his choices) within a causally determined framework.
Critics of determinism would stress that responsibility is 
based on agency, and then claim that a deterministic 
account cannot accommodate a sufficiently full notion of 
agency. To be held responsible one must be shown to be 
something more than 'a mere thread in the fabric of 
causation. /16 One must be seen in some real sense as a 
'self-chooser'17, and given that determinism excludes the 
possibility of being an originator, some other way must be 
found of accomplishing this. We shall begin by exploring 
the relationship between control and responsibility.
If I were to knock over a vase whilst sleep walking, the 
owner may regret what has happened, and mourn the loss of 
a valuable possession. I was causally responsible for this 
loss, but to blame me in any real sense would achieve no 
useful purpose. Moral blame requires more than causal 
responsibility, it requires intentionality, or at least 
negligence. I had no control over my actions, I did not 
intend to do it, and I could not have prevented it from 
happening by acting differently. On the other hand, if I 
drink too much and thereby lose control of my actions, I
16 Ibid., p. 75 .
17 Nozick, op cit., pp.352-362.
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can be taken to be responsible in a fuller sense. In the 
latter case, even though I lack control, I am culpable for 
that lack, I could have acted differently and avoided it 
happening, and therefore I am morally as well as causally 
responsible. I did not intend to break the vase but I did 
intend to get drunk, and I have to accept the consequences 
of that choice.
The critic of determinism would hold that these examples do 
not differ in any important respect. In his view no one 
whose actions are truly determined is ever 'in control' in 
a meaningful sense, and therefore never fully responsible 
for their actions. Whether or not a person drinks too much 
or remains sober is itself determined, and therefore the 
individual lacks control at a higher level in both cases.
Perhaps the important issue is not control, but rather 
choice. As I have said, if I walk in my sleep there is no 
way of saying I chose to break the vase (unless I stretch 
a point and say by choosing to sleep I put myself at risk 
of sleepwalking). However, if I deliberately get drunk I 
at least choose to put myself in a condition that might 
lead to me breaking the vase. Although both examples are 
different in kind to one in which I choose directly to 
break the vase, the second at least contains some element 
of choice, and this is significant. The question remains 
as to whether the determinist is entitled to speak in any 
meaningful way about choice.
220
The issue of choice is central to many discussions of 
determinism. Nozick defines indeterminism precisely in 
terms of individual choice, and interprets free will as the 
ability to choose which causes will influence you. What we 
need to know is whether this degree of choice might also be 
possible within a deterministic framework. If I can and do 
make such choices, I might be held responsible for what 
happens, even if I did not originate the situation which 
makes the choices necessary. So although it was determined 
that I arrive in a position where I choose between being 
drunk and being sober, I need to know whether I choose in 
some meaningful sense what to do.
It would appear that without a concept of free choice, our 
chances of establishing an acceptable account of individual 
responsibility are finally thwarted. To deny the
possibility of free choice is to close the gap between 
causation and compulsion, and the only way to ensure that 
determinism is compatible with some form of individual 
responsibility, is to permit these terms to be treated as 
distinguishable.
On the surface, the chances of achieving this aim might 
appear slight. To be morally responsible for something we 
have to have chosen to do it, and this is taken to imply 
that we could have done something else instead. Yet, 
however sophisticated a role we give the individual within 
our causally determined structure, the critic would always
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be able to say that in a certain situation it was never 
open to that individual to act differently.
This is often considered to be the Achilles' heel of the 
determinists' theory, and as such must be seriously 
addressed. Basically, it has to be shown that the fact 
that one could not have acted differently does not, in 
itself, rule out the possibility that a choice was made.
The Deterministic Chooser
If we wish to investigate Nozick's claim that the agent has 
some form of choice over whether or not a cause is 
effective upon him, and the earlier claim that the 
individual can exercise some form of control over his 
actions, we will profit greatly by examining the concept of 
the (causally determined) agent further.
It has already been stated that the story of human 
causation is rather different to that of other beings or 
objects. Rather than being swept along in the causal flow 
human action forms part of the causal chain and that chain 
runs through the human agent, effecting him and being 
effected by him. If a ball hits another ball what happens 
next is in part determined by the nature of the two balls - 
their size, heaviness, bounciness etc.. If a causal chain 
passes through a human individual its future course will
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similarly be effected by the characteristics of the 
individual, but the range of relevant characteristics is 
much more sophisticated. The human is not simply a 
physical being, he also has a mental life, and by passing 
through the human being the causal chain will be effected 
by his physical and mental functions. An individual 
presents within a determined universe a 'self' which is a 
physical, mental, and some might add, spiritual creation.
As individuals we have a strong image of 'self'. It is 
through that self that we see our actions emanating, and it 
is to that self that our plans and projects relate. The 
individualistic moral tradition within which social 
contract theory sits most happily celebrates the image, and 
emphasises individual integrity, moral perfection of the 
self, and self determination.
However, the extent to which we accept that the nature of 
the self is determined by causes outside the self may well 
differ, and these differences may have accompanying 
effects. If an individual believes that his basic 
character/self has been caused largely by external 
circumstances acting as causes, he may not feel inclined to 
take full responsibility for his actions. Whilst such an 
individual would possibly accept that he has control over 
what acts upon him as a cause, he may feel that he had no 
control over, or part in creating who or what he is ie. 
the self that is doing the choosing. In such a case
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knowledge of (or belief about) causes could work to erode 
the agent's sense of individual responsibility. On the 
other hand, an individual could think that they got to be 
the person (self) they are despite the external causes that 
could have made them somebody very different. In this case 
the indeterminist feels that something needs explaining 
which falls outside a deterministic framework.
According to the indeterminist even if a person's character 
is affected by external circumstances, inherited traits, 
socialisation, etc., the existence of some freedom to 
respond to those circumstances is evidenced by all those 
individuals who do not follow the path predicted for them 
on the basis of these facts. To claim that one's self has 
been formed entirely by causes outside the self, over which 
that self has no control, is unacceptable. We form 
ourselves by responding to our external and internal 
experiences, and by choosing which of them we shall allow 
to be causally effective. The self evolves precisely 
through the choices it makes and it is free to evolve in 
whatever way it chooses.
To this the determinist would answer, that yes individuals 
differ, (it is determinism's critics who impute to them a 
vision of human uniformity and predictability), but what 
makes them differ is predetermined, be it through their 
genes or however you choose to explain it. Even before 
society and its jumble of causes set to work, there is a
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basic self, the nature of which is determined, probably by 
biology. Man has an individual character (and a unique 
genetic make up) which may or may not be altered by his 
environment, but at its most basic level his fundamental 
starting point is something he inherits in the same way as 
the colour of his eyes, or the set of his jaw. The self 
which eventually emerges has to be seen as a development on 
from the embryonic self which provides the starting point.
We recognise the one essential fact that the nature 
precedes the act, and that the nature is simply a 
"given" fact in the world (not originally created by 
the agent himself...)18
It seems indisputable that the self as a sophisticated 
rational moral agent begins as a basic mental and physical 
being, definable in terms of its inherited biological 
profile and basic instincts. This is the given
predetermined kernel from which the full person grows. But 
this is the personal equivalent of the 'back to the dawn of 
creation' view of determinism, and acknowledging this fact 
does not entail denying any responsibility for the later 
self that one becomes. Just as concentrating on local 
causes facilitates our understanding of a causally 
determined universe, studying causes more local and 
immediate than our ancestry and upbringing often help us to 
understand how we have become the person we are, and why we 
act in the ways we do.
18 Hobart, op cit., p. 21.
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We accept that,
Each particular act of mine is determined from outside 
itself, i.e., by a cause, a prior event. But not from 
outside me. I, the possessor of the power, am not in 
my acts passively played upon by causes outside me, 
but am enacting my own wishes in virtue of a chain of 
causation within me.19
The buck has to stop somewhere, and in simple terms I have 
to accept that 'I' am the cause of my acts. I did not 
create myself, because my self is in part determined by 
what I am at my most basic level. But I am unique, my 
basic self, which I share with others bought forth an 
individual who has experienced life in a way no other 
individual has shared. The situations I find myself in 
have been determined partly by me, and partly by causes 
external to me. My present is always determined and 
unavoidable. My future is similarly determined, but I, as 
in my self, am an important determining factor of it. My 
character, my desires and my abilities will be causally 
effective. If I as an individual was not involved in the 
present, the future would be different. The fact that who 
I am now is determined cannot rob me of the belief that it 
is important that I, rather than someone else, have 
ultimate responsibility for my destiny. The story of 
causation sometimes concentrates its activity on me and 
works through me. What it does, what I do makes a 
difference, and sometimes it makes the difference I intend.
19 Ibid. , p. 14.
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We seem to be saying that it remains important that I am 
the cause of an event or action, even if I suspect that the 
'I' concerned is not of my own making. The indeterminist 
would be unhappy with this conclusion so it needs to be 
investigated further.
We often have to acknowledge that 'If I had not done X, Y 
would not have happened.' If I had not walked in my sleep 
the vase would not have been broken. This is of course 
true, but it only explains responsibility in the non-moral 
sense of having caused Y to happen. Nonetheless, I will 
still regret that it was I who walked in my sleep, and I 
who caused the vase to be broken. The fact that the causal 
chain passed through me in such a peculiar way, and caused 
this to happen, is reason for regret even when I had no 
control over my actions.
Similarly I may have cause to regret acts which I accept as 
my own, and which I acknowledge as emanating from my real 
self, even if I deny responsibility for creating that self.
I could now argue that if I discovered that I had broken a 
vase while sleep walking there would be no point in blaming 
me or punishing me because I was 'not myself when I did 
it.' I would acknowledge that whilst awake I am careful 
and considerate, and would never intentionally harm my 
friend's property. It is highly likely that -a drunken 
friend would employ the same defence, and indeed she may
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not have 'been herself' when drunk. The difference is that 
we believe that she had control over whether she 'was 
herself' or not. We might in fact believe that it was 
precisely in character for her to get drunk and hang the 
consequences. It is because of who she is that she made 
the choice which led to the loss of control which allows us 
to blame her. She was her self when she made that choice, 
and her drunk drunken self is simply a particular 
presentation of herself.
The importance of the distinction between these two cases 
becomes clearer if we ask why we want to know who caused Y 
to happen. It soon becomes apparent that we often seek to 
identify who is causally responsible in order to make a 
further judgement. Being responsible entails accepting the 
consequences that attach to your actions, in particular 
praise or blame.
If I wake up and find my vase broken and I know that three 
people have been in the house I will try and find out who 
was responsible for it happening. Then I will seek to 
establish whether or not they were responsible in a sense 
which entitles me to blame them morally, and perhaps demand 
reparation. If someone is causally responsible (in that 
they made it happen) and morally responsible (in that they 
were in control of it, and intended and chose that it 
should happen, or could have foreseen that it might happen) 
we can condemn or congratulate them accordingly.
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It would, we know, be pointless to punish the sleepwalker 
unless we felt we could thereby effect her future actions, 
and this may require us to redefine our action as something 
other than punishment. Retributive ground for punishment 
do not exist because she is not responsible in a moral 
sense for the wrong that has been committed (however guilty 
she might nonetheless feel). The drunken friend however 
may be punished, in order to deter her from again placing 
herself in a position in which she lacks control, and to 
pay her back for her irresponsible behaviour. But what if 
the drunken friend claims it was not her fault that she was 
drunk, or the friend who simply refuses to take 
responsibility for any of her actions, because, she tells 
you, we all live in a predetermined universe.
This is the indeterminist' s nightmare and it has to be 
confronted. It is in fact possible to employ praise and 
blame without depending upon the notion of responsibility. 
One way to do so is to blur the distinction between an 
agent and his acts, and adopt a broadly utilitarian ethical 
approach as discussed above. If one is concerned with 
outcomes and consequences then it is the nature of the act 
rather than the motivations or causal determinants of the 
agent that deserve attention. Individuals will be praised 
or blamed according to how far their actions (and our 
response) promote or reduce total utility. Why and how 
they came to act will be of importance only in so far as 
they determine the efficacy of punishment. A deterministic
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explanation would not prove dangerous to the ethical 
framework, in fact it would facilitate it. Indeed a 
standard criticism levelled at utilitarian theories of 
punishment is that the desire to prevent crime (and thereby 
increase utility) sometimes overrides the desire to punish 
those responsible for the crime (especially if you allow 
for the possibility of 'punishing' the innocent for 
deterrent purposes).
By this approach we could choose to punish those acts which 
are seen as socially harmful, or individually corruptive, 
in order to deter, reform, or simply condemn. If we punish 
the agent because of the nature of the act we may be able 
to prevent its reoccurrence and change the nature of the 
individual agent who originally performed it. If we excuse 
the act on the grounds that the individual's actions were 
causally determined, and therefore the individual was not 
to blame for her actions, neither act nor character will be 
dealt with, and the chance for reform is lost. Therefore 
we may choose to distinguish primarily not between acts 
which were causally determined and those which were not, 
but between acts which are morally acceptable and those 
which are not. The primary goal being reform and 
rehabilitation as opposed to retribution.
However, if one is convinced that acts for which an 
individual can be held morally responsible are in some 
important respect different from those for which they are
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merely causally responsible some more work needs to be 
done. Rather than punishing an agent because of certain 
acts, irrespective of the causal origin of those acts, we 
might want to distinguish between acts precisely in terms 
of how they have come about.
It was stated above that when I act I am 'enacting my own 
wishes in virtue of a chain of causation within me. ' To 
say that my wishes or desires are caused by my own 
fundamental nature is not particularly controversial, but 
within the context of determinism it is often seen to be 
so. This is partly due to the assumption that a causal 
explanation of individual behaviour is necessarily non- 
rational, and that the 'causes' operating have little - if 
anything - to do with me as a rational self-conscious 
being. Just as people worry about being puppets or 
zombies, so they do not want to see themselves as governed 
by their bodily secretions, genes and hormones, as the 
biological thrust of many determinist accounts suggests. 
However, this need not be the case, it is possible to 
accommodate a rationalisation process within a 
deterministic framework. Next we must ask how the agent is 
causally determined to act, which moves us on to the second 
question raised above.
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The Decision-making Process
One way in which to understand decision making within a 
deterministic framework is to identify the segment of the 
causal chain over which the individual has control as the 
deliberative process preceding a choice or action.
The stream of causation runs through my deliberations 
and decisions, and, if it did not run as it does run, 
the event would be different.20
In deliberating we concentrate on the immediate questions 
of cause and effect, and were we to be called to justify 
our actions, it would be to these we would refer. When we 
deliberate we seek to understand and control the causal 
factors which most directly effect us, and we invariably 
direct our efforts towards a particular end. The 
deliberative process is causally effective because it 
determines the course the causal chain will take having 
passed through the individual deliberating. It will be 
argued here that what we take to be "the" cause of any 
particular action can only be understood by examining the 
process of deliberation preceding that action in the light 
of what we know, or can safely infer, about the person 
deliberating.
Having asserted the importance of deliberation in this 
account, one is forced to respond to the indeterminists'
20 Ibid., p. 16 .
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insistence that it is impossible for a determinist to 
deliberate in the generally accepted sense of the term. 
Giving voice to an indeterminist view he does not in fact 
share, Dennett comments:
It seems that we can conclude that if determinism is 
true, then any belief we ever have about there being 
more than one possible future for us is false. If 
determinism is true, then only the actual is possible: 
whatever did happen was the only thing that cold have 
happened, and what will happen was the only thing that 
could have happened, and what will happen will be the 
sole possibility the future ever held in store for us. 
But then since deliberation surely presupposes there 
are multiple possibilities to be decided amongst, 
determinism and deliberation are incompatible.21
Dennett is quite content with all these assertions except 
the last; there is no reason why a determinist cannot 
deliberate, nor any reason why one should accept that there 
is no place in the vocabulary of deliberation for, 'terms 
such as appreciation and appraisal and weighing of pros and 
cons [which certainly] do not express any causal relation.' 
The non-determinists' reluctance to allow the determinist 
to deliberate is understandable, but certain of their 
arguments seem to rest on a deliberate misunderstanding of 
what determinism entails in this respect.
Now if a man believes concerning some of the actions 
he is going to perform, that there already exist 
conditions causally sufficient for his performing 
them, the conditions which therefore render them 
inevitable, then he cannot deliberate whether or not 
to perform them. If, accordingly he believes this to 
be true of all the actions he ever performs then he
21 Dennett, op cit. , p. 102.
233
cannot consistently with that belief deliberate about
any of them.22
Such a statement contains certain assumptions about 
determinism and the determinist deliberator that need not 
hold, indeed will not hold if the deliberator understands 
his position in the causal chain in the way it is presented 
here. There is no reason to assume that because something 
is determined it is necessarily inevitable at a point prior 
to the deliberative process having been completed. To do 
so is to deny the deliberator any role in the causal 
universe, which would be closer to fatalism than 
determinism. An agent can understand his actions as 
determined, whilst at the same time accepting that he also 
has a role in causing them to happen. Something only 
becomes inevitable when all the possible contributory 
antecedent causes have had their effect, and before an 
individual participant has deliberated this cannot be said 
to be the case.
As Chauncy Downes points out, who is to know in any one 
case that the causally sufficient conditions for an action 
existed prior to deliberation. Could they not appear prior 
to the action but not necessarily prior to the deliberative 
process?23 In fact is it not advisable to consider the
22 R. Taylor, Action and Purpose, Prentice Hall, New 
Jersey, 1966, p.182.
23 C. Downes, 'Can a determinist deliberate?', Mind, 
LXXVIII, 1969.
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very function of deliberation as serving to make one aware 
of precisely those factors which, together with background 
conditions, should determine which actions to take. By 
deliberating, one attempts to ensure that one's given (in 
the sense of causally determined) appetites and desires are 
effectively pursued.
Deliberation is (rather) an activity the very point of 
which is to bring to light factors and aspects of the 
situation and of myself, the awareness of which will 
be "causally sufficient" for my action. It is so to 
speak the product of deliberation that is efficacious 
not the process.24
For example, if I am playing a game of chess and make a bad 
move, but not a very obviously bad move, I can probably 
predict whether, given time to deliberate, my opponent will 
take advantage of the resulting opening. I could probably 
predict that if he did not take the time to deliberate he 
would miss the chance, but if he took the trouble to do so 
he would realise his advantage, and go on to win. What is
important is whether or not he becomes aware of his
powerful position, and this in turn depends on his
deliberating. Whether or not he does so is causally
determined. Nonetheless, his awareness of that opening is 
a causally sufficient factor for his winning the game and 
although it exists before the action of winning, it was not 
in evidence prior to his deliberation. Returning to the 
earlier question of control, he remains in control of his
24 Ibid. , p . 127 .
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game for as long as he is capable of deliberating 
effectively over his moves.
One advantage of calling an act deliberate, in the sense of 
intentional and fully considered, is the accompanying 
possibility that it is also rational in some objectively 
defined sense. However, for an indeterminist, the fact 
that an action has been causally determined, is often 
enough to exclude it from being deliberate in this way.
Behaviour is rational  if, and only if, it can be
influenced, or inhibited by the advocacy of some 
logically relevant consideration. But this means that 
if a man's behaviour is rational it cannot be 
determined by the state of his glands or any other 
antecedent causal factor. For if giving a man more or 
better information, or suggesting a new argument to 
him is both necessary and sufficient condition for, as 
we say, changing his mind, then we exclude, for this 
occasion at least, the possibility of other sufficient 
conditions...Thus to show that behaviour is rational 
is enough to show that it is not causally determined 
in the sense of being the effect of a set of 
• sufficient conditions operating independently of the 
agent's deliberation or possibility of deliberation. 
So the discoveries of the physiologist and 
psychologist may independently increase our knowledge 
of why men behave irrationally but they could never 
show that rational behaviour in this sense was 
causally determined.25
As has already been stated, there is no good reason to 
consider only the causal factors 'operating independently 
of the agent's deliberation'. Because we are concerned 
with the actions of human beings we must consider whether 
arguments or information can be properly interpreted as
25 MacIntyre, op cit., p.34 (my emphasis).
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causal factors, alongside more obvious determinants. The 
indeterminist wishes to say that the presentation of an 
argument cannot affect a causal chain, what is decisive is 
whether or not the individual accepts the argument; 
however, many determinists refuse to accept this view.
Presentations of arguments have all sorts of effects
on the causal milieu: they set air waves in motion,
cause ear drums to vibrate, and have hard to identify 
but important effects deep in the brain of the 
audience. So although the presentation of the 
argument may have no detectable effect on the
trajectory of a cannonball, or closer to home, on 
one's autonomic nervous system, one's perceptual 
system is designed to be sensitive to the sorts of 
transmissions of energy that must occur for an
argument to be communicated.26
This thoroughly mechanistic vocabulary, although it is 
appropriate in this context, is not necessary to the 
determinist's argument. Man is a machine/system
specifically designed to be affected by the input of 
information.
...so the discovery in such a system of a causal chain 
culminating in a bit of behaviour does not at all 
licence the inference 'since the behaviour was caused 
we could not have argued him out of it', for a prior 
attempt to argue him out of it would have altered the 
causal ancestry of the behaviour, perhaps 
effectively.27
26 D.Dennett, 'Mechanism and Responsibility' in T. 
Honderich (ed.), Essays on Freedom of Action, London, 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973, p.174.
27 Ibid.
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The interesting question is how does the information have 
its effect? In his attempt to reconcile determinism and 
deliberation R.G. Collingwood concentrates on the meaning 
of the word "cause".28 He offers three meanings, the first 
of which most adequately coincides with Hobbes's. This 
'historical sense' of the word reconciles freedom and 
deliberation on the one hand, and universal causation on 
the other; and states that what is caused is the 'free and 
deliberate act of a conscious and responsible agent' and 
causing him to do it actually means offering him a motive 
to do it.29
Collingwood explains that if an action is deliberate it is 
caused by the result of deliberation. This deliberation is 
in turn linked to external factors such as goals, 
circumstances, opportunities and the agent's own 
disposition and character.
'the conditions determining an action, together with 
an agent's information, his character, dispositions, 
and goals are not so much factors causing the 
deliberative process as reasons that make up the 
fairly methodical activity of deliberating and the 
decisive consideration terminating that activity.'30
To give someone a reason for or against performing an 
action, or to provide a motive for him to act or refrain,
28 R.G Collingwood, An Essay on Metaphysics, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 1940.
29 Ibid. , p. 285.
30 Ibid.
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is to cause him to decide how to behave. This is 
particularly true in the case of a person whom one knows 
well enough to discern which arguments/reasons/motives will 
prove effective - or on a more general level, if one has a 
concept of human nature which enables such assessment. If 
this is so then persuasion may be seen as a form of 
causation, with the reasons given, and not the individual's 
actual choice as the effective causal factor. In a 
determinist framework, reasons are weighted prior to the 
deliberative process, and by deliberating the individual 
simply becomes aware of the relative weighting of competing 
reasons. This is an important difference which explains 
why any particular process of deliberation can only ever 
present the same answer in a given situation.
According to Dennett, the determinist need not worry about 
the curious desire in some people that it should turn out 
to be true of anyone's acts that if exactly the same 
physical state of affairs should obtain again, some other 
act would come forth.31 This may be true, but the 
indeterminists' reluctance to conflate the physical and 
mental may in part explain their 'curious desire' in this 
context. It is however possible to discuss the operation 
of reasons within a causal universe without relying on an 
overtly mechanistic framework.
31 Dennett, op cit., Ch.6, particularly pgs. 133, 138.
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For the determinist circumstances and prior causal effects 
determine which reasons will prove effective in the sense 
of motivating or causing the agent to act, and so long as 
circumstances stay the same, the same action will result. 
A reason may be a reason without being a reason for me, but 
only then do I need to make a clear distinction between 
reasons and reasons/causes.
To sum up, a determinist as presented here acknowledges 
that the individual is in control to the extent that he can 
deliberate and make choices, and thereby effect the course 
of any causal chain which runs through him. By 
deliberating he ensures that the causal chain passes 
through him in a significant manner and allows it to latch 
on to his personal desires, plans and ambitions. The 
deliberative process is sometimes presented as a pause in 
the causal chain, but really it is a productive period. 
The fact that an agent ultimately chooses to do X rather 
than Y is causally determined, because the agent's basic 
self and his fundamental goals and desires are determined, 
and the same choice will always arise in identical cases. 
The individual is responsible for the actions that follow 
on from his deliberation because he caused them to happen, 
and because they were the product of a self for which he is 
responsible. To hold him morally responsible further 
requires that he intended the outcome, or should have 
foreseen it. However, if the individual is incapable of 
deliberation then we will not consider him to be in
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control, and will hesitate in holding him responsible in 
the same manner. At present the account has many loopholes 
which we shall attempt to fill by looking at the specific 
version of deterministic decision-making offered by Hobbes.
Hobbes's determinism
Although Hobbes's lengthiest treatment of free will and 
determinism occurs in the work Questions Concerning Liberty 
Necessity and Chancer his fundamental statement on the 
matter is taken to appear in Chapter VI of Leviathan, where 
he defines the will in the following terms.
In deliberation the last appetite or aversion 
immediately adhering to the action, or to the omission 
thereof is that we call the will; the act, not the 
faculty of willing. And beasts that have deliberation 
must necessarily also have will. The definition of 
the will given commonly by the schools, that it is a 
rational appetite, is not good. For if it were there 
could be no voluntary act against reason. For a 
voluntary act is that which precedeth from the will, 
and no other. But if instead of a rational appetite, 
we shall say an appetite resulting from a precedent 
deliberation then the definition is the same that I 
have given here. Will therefore is the last appetite 
in deliberating.32
This definition introduces the fundamental characteristics 
of Hobbes's account of volition.
32 Leviathan Ch.6, p.127. This definition is entirely 
in keeping with that offered in Elements of Philosophy, 
p.409.
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i. The will is simply an appetite, albeit the last appetite 
in a process of deliberation. As such it is clearly a 
species of motion, appetites and aversions being defined in 
Volume One of the English Works as 'motions of the 
heart'.33 As a species of motion it is subject to a causal 
explanation, and must be interpreted within the mechanistic 
structure of Hobbes's work.
...where there is appetite, the entire cause of 
appetite hath preceded; and consequently, the act of
appetite could not choose but follow, that is of
necessity hath followed.34
ii. The fact that the will is determined does not exclude, 
for Hobbes, the possibility of deliberation, indeed will is 
a special sub-class of appetite precisely because it 
follows deliberation.35
iii. The will is not necessarily rational, although there
is nothing to say that it will not on occasions coincide
with reason.
If the will does not determine itself, and it cannot be 
chosen by the individual in which it occurs, some other 
explanation must be found of how it is caused. In the
33 English Works Vol. 1, Part IV. 30., sl5, p.526.
34 English Works, Vol 1, Part IV. 25, sl3, p.409.
35 Ibid.
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Elements of Law Hobbes defines a cause in the following 
way:
. . . the aggregate of all the accidents both of the 
agents how many soever they be, and of the patient, 
put together; which when they are all supposed to be 
present, it cannot be understood but that the effect 
is produced at the same instant; and if any one of 
them be wanting, it cannot be understood but that the 
effect is not produced.36
and in Liberty, Necessity and Chance he states,
That which I say necessitateth and determineth every 
action is the sum of all those things which being now 
existent conduce and concur to the production of that 
action hereafter, whereof if any one thing were now 
wanting, the effect could not be produced. This 
concourse of causes, whereof every one is determined 
to be such as it is by a like concourse of former 
causes, may well be called (in respect they are all 
set and ordered by the eternal cause of all things, 
God Almighty) the decree of God.37
At first, this very wide concept of a cause risks sounding 
like the 'back to the beginning of time' style explanations 
the indeterminist finds so damaging. Yet Hobbes soon 
focuses in on a particular point on the causal chain, that 
is the creation of human appetites, and the way in which 
these come to determine action through the deliberative 
process.
In Leviathan Hobbes offers the following definition of 
deliberation:
36 English Works, Part II. 9. s3, pp. 121-22.
37 Liberty, Necessity and Chance, English Works, Vol V, 
No.XI p. 105.
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When in the mind of man, Appetites and Aversions, 
Hopes and Feares, concerning one and the same thing 
arise alternately: and divine good and evill
consequences of the doing or omitting of the thing 
propounded, come successively into our thoughts: so
that sometimes we have an appetite to it, sometimes an 
aversion from it: sometimes hope to be able to do it; 
sometimes despaire or feare to attempt it; the whole 
summe of Desires, Aversions, Hopes and Feares, 
continue 'til the thing be either done or thought 
impossible, is that we call Deliberation.38
Commentators have differed in their interpretation of 
Hobbes's account of deliberation, and indeed this basic 
definition is open to a number of interpretations. Hobbes 
tells us that deliberation occurs when a succession of 
desires, appetites, aversions and fears enter a man's mind, 
and it ends when the thing being deliberated over is either 
dismissed as impossible or done. This account does not 
suggest, as some have assumed, that appetites and aversions 
randomly come to mind as if someone has pulled the handle 
on a one armed bandit, and then come to a stop at some 
combination thereof. Rather there appears to be a 
selection process, but, as Hobbes said, one should not 
impute to this process a purely rational character.
As discussed in the previous chapter, appetites and desires 
are based on our sensory perceptions of the world and as 
such cannot be assumedft^> alway^be rational in content.
J.D. is mistaken in thinking I maintain that the will 
follows always the last judgement of right reason,
38 Leviathan Ch. 6, pp. 126-7.
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truth is it follows the last opinion of the goodness 
or evilness of the object of opinion, true or false.39
However, this does not exclude the possibility of there 
being a rationale to the deliberating process. It is 
worth keeping in mind that 'the absence of a presupposition 
of rationality is not the same as a presupposition of 
non-rationality. '40
To explain, Hobbes is committed to a deterministic view of 
human will largely because of his mechanistic 
interpretation of human behaviour. As stated in the 
previous chapter, man as a form of matter in motion will by 
the laws of science, be primarily concerned with staying in 
motion, and therefore will have appetites for those things 
which appear to promote or enhance vital motion. Given 
that the information the individual is processing has been 
picked up by the senses, and these according to Hobbes are 
notoriously unreliable, he prefers to state that one is 
dealing with 'opinion', which may or may not coincide with 
fact. Men will on occasions have appetites that will be 
contrary to their long term survival, and explanations must 
be found for this.
The fact that someone has an aversion to something is what 
makes it bad, and it is the fact that someone has an
39 Liberty, Necessity & Chance, English Works Vol. V, 
No. VII, p.76.
40 D. Dennett, in T. Honderich, op cit., p. 169.
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appetite for something that makes it good. This is 
determined by nothing other than the perceived effect that 
action or thing would have on the individual's self 
preservation. Because,
these words of Good, Evill, and Contemptible, are ever 
used with relation to the person that useth them: 
There being nothing simply and absolutely so; nor any 
common Rule of Good and Evil, to be taken from the 
nature of objects themselves; but from the person of 
the man (where there is no Common-wealth) or, (in a 
Commonwealth,) from the Person that representeth it; 
or from an Arbitrator or Judge, whom men disagreeing 
shall by consent set up, and make his sentence the 
rule thereof.41
[if something sounds good a man will choose it and if 
evil he will shun it. It is the following of one's 
hopes and fears that constitute the nature of 
election] . So that a man may both choose this and
cannot but choose this. And consequently choosing and 
necessity are joined together.42
In this second passage Hobbes asserts a belief that he 
defends continually against Bramhall's repeated attacks; 
that is, the idea that in an important sense, necessity and 
freedom are compatible. It will be argued here, that if 
one can accept Hobbes's arguments for this compatibility, 
one can then go some way towards answering some of the more 
general questions raised about determinism in the previous 
section.
41 Leviathan, Ch.6, pp.120-1.
42 Liberty Necessity & Chance English Works Vol V., No. 
VII, p.75, section in parentheses paraphrased.
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It is clear by now that Hobbes has no time for the standard 
relationship between freedom and will, that is the freedom 
of the undetermined will. He dismisses the idea at various ^  
times as 'absurd' and 'without meaning'43, and attributes 
man's continued belief in such an absurdity to, as much as 
anything, an ignorance of causation.
A wooden top that is lashed by the boys, and runs 
about sometimes to one wall, sometimes to another, 
sometimes hitting men on the shins, if it were 
sensible of its own motion, would think it proceeded 
from its own will, unless it felt what lashed it. And 
is a man any wiser, when he runs to one place for a 
benefice, to another for a bargain, and troubles the 
world with writing errors and requiring answers, 
because he thinks he doth it without other cause than 
his own will and seeth not what are the lashings that 
cause his will.44
The first sense of freedom Hobbes addresses with respect to 
the will is perfectly consistent with the negative freedom 
stressed throughout his work, and it essentially side steps 
the problems caused by determinism.
From the use of the word Freewill, no liberty can be 
inferred to the will, desire, or inclination, but the 
liberty of the man; which consisteth in this, that he 
finds no stop in doing what he has the will, desire, 
or inclination to doe.45
43 Leviathan, Ch.5, p.113
44 Liberty, Necessity and Chance, English Works, Vol 
V, No. 3, p.55.
45 Leviathan Ch. 21, p.262
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Although a man's will cannot be free in terms of having 
determined itself, a man is free to the extent to which he 
is allowed to act upon his will. He defines liberty as:
'the absence of Opposition; (by Opposition, I mean
externall Impediments of motion; )46
If the obstacle to our performing some action is internal, 
says Hobbes, the problem is not lack of liberty, but lack 
of power. Such that the man who cannot fly because he has 
no wings cannot bemoan his lack of liberty, but the man who 
cannot walk because someone has tied him to a post is quite 
right to consider himself unfree. This view is quite 
commonly linked with the classic negative interpretation of 
liberty discussed in the first chapter. However, Hobbes is 
wrong to rest the distinction simply on externality and 
internality, as we could argue for cases where a lack of 
negative freedom results from 'intrinsic qualities of the 
agent'.
For example, a paraplegic does not have the power to go to 
the cinema in the way that we do, but we also have to say 
that he is not free to go to the cinema if we have not made 
the aisles big enough for his wheelchair. The condition of 
the individual (his disability) is unalterable but the 
environment is alterable, he cannot be given the power to
46 Leviathan, Ch.21, p.261. In Liberty, Necessity and 
Chance he defines liberty as 'the absence of all 
impediments to action that are not contained in the nature 
and in the intrinsicall quality of the agent.' p.367.
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go to the cinema but he can be given the freedom to do so 
if we help him.
Rather it would seem the distinction should be between 
those obstacles and interferences that have been caused by 
some outside agency or which could reasonably be removed by 
outside agencies, and those which are simply caused by the 
impersonal forces of nature. The distinction, if taken to 
extremes would then apply to the case of a tree falling 
across my path (which would simply prevent me from 
passing), as compared to a barbed wire fence being 
deliberately placed there (which would remove my freedom to 
pass). If however, the landowner refused to remove the 
tree it also becomes an issue of liberty as opposed to 
ability or power.
A free agent then, is he who 'can do if he will and forbear 
if he will'. 'Can do' could entail having both the power 
(in Hobbes's terms absence of internal impediments) and the 
liberty (absence of external obstacles), but Hobbes only 
takes the second to be relevant to questions of freedom, 
the former being a simple question of ability. In this 
context a free agent can do as he wills if he is able to 
overcome internal obstacles and external obstacles, and 
both may on occasion be issues of liberty as opposed to 
power. If an obstacle can reasonably be removed by other 
agents or institutions their unwillingness to do so may 
constitute an obstacle to the individual's freedom .
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One of the major criticisms levelled against Hobbes's 
account of liberty is that he allows for too great a degree 
of compulsion to be compatible with freedom. As Von Leyden 
points out, in the case of external impediments, Hobbes 
makes liberty consistent with a sizeable degree of 
opposition or compulsion.47
He explicitly states in Chapter 21 of Leviathan
Fear and liberty are consistent; as when a man 
throweth his goods into the sea for feare the ship 
should sink, he does it nevertheless willingly, and 
may refuse to do it if he will. 48
Consider the example Hobbes offers of a man who, under 
threat of death, gives his money to a robber. Hobbes says 
he did so freely, because he did as he willed. The man 
himself would probably argue that he acted against his 
will, but to Hobbes such a statement is absurd. The fact 
that he gave the money to the robber shows that this is 
what he willed. He could have attempted to run away, 
tackle the gun man or call his bluff, but he didn't take 
advantage of what Von Leyden calls his 'right of 
defiance',49 he instead capitulated to the demands. Given 
that he was able to carry out his wishes and hand over the
47 W. Von Leyden Hobbes and Locke: The Politics of
Freedom and Obligation, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1982.
48 Leviathan, Ch. 21, p. 262.
49 Von Leyden, op cit., p. 37.
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money, Hobbes would continue to interpret this as a free 
action.
The definition of consent utilised here demands that it be 
freely given in the sense of uncoerced, and as discussed in 
the first chapter, the context within which consent is 
requested does much to determine whether it can be freely 
given. If you are asked to make a decision with a gun at 
your head the context does not appear to be conducive to 
free choice. Even if you can justify your choice, and you 
admit that you could not have done otherwise, you may 
regret having to choose in the way you did. The fact that 
having made your decision you were allowed to enact it is 
only a very small comfort.
At present the Hobbesian account of freedom appears very 
weak, and examples such as this will continue to work 
against its acceptance. However, if we read this account 
of freedom in conjunction with the second form of freedom 
Hobbes presents, it does become stronger.
The second form of liberty Hobbes works with is the liberty 
one has prior to bringing the process of deliberation to an 
end. This is quite different from the freedom outlined 
above, which began with the action, and was the ability to 
do or forbear as one wills. This liberty exists prior to 
acting, indeed prior to willing, and most importantly it 
can be neither endangered for lost, though it can be
7
7
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terminated by the individual himself. This makes its 
enjoyment more secure as compared to the previous form of 
freedom which is 'as to the body'50 and can therefore be 
more, or less, or none quite independent of the 
individual's wishes.
Here Hobbes is speaking of freedom as deliberation. Whilst 
you continue to deliberate you remain free because you have 
not yet been determined to act in a particular way on the 
issue at hand.
...and that of voluntary agents is all one to say he 
is free and to say he hath not made an end of 
deliberation.51
This form of freedom is presented as a moment of 
indeterminacy in a determined universe. Until the process 
of deliberation is complete the causal factors relevant to 
the future have not yet been assembled and things could 
proceed in a number of different ways. By stopping to 
deliberate you instigate a pause in the causal chain at the 
point at which it flows through you. When you do finish 
deliberating and act you are still free if you have been 
able to act in the way that you willed on the basis of your 
deliberation.
50 'But when the words Free and Liberty, are applied to 
any thing but Bodies, they are abused;' Leviathan, Ch.21, 
p. 262.
51 Liberty, Necessity & Chance, English Works, Vol. 5, 
No. 20, p 363.
252
This second form of freedom is at^  once more promising as it 
highlights the role of the individual agent in the causal ^
obviously one must question Hobbes's assumption that the 
deliberative process is impervious to outside constraint, 
and that individuals are assured of this form of freedom. 
As will be shown below freedom as deliberation can and does 
come under attack within Hobbes's account.
However, it is possible to utilise the deliberating process 
in formulating another variety of freedom. To do so we 
must refer once again to the idea of reasons acting as 
causes, and use it in an examination of Hobbes's claim that 
deliberate acts are in some special sense voluntary acts.
If Hobbes's account of deliberation can accommodate a 
meaningful degree of individual choice and agency his 
voluntarism will be much more firmly rooted. Not only will 
the definition of freedom as the ability to do as one wills 
immediately become more meaningful, but it will also allow 
for a third form of freedom to emerge - a positive notion 
of freedom as acting in conformity with one's nature and 
goals, or, as Nozick calls it, 'tracking bestness'.52
To explain: If you are capable of effectively deliberating 
and evaluating the strength of competing appetites and 
desires, then you will always choose to act in the way that
chain without difficulties. Most
52 Nozick, op cit., p. 317.
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is most likely to further your goals. So the reasons that 
speak as reasons to me will be the reasons which 
effectively cause me to do what is best for me. However, 
achieving this within the Hobbesian framework, is by no 
means a simple task.
In a recently published article Philip Pettit and Michael 
Smith present an argument which they might well be 
surprised to see employed in the present context.53 
However, their discussion throws some useful light on 
Hobbes's account of deliberation.
According to Pettit and Smith, human beings are both 
intentional and deliberative beings. By this they mean 
broadly
Where the intentional conception says that every 
action issues from a set of beliefs and desires that 
rationalize it, the deliberative conception holds that 
somewhere in the process leading to action there is 
normally the belief that the option chosen has a 
property which provides some justification for 
choosing it 54 
/v
The interesting component for our purposes is the 
deliberative one which
53 P. Pettit and M. Smith 'Backgrounding Desire' The
Philosophical Review, Vol. XCIX, No 4, October 1990.
34 Ibid. , p. 566 .
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always involves a thought of the kind " x-ing has the 
property of being F, or conducing to a state of 
affairs that is F, so I should do x." 55
However, in order to understand the significance of this 
more has to be said concerning intentionality. Pettit and 
Smith explain that under the intentional conception of 
human beings:
...every action is causally explained by the beliefs 
and the desires of the agent: specifically by beliefs 
and desires which rationalize it, and which causally 
explain it in virtue of rationalizing it: which
causally explain it in the "right" way. 56
Hobbesian man is intentional in the sense that his actions 
are motivated by a desire to stay alive, a desire that is 
enforced upon him by his biological nature. The most basic 
desires he shares in common with all men, but his 
experience of them will differ from others. Furthermore, to 
borrow Pettit and Smith's vocabulary, these desires may not 
always be present in the foreground of the decision making 
process rather they will be backgrounding desires.
Man is also a deliberative being because, as Pettit and 
Smith explain:
...the human agent always chooses among options on the 
ground that the option preferred, or the state of 
affairs to which it is likely to lead, has some
55 Ibid. , p . 567 .
56 Ibid., pp.565-6.
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putatively desirable property: some property which by 
the agent's lights, make it a suitable action to 
choose; some property such that its presence entails, 
so the agent thinks, that the action is right or good 
or permissible or whatever.57
Freedom, it could be argued, involves simultaneously 
fulfilling both the intentional and deliberative condition, 
such that you are able to do that which you have decided 
most effectively satisfies your fundamental desires. 
"X-ing has the property of promising to satisfy my desire 
for S, so I should do x, "58 and I am free to the extent to 
which no one prevents me from doing x either through their 
action or unjustifiable inaction.
If this is what freedom entails it is not relevant that the 
desires in question are determined. It is however relevant 
to ask whether these desires are really conducive to the 
agent's well-being. To this Hobbes would answer that we 
only desire those things which we consider to be conducive 
to our self preservation. Even though we may be mistaken 
as to whether this is the case in fact, all our actions are 
backgrounded by the desire to stay alive which is a 
necessary prerequisite to all further goods. We are free 
in a negative sense if we are left to follow our own 
lights, we are free in a positive sense if our 
deliberations correctly cause us to satisfy this background 
desire. It remains to be seen if this is likely.
57 Ibid. , p. 566 .
58 Ibid. , p. 567 .
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As will to do is appetite, and will to omit fear, the 
causes of appetite and of fear are the causes also of 
our will. But the propounding of benefits and harms, 
that is to say, of rewards and punishments, is the 
cause of our appetites and of our fears, and therefore 
also of our wills.... and consequently our wills will 
follow our opinions, as our actions follow our 
wills.59
In the simplest cases our appetites and aversions are 
caused by other bodies that we come into contact with in 
the outside world. However, it is not the object we are 
averse to, but rather the idea attached to it, for example, 
the harm we see it threatening. If we have no reason to 
believe that dogs bite we will not be afraid of them. If 
we are bitten once, we may become more cautious, if we are 
bitten on a number of different occasions, by a number of 
different dogs, we shall form the opinion that they are 
dangerous, and probably avoid them. The same could be said 
of our own behaviour, if I discover by experience that a 
certain activity is painful, I will probably label that 
thing bad and attempt to avoid doing it.
Some commentators disapprove of the way in which Hobbes is 
willing to see opinions and actual appetites as 
interchangeable. To do so, they say,
59 Elements of Law, Part 1 , pp.47-8.
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is to risk conflating causes with reasons, reactions 
with actions and above all - being determined with 
being persuaded.60
According to Riley, having a reason for aversion - an 
adverse 'opinion' - is not the same as being determined by 
'aversion' as a general psychological cause. Bramhall is 
also unhappy with Hobbes's view of reasons as causes, and 
sees the major difference being that reasons act as 
motives, which determine not naturally but morally.61 In 
line with objections outlined above they believe that if I 
give you a reason for or against something it is your 
decision whether or not to accept it as valid, therefore I 
cannot have caused you to act in the way you choose. The 
only way to succeed is through moral pressure, if I am 
right and you recognise it.
Much of their unhappiness stems from the broader issue of 
Hobbes's refusal to adopt a dualistic approach to the 
question of the will, and his belief that one need not 
distinguish between a physiological and a moral will. In 
a dualist approach much is made of the supposed difference 
between willing to blink your eyes, for example, and 
willing something morally significant, such as making a 
promise. In the former case the action is seen as more 
conducive to a mechanistic and therefore a deterministic
60 Riley, op cit., p. 502.
61 Liberty, Necessity & Chance, p. 279.
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explanation, in the latter case this form of explanation is 
thought to be impossible.
Specifically it is felt that the introduction of the idea 
of opinions formed on the basis of reasons being causally 
effective, takes mechanistic determinism beyond its logical 
scope. The non-determinist believes that when presented 
with an argument, we choose whether or not to accept it. 
Only by allowing it to influence us is extra weight given 
to the reason we see as persuasive. Thus we end up with 
Nozick's image of the self chooser.
Hobbes, on the other hand, believes that we only choose on 
the basis of that reason because it already has the weight 
of validity attached to it. The argument is in some senses 
circular. Although something is only good because we 
choose it, we only desire and therefore choose it because 
we think it is good in some way. If we see a situation 
properly, we will see the best choice available, if we 
don't we won't. Either way the choice we do make is 
determined, and would be made again whenever identical 
circumstances arose. This is the case because what is 
there for us to see, and how we see it is determined by 
antecedent causes.
It is worth noting at this point that Hobbes may not be the 
thorough going moral subjectivist he appears to be at face 
value. There is in fact room within his theory for a
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two-tier meta-ethical framework. As previously discussed 
men within the state of nature label actions, events and 
objects as good or bad in terms of their opinion of how 
these things aid or hinder their self preservation. These 
opinions may be false, and someone may label something good 
which, even though they have an appetite for it, is 
actually harmful. Something is only good, in the true 
sense, if it really is conducive to the continuation of 
life. Individuals may well be able to close the gap 
between opinion and knowledge as their experience and 
prudence grows, but it is also possible that a place might 
remain in the scheme of things for moral experts. These 
will be moral experts of a strange type, as their moral 
judgements will be based upon judgements concerning vitall 
motion.
Returning to the question of motivation, it is useful to 
consider an example. It is not unreasonable to suggest 
that if I offer a heroin addict a free supply of drugs in 
return for his co-operation in some criminal activity, I am 
effectively causing that person to become a criminal. As 
stated before, what causes a man to act is the sum total of 
all conditions, personal and external relevant to the 
decision in question. Taking the example of the drug 
addict, the overriding factor has to be his addiction, but 
in a less extreme case the influences may be numerous. In 
the light of all these considerations one deliberates, and 
whilst doing so is naturally drawn towards the alternatives
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that appear good, and away from those less favourable. If 
therefore someone introduces a motive for acting in a 
certain way they are effecting how good this course of 
action appears to be, and therefore causing you to move 
towards it. If they have correctly assessed your 
character, desires and circumstances the motive will be 
sufficient not only to attract you to the idea, but to make 
you do it.
However, it would be ludicrous in this situation to suggest 
that we were given a motive and left to consider whether or 
not to act on it; this was previously determined by 
antecedent causes, in the same way that we cannot fail to 
respond to our appetites. A given person in a specific
situation will only ever react in one way to a given
motive; only if a person's internal disposition or 
circumstances alter will their reaction adjust accordingly. 
If someone we know very well acts in a way that we would 
call unpredictable, we may have to accept that there has 
been a change of circumstances about which we are as yet 
unaware.
Whilst we may be happy to accept the inevitability of the 
choice, most people would be reluctant to then accept that 
such a choice was free in any real sense. If reasons or 
motives can act as causes then the room for manipulation 
seems even larger. In the case of the drug addict, although
he is free in that he may do as he wills, if he is
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attempting to reform and we tempt him back into bad ways, 
surely his freedom is threatened. If someone can cause us 
to act from motives we should not wish to choose, it is not 
so easy to say that our acts are in any real sense free.
Hobbes would possibly make a special case for someone 
suffering an addiction, explaining it in terms of some 
mechanical malfunction. In the case of the drug addict his 
addiction has prevented him from functioning like normal 
human beings. His actions are backgrounded by his desire 
for drugs, as opposed to a fundamental desire for 
self-preservation. However, problems also arise in less 
extreme cases.
Consider the case of an individual asked to inform on his 
fellow workmates, with the threat that if he does not he 
will lose his job. The man may genuinely feel that he has 
no alternative but to comply, but would probably be at 
pains to make clear that he does not wish to behave in this 
way. A threat is a powerful motive, and it is difficult to 
see it as compatible with freedom as usually understood. 
The coercion in these examples is blatant, but it is 
possible to be more subtle.
Consider the infrequently discussed case of the 
eloquent philosopher who indirectly manipulates a 
person's brain by bombarding his ears with words of 
ravishing clarity and a host of persuasively presented
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reasons, thereby inducing all his desires, beliefs and 
decisions.62
In essence this 'indirect manipulation' is potentially just 
as worrying. As Hobbes is at pains to point out, eloquence 
and persuasiveness are valuable assets, too readily 
exploited by the ambitious and unscrupulous. However, we 
could consider the other side of the coin;
... the delightful case of the well informed, truthful 
oracle who indirectly manipulates a person's brain by 
bombarding his ears with lucid and accurate warnings, 
made all the more irresistible by the citation of all 
the evidence in their favour and a frank account of 
the entire evidence-gathering operation.63
This surely is the only context in which freedom and 
causation through the use of arguments and reasons are 
truly compatible. As was discussed in the opening chapter 
of this thesis, freely given consent implies that the 
individual consenting has made a rational decision based 
upon complete and accurate information. If by providing 
someone with such information I assist them in 'tracking 
bestness' and I thereby cause them to become free in a 
positive sense. They remain free in this sense if they are 
able to act through motives they would have rationally 
chosen for themselves even if my persuasion lends towards 
coercion. If, as Nozick puts it, they can withstand the
62 Dennett, op cit., p. 64.
63 Ibid., p. 65 .
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knowledge of the causal ancestry of their acts, then they 
may still be free. As Hobart states:
all compulsion is causation, but not all causation is
compulsion. Seize a man and violently force him to do 
something and he is compelled and also caused to do 
it. But induce him to do it by giving him reasons and 
his doing it is caused but not compelled.64
Of course this is true in some but not all cases; reasons 
can also seize and coerce, a fact of which Hobbes was no 
doubt aware. Similarly eloquence can be employed to both 
good and bad ends. Both these facts are relevant to the 
next stage of our enquiry.
Consent, freedom and political obligation: the Hobbesian 
version
In Chapter One of this thesis a general criticism was 
levelled against theories of political obligation. It was 
suggested that political obligations often lack the 
specificity of paradigm case obligations, especially when 
they are collapsed into a single obligation to obey the 
law. This criticism is particularly apposite in a 
Hobbesian context, where the obligation to obey the law
essentially entails an undertaking to do whatever the
sovereign commands. Since the Sovereign is given a free 
hand to do whatever he considers necessary to ensure peace
64 Hobart op cit., p. 11.
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and security within his nation, and is answerable only to 
God for his actions, the scope of a citizen's obligations 
is potentially vast.
This interpretation is rendered slightly more acceptable if 
you appreciate the special meaning Hobbes gives to the term 
obligation. When offering his definitions of the terms 
employed in the discourse of covenanting Hobbes does not 
introduce the distinctions offered in the first chapter 
between being obligated, having a duty and what one ought 
to do. In Chapter 14 of Leviathan he happily conflates the 
three:
And when a man hath in either manner abandoned or 
granted away his right, then he is said to be OBLIGED 
or BOUND not to hinder those to whom such right is 
granted, or abandoned from the benefit of it; and that 
he ought and it is his DUTY not to make voyd that 
voluntary act of his own.65
This 'traditional assumption of similitude' is rather 
unfortunate and ultimately unhelpful to Hobbes's case, as 
distinguishing between forms of moral commitment could be 
useful to him. Remembering that the individual's choice is 
determined at a local level by considerations of self- 
preservation and security, an agent ought (prudentially) to 
do that which promotes these goods, and he will do that 
which he believes to do so. He ought (morally) to do that
65 Leviathan, Ch. 14, p. 191.
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which he has consented to do only if it does not work 
against his self preservation.
An interesting example of Hobbes's implicit acceptance of 
the distinction emerges from his discussion of the laws of 
nature and the extent to which they constrain an 
individual's actions in the state of nature. In the state 
of nature individuals are obliged to obey the laws of 
nature in foro interno, that is within the realm of 
conscience only. When they act against the laws of nature 
they are required to acknowledge the fact, but they are not 
required to modify their actions. The reason for this is 
straightforward. The laws of nature are prudential maxims, 
commands men should obey if they wish to promote their 
welfare. As all normal men necessarily wish to promote 
their welfare, every individual has a reason to obey them.
However, the maxims only work to promote individual welfare 
in environments where general obedience can be ensured, and 
individuals have sufficient security to place moral 
requirements on a par with their selfish concerns. Such an 
environment is unlikely to exist in the early stages of the 
state of nature, but may well become more feasible as the 
evolutionary developments outlined in the previous chapter 
take place.
So, in Hobbes's terms we should only accept an obligation 
if we expect to benefit thereby, and we cannot benefit by
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anything which threatens our survival. The happiest 
situation is that in which the individual consents and 
thereby becomes obliged to do that which actually promotes 
his welfare and security.
It would appear therefore that within a Hobbesian context 
the content of consent does appear to be crucial, in that 
we can only take to be the actions of a fully rational 
autonomous individual those which promote the continuation 
of life etc. To clarify this point a lengthy quote is 
required:
Whensoever a man Transferreth his Right, or Renounceth 
it; it is either in consideration of some Right 
reciprocally transferred to himselfe; or for some 
other good he hopeth for thereby. For it is a 
voluntary act and of the voluntary acts of every man, 
the object is some good to himselfe. And therefore 
there be some Rights, which no man can be understood 
by any words, or other signes, to have abandoned, or 
transferred. As first a man cannot lay down the right 
of resisting them, that assault him by force, to take 
away his life; because he cannot be understood to ayme 
thereby, at any Good to himselfe. The same may be 
sayd of Wounds, and Chayns, and Imprisonment; both 
because there is no benefit consequent to such 
patience as there is to the patience of suffering 
another to be wounded, or imprisoned: as also because 
a man cannot tell, when he seeth men proceed against 
him by violence, whether they intend his death or not. 
And lastly the motive and end for which this 
renouncing, and transferring of Right is introduced, 
is nothing else but the security of a mans person, in 
his life, and in the means of so preserving life, as 
not to be weary of it.66
Obligating yourself is a voluntary act and, according to 
Hobbes, 'of all Voluntary Acts, the Object is to every man
66 Leviathan, Ch. 14, p. 192.
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his own good'.67 This idea is born of his mechanism, but
it fits in well with the classic social contract model
which involves giving up certain individual rights in order 
to permit a government to secure others on your behalf. Of 
course Hobbes does not allow the individual complete 
discretion when deciding which rights to give up or 
transfer. Given that the object of the exercise is to 
benefit the obligee, he assumes that there are certain 
rights which are, for want of a better word, inalienable.
The message is clear, an individual cannot voluntarily take 
on an obligation unless (he at least expects) it will 
benefit him, and because no man can benefit from his own 
death and suffering, the rights which protect him from 
these states can never be renounced or transferred. In 
fact Hobbes puts this is the strongest possible terms:
And therefore if a man by words, or other signes, seem 
to despoyle himself of the End, for which those signes 
were intended; he is not to be understood as if he 
meant it, or that it was his will; but that he was 
ignorant of how such words and actions were to be 
interpreted.68
In both logical and moral terms you cannot be obligated to
do that which threatens your life and security, and most
interestingly, if anyone makes such commitment 'he is not 
to be understood as if he meant it.'
67 Leviathan, Ch. 14, pp. 192, 209.
68 Leviathan Ch. 14, p. 192.
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It is worth noting at this point that Hobbes's prohibition 
upon consenting to certain things undermines his commitment 
to negative liberty - that is freedom in terms of being 
allowed to do as you will. It also allows for examples of 
coercion to be reinterpreted as an enhancement of freedom 
after the event. If we can show an individual that their 
agreement to do X contributed to their 'tracking 
bestness', then we might be able to override their 
dissatisfactions concerning what motivated them to agree to 
do X. So for example if we force someone to stop taking 
drugs by cutting off their supply, although they did not 
want us to do this at the time, they might in retrospect 
state that we had given them a new form of (positive) 
freedom by doing so. This second option smacks of 
Rousseauian style freedom which may be forced upon the 
individual,69 but it would appear that Hobbes allows for 
the possibility of making people free, maybe even against 
their wishes. This is particularly true of men in the 
state of nature who may only base their deliberations upon 
information supplied by the senses, which Hobbes considers 
unreliable.
We therefore have a double task ahead of us if we wish to 
establish whether or not an individual is obligated to obey 
the sovereign in a Hobbesian commonwealth:
69 J. J. Rousseau, Social Contract, ed M. Cranston 
Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1968.
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First, because of Hobbes's commitment to the social 
contract model we have to show that the individual 
consented to obey.
Second, because of Hobbes's particular interpretation of 
obligation, we have to show that there is at least a 
reasonable chance of the individual benefitting from 
consenting to obey the sovereign.
Only the first enquiry is directly affected by the question 
of determinism, but some attention will be given to the 
second issue as well in the interests of a complete 
argument.
Do Hobbesian individuals consent?
Given the definition of consent we are working with, we 
have to establish the following facts in order to be able 
to say that an individual has consented:
1. that the individual intended to give the sovereign 
absolute power,
2. that he did so freely,
3. that he acted as a rational autonomous agent in doing 
so,
4. and that he made his choice on the basis of full and 
accurate information.
When speaking of commonwealth by institution the consent 
given is expressly stated as opposed to tacitly assumed, 
therefore we do not meet the problem of whether the 
individual intended to consent. However, we still have to 
ask whether the individual consented to do what we are 
assuming him to have consented to, in this case to obey the 
absolute rule of an individual sovereign.
In Chapter 21 of Leviathan Hobbes says the following:
For in the act of our Submission, consisteth both our 
Obligation and our Liberty; which must therefore be 
inferred from arguments taken from thence; there being 
no obligation on any man, which ariseth not from some 
free act of his own; for all men equally are by Nature 
Free. And because such arguments must either be drawn 
from the expresse words, I Authorise all his Actions, 
or from the Intention of him that submitteth himself 
to his Power, (which intention is to be understood by 
the End for which he so submitteth; ) The Obligation 
and Liberty of the Subject, is to be derived, either 
from those words, (or others equivalent,) or else from 
the End of the Institution of Sovereignty; namely, the 
Peace of the Subjects within themselves, and their 
Defence against a common enemy.70
This pronouncement would appear to allow us to read into 
the individual's consent the authorization of the Sovereign 
to do whatever he considers necessary to ensure the ends 
for which consent is given. In his account of the original 
contract Hobbes explicitly states the terms of the 
covenant, and is unambiguous about the extent of the 
individuals obligations. Intentionality may therefore be 
assumed both in terms of the individual intending to give
70 Leviathan, Ch. 21, p. 268.
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consent, and in terms of the individual intending to give
consent to X as opposed to Y, or Z.
The question of freedom we have discovered emerges at a 
number of levels, and we now have a type of freedom 
available to us, which fits comfortably within the 
deterministic framework Hobbes constructs. As well as the
freedom of being able to do what one wills (negative 
freedom), and the freedom enjoyed whilst deliberating 
(elective freedom) there is the freedom that arises out of 
self-realisation and tracking bestness (positive freedom). 
We now have to see how these concepts of freedom work 
alongside consent.
Given the assumption that choices are determined we need to 
show if and how the choice to consent may yet be said to be 
free. As has already been stated, Hobbes often shifts the 
emphasis away from the choice, and locates (negative) 
freedom at the point at which the choice is acted upon. 
This is of course relevant in that we would hope to ensure
that once the individual has consented to do X in return
for Y, nothing is done to prevent both parties performing 
their side of the deal. However, we need to show that 
there is a way in which the choice to consent to be ruled 
may be free, and the best way of doing this is to begin by 
showing how it may also be unfree or coerced.
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In the preceding discussion much emphasis was placed on the 
role of deliberation in a deterministic framework. 
Deliberation is crucial to the survival of freedom first 
because an individual remains free until they have brought 
their deliberations to a close, and secondly, because by 
deliberating they exercise control over the causal chain 
and ensure that their choices promote their liberty in 
terms of tracking bestness. It is therefore a necessary 
condition for an act of free consent to ensure that the 
individual is afforded an opportunity to deliberate.
Because of his mechanistic first principles Hobbes sees man 
as fundamentally self-preserving, and subject to appetites 
for those things which enhance vital motion. A process of 
deliberation will involve comparing various actions to 
discover which is most conducive to this end. Sometimes 
the information he is dealing with will be unreliable, on 
other occasions some mental malfunction will cause him to 
lose sight of his true aims, but by and large he should, as 
his prudential powers develop, be able to deliberate 
effectively.
What causes man to deliberate is his wish to do the best 
thing, and it is the fact that man has this wish which sets 
him apart from other forms of matter in motion. What 
causes him to recognise this wish is his increasingly 
prudential if not fully rational nature. He realises that 
continued motion or life is a necessary prerequisite to all
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further goods, and that his aim is to ensure for himself a 
life of continual satisfaction free from the fear of 
violent death. Man's image of what the best thing is 
therefore broadly fixed, but it is also determined by his 
individual nature, and will differ slightly from person to 
person as that nature will differ. Certain fundamental 
assumptions about the good life will be shared by all, in 
the same way as certain basic human characteristics are 
shared. What causes these shared characteristics may be 
lost in an interwoven tale of biological causes, but the 
characteristics themselves can be taken as given by all 
those who share the same theory of human nature. For this 
reason Hobbes feels safe to proclaim that those who choose 
to reject those things considered fundamental to human 
welfare do so through ignorance or madness, and their 
consent should not be seen as binding.
It was also stated that part of an individual's freedom 
within a deterministic universe entails them being happy 
with, or reconciled to, the causal ancestry of their 
actions. If Hobbesian man reflects upon his choices, he 
will realise that they are all backgrounded by the 
fundamental desires which are his biological inheritance- 
most obviously the desire to stay alive. There is little 
point in regretting these biological drives which will 
necessitate and motivate all his actions as they are a 
constitutive element of being a human. However, what he 
can regret are those occasions when he is forced to
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sacrifice something else which is dear to him, in order to 
satisfy his most fundamental desires.
Returning to the example of the gunman. Hobbes says that 
you choose to give your money to the gun man, whereas most 
people would consider this an example of coercion as 
opposed to free choice. Although the hostage would 
probably continue to believe that he made the right choice, 
he will regret that the choice had to be made. The hostage 
was coerced because in this situation another individual 
relied upon the fact that he would have to satisfy his 
desire to stay alive, and made the cost attached to doing 
so artificially high.
This analogy can be usefully applied to the question of 
consenting to be ruled. Hobbesian man's motive for 
entering political society is to ensure his security and 
preserve his life. If he knows by experience that his 
present natural condition does not allow him to satisfy his 
desires, and if he can be shown by demonstration that a 
particular form of government will allow him to do so, then 
he will freely consent to that government. Even if he is 
motivated primarily by fears arising out of his present 
existence, the fears are rational, the condition is 
natural, and what he consents to is required to alleviate 
them.
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However, if an individual has fears instilled in him, not 
by his experience but by the tales of others we have to 
enquire more closely. If we are talking about man outside 
the state of nature his reckonings may well be dependent 
upon another's account of a hypothetical state of nature. 
We then have to ask whether the tale he is told offers an 
accurate account of how things were, could have been and 
might still be, or whether they fulfil a purpose similar to 
the highway man's gun? It is possible that the picture 
offered will be an accurate account of reality (as far as 
that is possible), and then the free nature of consent is 
unaffected. If however, the account given misrepresents 
the costs attached to withholding consent, and perhaps also 
the benefits to be derived from giving it, the freedom of 
choice is diminished.
Hobbesian man has to (in the sense that he is determined) 
make the choice which he considers most appropriate in the 
light of his fundamental desires and aversions. Making the 
right choice is dependent upon having an accurate picture 
of his present reality, and a fairly reliable vision of the 
future. If this information is deliberately withheld or 
misrepresented then coercion accompanies determinism. 
Similarly, if one individual places another individual in 
a position where they can only choose to sacrifice 
something of value to them, because the alternative is 
death or suffering, coercion has occurred. This is not 
because they have acted from motives they would not choose
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to act upon per se, but because an unnatural situation was 
created within which they were forced to act upon these 
motives, instead of those that they would have more 
immediately followed.
Concerning the rationality and autonomy of the individual 
we have a choice of interpretations. It was argued in the 
previous chapter that men emerge from the state of nature 
equipped with prudence. Full rationality, as Hobbes
defines it, is not available to them as this has to be 
cultivated, and this is not possible whilst man's existence 
remains insecure. However, it would appear that men are 
capable of making decisions which we would ordinarily 
pronounce rational, and they are also capable of exercising 
autonomous - albeit determined - choice.
Hobbes's account allows for this reading, and he 
implicitly acknowledges the evolution of man's nature 
within the state of nature. However, it has been argued 
here that in the interests of the text as a polemic he 
prefers to present a more dramatic and necessarily less 
rational (in ordinary usage terms) picture of man outside 
the commonwealth.
Without going over old ground we shall simply state that 
man will be sufficiently autonomous, and will be capable of 
deliberating effectively when asked to consent. Whether or 
not he is given the opportunity to do so is a separate
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question. What should be said however, is that given the 
definition of autonomy we are working with, there is no 
reason to suppose that handing power over to the sovereign 
necessarily entails a loss of autonomy. As discussed in 
Chapter One, if the decision to do so is a rational 
decision based upon the valid belief that the sovereign can 
achieve security and prosperity for the subject, then the 
subjects remain autonomous although no longer independent.
This brings us on to the final issue, which is that of 
information. We have already shown how the issue of 
information is crucial to the question of whether or not 
consent has been freely given. In order to clarify the 
argument we should now look at the Hobbesian social 
contract and assess whether the individual is provided with 
information which facilitates, or impedes, the consenting 
process.
Information relevant to the deliberations preceding consent 
is crucially important not only because the freedom of the 
consent relies upon its being accurate, but also because 
the valid creation of an obligation relies upon its 
facilitating an accurate cost-benefit analysis. If the 
individual's consent is to create an obligation in him, we 
have to be able to show that what he has consented to do 
will benefit him in some real sense.
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It is important to view the question of information 
relevant to a Hobbesian social contract from two 
perspectives. First, information acquired through 
experience, that is the information available to those who 
have lived in the Hobbesian state of nature or an 
approximation thereof. Secondly, information provided by a 
second party, such as the account of life in the state of 
nature offered by Hobbes to his readership. One could also 
consider a third type of information that based upon 
deduction and demonstration carried out by individuals. 
Assuming this is based on true definitions and valid 
assumptions it is the best type of information but Hobbes 
believes that few will bother with such proofs preferring 
to rely on the reasoning of others.
Given that men will make decisions based upon their own 
experience, if their experience of the state of nature 
differs from the traditional account in the way suggested 
in the previous chapter, it is possible - indeed probable 
- that the decisions they make concerning the appropriate 
form of political rule will not coincide with Hobbes's 
recommendations. This in turn has implications for future 
generations of citizens who will be bound by the consent of 
their forefathers. Without going into great detail we can 
imagine that men emerging from a state of nature that had 
developed to the stage described in the previous chapter 
would be less convinced of the need for absolute rule ad 
infinitum. As man's nature is tempered by the development
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of prudence, and eventually reason, he will begin to 
appreciate the benefits of commodious living, and perhaps 
at the same time begin to doubt the need for a Sovereign 
with the far-reaching powers Hobbes describes.
Most interestingly for us, however, is the effect that 
Hobbes's account of the state of nature would have upon his 
readership. Despite his inial commitment to scientific 
enquiry it has been argued that Hobbes presents a picture 
of man in his natural state which stands unsupported by his 
scientific conclusions. It is likely that he came to heed 
his own warnings about the inadequacies of science when met 
with a popular audience,
The Sciences are small power; because not eminent; and 
therefore, not acknowledged in any man, nor at all, 
but in a few, and in them, but of a few things. For 
Science is of that nature, as none can understand it 
to be, but such as in good measure have attained it.71
In its traditional form the account 'seizes and compels', 
and demands that those who care about their security 
consider the proposals Hobbes presents. Fear is introduced 
as a motive, it does not necessarily spring naturally from 
the readers own experiences, even though Hobbes may wish to 
persuade them otherwise. Of course historical context does 
throw some useful light here given the background of the 
civil war, but I would suggest that the account is designed 
to terrify those for whom the war is distant history as
71 Leviathan, Ch.10, p.151.
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well as those who lived through it. If you believe in 
Hobbes's state of war, he only has a little more work to do 
to get you to accept his absolute ruler. The question is 
will you have done so freely?
I suggest that we have discovered another fundamental 
weakness of Hobbes's theory. We can only show that men 
will freely consent to the Hobbesian sovereign if we accept 
that they do so to avoid the state of nature as represented 
by Hobbes. However, we can only show that they are free 
and autonomous beings capable of giving consent if we 
present their experiences in the state of nature quite 
differently. If the state of nature is a fiction, or at the 
very least an exaggeration, we have a problem in explaining 
why individuals consent: if the state of nature is as
Hobbes's traditionally presents it we have a problem in 
explaining how men consent. It is my suggestion that a 
political philosopher should be more concerned with 
resolving the second problem, but a political pamphleteer 
will be more concerned with the first.
If we are forced to rewrite the state of nature as has been 
suggested, it is difficult to argue that men will 
rationally and autonomously choose to be ruled on a long 
term basis, in the manner Hobbes suggests. If we then say 
that Hobbes may have been aware of this fact, and 
deliberately exaggerated certain features of his account 
and underplayed others, we have to ask whether those who
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accept the reality of his account, or find themselves 
seized by his imagery^ are in a position 
evaluate his proposals.
If his account of the state of nature is inaccurate, Hobbes 
could be accused of polluting the deliberative processes of 
those who read it. Men lose their freedom to consent not 
because they are determined beings, but because Hobbes 
takes advantage of this fact and attempts to determine 
their actions in a particular direction. The account of 
the state of nature provides men with reasons to accept an 
absolute ruler. Although he could have freely consented 
Hobbes has robbed the reader of the opportunity to choose 
effectively amongst a variety of options.
This is an unpleasant conclusion to reach and it would 
appear that there is only one way in which Hobbes may be 
redeemed, if not fully then at least partly. It was stated 
above that the information upon which the decision to 
consent was based was important for two reasons, the second 
being the need for information to facilitate the cost 
benefit analysis required to back an obligation. So far we 
have only discussed information relevant to part of the 
story, that is information concerning the state of nature. 
Further information is required.
The covenant basically takes the following form: due to the 
dangers of the state of nature men come together and agree
operationallyJ/
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( with one another) to pass over their natural right to do 
whatever they consider necessary for their self 
preservation to a sovereign who will in return provide 
peace and security. If the state of nature is not 
necessarily as dangerous as Hobbes says, then it is 
difficult to understand why men would agree to pass over 
all their rights (with the few famous exceptions) and why 
the sovereign should made be so powerful.
This is not to say that there is no way of understanding 
why men will leave the state of nature and institute 
government. As Locke informs us the 'inconveniences' of 
life outside a political system are enough to explain this. 
The difficult questions are 'why the Sovereign?', and 'why 
such absolute power'? If Hobbes can offer answers to these 
questions which would remain valid given our re-reading of 
the state of nature, there is a chance that we can view the 
situation more favourably.
If it can be shown that life under the Sovereign is a good 
life irrespective of whether the alternative is a 'solitary 
poor nasty brutish and short' existence, we might be able 
to say that the account of the state of nature is a 
necessary means to a justifiable end. In other words, 
Hobbes has sacrificed the proper working of the consent 
process in order to ensure that men will what is best for 
them.
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The popular image of the Sovereign is understandably bleak, 
and many would concur with Locke's view that the journey 
from the state of nature to the commonwealth is akin to 
escaping a pack of wolves only to find yourself in a lions 
den. It is not my intention to mount an enthusiastic 
defence of Hobbes's absolutism, but in the interests of 
fairness it is necessary to see if it is possible to 
present it in a more palatable form.
What do they consent to?
In Chapter 18 of Leviathan Hobbes outlines the powers of 
the Sovereign, and in Chapter 19 he explains why he prefers 
monarchy to other forms of government. Later chapters are 
sprinkled with passages awarding the Sovereign yet greater 
powers including the right to suppress even correct 
philosophy if it undermines the laws of the Commonwealth.72
It is difficult to argue that the enormity of the 
sovereign's power is balanced by the liberties of his 
subjects, which are outlined in Chapter 21 of Leviathan. 
However, the following points should be borne in mind.
1. The power of the sovereign lasts only as long as he is 
able to exercise his power effectively towards the ends for 
which it was given to him.
72 Leviathan, Ch. 46, p. 703.
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2. The ability to ensure peace and security depends upon 
the obedience and support of his subjects. This is true 
both internally, and with respect to other nations with 
whom the commonwealth will remain in a state of war.
3. The obedience of subjects will be assured only for as 
long as they believe that the sovereign is ensuring their 
peace and security.
Although Hobbes is less than clear concerning the manner in 
which the original Sovereign will be selected, he does 
suggest that he will be chosen because of his personal 
qualities:
For he is Worthiest to be a Commander, to be a judge, 
or to have any other charge, that is best fitted with 
the qualities required to the well discharging of 
it;73
Amongst these will be rational faculties which surpass 
those of the majority of men.
He who hath by Experience or Reason, the greatest and 
surest prospect of Consequences, Deliberates best 
himself; and is able when he will, to give the best 
counsell unto others.74
Having been given power, the Sovereign will have powerful 
utilitarian reasons to ensure that his subjects remain
73 Leviathan, Ch. 11, p. 160.
74 Leviathan, Ch. 6, p. 129.
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loyal to him. He is like them a form of matter in motion, 
and he wishes above all else to stay in motion. His 
ability to do so, given the state of war that exists 
outside his boundaries, is inextricably bound up with the 
fortunes of his subjects.
...considering that the greatest pressure of Soveraign 
Governours, proceedeth not from any delight or profit 
they can expect in the dammage, or weakening of their 
Subjects, in whose vigor consisteth their own strength 
and glory; but in the restiveness of themselves, that 
unwillingly contributing to their own defence, make it 
necessary for their Governours to draw from them what 
they can in time of Peace, that they may have means on 
any emergent occasion, or sudden need, to resist, or 
take advantage on their enemies. For all men are by 
nature provided of notable multiplying glasses, (that 
is their Passions and Self love,) through which, every 
little payment appeareth a great grievance; but are 
destitute of those prospective glasses, (namely Morall 
and Civill Science,) to see farre off the miseries 
that hang over them and cannot without such payment 
bye avoyded.75
But he must be careful as the image of the state of war 
will be a distant one (despite Hobbes's attempts to keep it 
alive) . The citizen must be made aware of the liberties 
and advantages he enjoys by being a subject of the 
commonwealth.76 Civil liberties which exist in the areas
75 De Cive, Ch. Xiii, sect. 8.
76 As Hobbes points out in Chapter 30 of Leviathan 
ensuring the safety of his citizens does not mean 'bare 
preservation, but also all other contentments of life, 
which every man by lawful Industry without danger, or hurt 
to the Commonwealth shall acquire to himself.'p.376. He 
has previously stated in Chapter 27 that 'When a man is 
destitute of food or other thing necessary to his life, and 
cannot preserve himselfe any other way, but by some fact 
against the Law; as if in a great famine he take food by 
force, or stealth, which he cannot obtain for money or 
charity he is totally excused.' p.346. The sensible
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in which the law is silent, and the most profound form of 
liberty which is freedom from the fear of death. For as 
long as this liberty exists men remain free in the most 
meaningful sense available, and the way is open to develop 
yet more freedom in the sense of positive freedoms acquired 
through self- development and living the good life.
Leisure is the mother of Philosophy; and Commonwealth 
the mother of Peace, and Leisure.77
The commonwealth affords men the time and opportunity to 
develop themselves as rational human beings, and if they 
achieve this their deliberations will no longer be as 
dependent upon the vagaries of their senses, and the 
contingent effectiveness of prudence. However, the 
conclusion Hobbes refuses to reach is that the birth of 
reason might lead to the end of the commonwealth.
The obligation of subjects to the sovereign is 
understood to last as long, and no longer, than the 
power lasteth by which he is able to protect them. 
For the right men have by nature to protect 
themselves, when none else can protect them, can by no 
covenant be reinforced. The sovereignty is the soule 
of the Commonwealth, which once departed from the 
Body, the members doe no more receive their motion 
from it. The end of obedience is Protection; which, 
wheresoever a man seeth it either in his owne, or in
sovereign therefore provides for his citizens in order to 
avoid external and internal disruption, and acknowledges 
that 'the good of the Sovereign and people cannot be 
separated.'p .3 8 8.
77 Leviathan, Ch.46, p.683.
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anothers sword, Nature apllyeth his obedience to it, 
and his endeavour to maintain it. 78
The problem for Hobbes is that if the Sovereign performs 
his job effectively he will, in the eyes of rational men, 
render himself redundant. In order to ensure that a 
majority of men do not come to share this conclusion Hobbes 
works hard to discredit the authority of such men, and 
counsels individuals to reach their own conclusions (unless 
they follow the opinions of the sovereign) . The 
individualism championed by Hobbes has as much to do with 
fear of collaboration as it has to do with anything else.
He also offers his picture of the state of nature as an 
ever present possibility in order to counter men's 
criticisms of their present state. Hence the need for a 
vivid picture of a fearful existence which no man could 
rationally choose over any alternative offered. And the 
message that remnants of that terrifying existence persist 
even in ostensibly well ordered societies.
Ultimately, Hobbes has to rely upon the inaccurate 
information concerning the state of nature in order to 
disproportionately promote the benefits of life in the 
commonwealth. If men were left to decide without this dark 
spectre of an 'unavoidable' alternative, their
78 Leviathan r Ch.21, p. 272.
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deliberations might throw up a quite different system of 
rule.
The greatest freedom offered by life under the sovereign is 
the most dangerous freedom to that sovereign - rational 
autonomous men will be less susceptible to Hobbes's 
coercive attempts, they will see human nature for what it 
is, and trust themselves to be ruled in a different manner. 
It is my suggestion that the commonwealth is doomed not 
because of the sovereign's inability to exercise power, but 
because of the subjects' inevitable eventual realisation 
that the purpose for which that power has been given does 
not entitle the degree of power given. Just as human 
nature evolves in the state of nature, government will 
evolve in the commonwealth, and the Sovereigns' days will 
be numbered unless he significantly renegotiates the extent 
of his power.
Conclusion
This chapter has covered a great deal of ground, but the 
basic conclusions can be presented fairly simply. Hobbes's 
determinism does not in itself raise serious problems for 
his social contract theory, despite the fact that 
voluntarism and determinism do not appear mutually 
compatible at first. By looking at Hobbes's account of 
deliberation, and the forms of freedom he sees coming out
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of it, it is possible to show how a choice may be 
determined and in some real sense free. Basically, those 
choices are free which correctly 'track bestness' or, in 
mechanistic terms, promote vital motion.
However, given the definition of consent we are working 
with something further is required to ensure a distinction 
between free determined choice and coercion. This is where 
the problems set in. Individuals can only make choices 
which correctly track bestness if they can acquire full and 
accurate information pertaining to their choice. There is 
a built in weakness to the system, as men gain information 
through their senses which can be unreliable, but Hobbes 
exacerbates this problem with respect to certain forms of 
information.
As was argued in the previous chapter Hobbes's scientific 
method should have thrown up a rather different picture of 
the state of nature to that which he offered. However, in 
the interests of his political aims he chose to exaggerate 
certain features of the account and suppress others. This 
has serious consequences for his claim to be committed to 
a consent-based theory of political obligation.
In the terms of his own theory men should only accept 
obligations if they expect to benefit thereby. To show 
that they will benefit sufficiently under the rule of the 
sovereign Hobbes's relies upon a comparison with life
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without rule of any sort. He also relies upon a magnified 
and incomplete image of that life, and thereby deprives any 
individual who refers to his account of the information 
necessary to make a rational choice. He coerces through 
the use of imagery and ideas which get their power through 
trading on man's greatest fear - the fear of painful death.
This was not the only route available to Hobbes. He could 
have used his information concerning human nature, and his 
understanding of determinism in a far more positive manner. 
It is even possible that he could have achieved support for 
his political recommendations by so doing. If instead of 
relying upon fear as a motive he had relied upon the idea 
of a good life he could have persuaded without coercing, 
and forced people to be free through promises of a life not 
yet achieved rather than the threat of a life best 
forgotten.
As man's psychology develops, and his experiences change, 
the immediate fear of death will recede, and the basic 
desire to stay alive will develop into a more sophisticated 
desire to live well. If Hobbes can construct an image of 
the good life conducive to man's basic nature then his 
political recommendations can stand on their own, without 
the support of the state of nature. It is therefore 
necessary to evaluate the life offered under the sovereign 
to see if it is a good life in the sense required.
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In terms of the negative liberty enjoyed by subjects the 
Hobbesian commonwealth is unpromising to say the least. In 
terms of positive liberties available the picture is 
slightly better. Released from the insecurity of the state 
of nature men will be able to develop the arts and sciences 
that were unavailable to them in their previous state. 
They may enjoy familial and commercial relationships, and 
the benefits accruing from these. On the re-reading 
offered here men will have experienced some level of 
civilisation within the state of nature, and will have been 
able to develop their moral faculties within their family 
units. Experience will show them that the way forward lies 
in the development of rationality, which will in turn 
reconcile them to the objective morality provided by the 
laws of nature.
Men who actually live in the state of nature will
understand the way forward on the basis of their
experience. Men who have not experienced life in that
state could be bought to see the nature and the benefits of f
A  /V
the good life by argument and demonstration. Had Hobbes
been confident enough in the power of science as opposed to
rhetoric he would have attempted to do this. Although bad
experiences are the best teachers, and fear is often the
most effective motive, neither sit well with consent.
The conclusion reached is this. Hobbesian men emerging 
from a state of nature are able to give consent in a
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meaningful way. It is not however clear that they would 
consent to the form and extent of rule Hobbes proposes. If 
they did, it is highly likely that the nature of rule would 
have to change as men and society developed. Men who are 
asked to consent at any stage after the initial covenant 
are at an immediate disadvantage, given that they cannot 
rely on experience, but must rely on the accounts offered 
by others. Hobbes offers such an account and in doing so 
he deprives those who are moved by his picture of life in 
the state of nature, of the ability to deliberate 
rationally and to make a free choice. Hobbes offers a good 
example of the way in which information concerning man's 
nature and the manner in which his actions are determined 
can facilitate manipulation. This confusion is doubly 
regrettable if one is unconvinced by Hobbes's claims that 
life in the commonwealth is a good life per se.
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fliocke's notion of consent has quite rightly been criticised 
at a number of levels, but to give it a fair assessment it 
must first be recognised as only a small part of a much
3
Marger whole. In this chapter I wish to illustrate this 
point by reference to the interrelationship between Locke's 
theory of natural law and his theory of political 
obligation. I hope to show that the relationship between
f'these two elements of his theory does much to compensate
{
for the failings of each when considered separately. I am
jgy
K; §
also concerned to show that the political purpose for which
W
the concept of natural law was employed does much to 
explain the particular way in which the Law of Nature is 
presented by Locke.
r
Using the distinctions made in the first chapter of this 
thesis, it will be argued that the basis for civil 
|government within Locke's theory is profoundly moral, but
that it may have more to do with what men ought to do, than
. . . .  with the specifically political obligations they consent to
accept.
Responses to Locke's Theory of Natural Law
?!
Of course much attention has been paid to Locke's theory of 
natural law in the past; but it has often been employed in 
the defence of somewhat extremist interpretations of his 
work, ranging from Strauss's claim that Locke himself did
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liot believe in the theory he put forward/2 to Green's
1
assertion that it was the most important element of his
w
work, rendering the contract obsolete.3 Only recently has 
there been a concerted attempt to integrate the theory into 
he political framework as a whole, and assess its
specifically political applications. This positive step 
Was developed by such figures as Ashcraft, Anglim and
ttliley,4 who, within the vocabulary of Locke scholarship
'My.
have been labelled the 'Restorationists' . Yet, even
amongst these writers there has been a tendency to stop 
Bhort of recognising the full implications of their
theorising.
■'
&
KC
Most importantly, there has been a failure to appreciate
■V(
ijthe significance of the way, or more properly ways, in 
which Locke presents his theory of natural law. Many 
commentators have chipped away at Locke's 'proof' of God's
I
existence, and his 'mathematical' aspirations, but few have 
asked why, on the guestion of natural law, he persisted 
along what seem to be two contradictory theoretical paths.
2 L. Strauss, Natural Right and History, Chicago, 
University of Chicago Press, 1953, Ch V section B.
3 T.H. Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political 
Obligation, London, Longmans, 1941.
4 Each of these writers has published a wealth of 
excellent material, but most relevant to the present 
enquiry are R. Ashcraft, 'Locke's State of Nature, 
Historical fact or Moral fiction?' American Political 
Science Review LXII, 1968: P. Riley, 'On finding an
equilibrium between consent and natural law in Locke's 
political philosophy', Political Studies XXII, 1974: R.
Anglim 'On Locke's State of Nature', Political Studies 
XXVI, 1978.
In my view these questions are as important and relevant as 
those concerning the actual content and usage of the laws, 
knd I intend to address the question of Locke's 
presentation of the argument for natural law in some 
detail.
n
In the Second Treatise, Locke's premier political text, he 
assumes a degree of foreknowledge and understanding of his 
theory of natural law that might appear unwarranted, 
}stating that;
though it would be beside my present purpose to enter 
here into the particulars of the law of nature, or its 
means of punishment, yet it is certain there is such 
a law and that too, as intelligible and plain to a 
rational creature, and a Studier of that Law, as the 
Positive Laws of Commonwealth, nay possibly plainer:5
As Peter Laslett remarks,
Throughout the political work the expression natural 
law is used with suave assurance, as if there could be 
no doubt of its existence, of its meaning, of its 
content in the minds of author and reader.6
Von Leyden claims that 'for his purposes in this Treatise 
it was sufficient to have introduced the idea of the law of 
nature as the declaration of God's will, and as the
5 Treatise II, 12, p.315
6 Introduction to Two Treatises, op cit., p. 94.
standard of right and wrong'7 and leave it at that. Whilst
I Riley concludes that it would not have been advantageousfor Locke to enlarge on the difficulties of natural law
 ^.theory within the Second Treatise. 8
|i
I.Locke's friend Tyrrell on the other hand wrote
fe
...I wish you would publish your owne thoughts upon 
this excellent; and material subject; since I know you 
have made long since a Treatise or Lectures upon the 
Laws of Nature which I would wish you would revive and 
make publick, since I know none more able, than 
yourself to do it... I have heard you say more than 
once that you intended it.9
| Experience has shown that Tyrrell's opinion was wisely 
held, one cannot deny that Locke did himself a disservice 
by not giving readers of the Second Treatise more insight 
into his theory of natural law, and that as a result some
u
quite spectacular misinterpretations have grown out of what
RI f
is said in that work.
In the opening pages of the Second Treatise Locke states 
that one of the chief purposes of the work is to understand 
the nature and origin of political rule. In order to do 
so, one must begin by examining man in his natural state. 
This state is one in which men are in
7 W. Von Leyden, John Locke, Essays on the Law of 
Nature, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1954, p.80.
8 P. Riley op cit., pp 432-52.
9 cf. The Correspondence of John Locke, 4: 112-113 
(ed.) E. S. DeBeer, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1979.
...a state of Perfect Freedom to order their actions 
and dispose of their possessions as they think fit, 
within the bounds of the Laws of Nature, without any 
leave or depending upon the will of any other man.10
He goes on to say that,
iti
The State of nature has a law of nature to govern it 
which obliges everyone. And reason which is that law 
teaches all mankind who will but consult it, that 
being all equal and independent no one ought to harm 
another in his life, Health, Liberty or Possessions.11
Some commentators have taken this to mean that the natural
i f
law is exactly synonymous with reason, an issue which will 
be discussed further below. Further references to the
content of natural law are equally vague, he refers to the
<
'rule of reason and common equity'12 and speaks of it as 
being the law which 'willeth the peace and preservation of 
all mankind.'13 Unlike Hobbes who meticulously lists the 
individual laws of nature,14 Locke does little to 
substantiate the concept beyond offering a set of rather 
generalised ends which it seeks to promote.
Passages in which Locke speaks of the law of nature as 
being "writ in the hearts of all mankind"13 and as
10 Treatise II, 4, p. 309 .
11 Treatise II, 6, p.311.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 Hobbes, Leviathan, Ch XIV.
13 Treatise II, 11, p.315.
owhere to be found but in the minds of men"16 have also
£»
aused problems. Leo Strauss took these to be statements to 
evidence of the innateness of natural right, in direct 
ontradiction to Locke's well known views on the 
nlikelihood of there being any innate forms of 
owledge.17 
p
indeed Locke seems to require his readers to accept the 
^existence of the laws of nature without being given much 
detail of their content or origin. While this was probably
it'
a safe assumption to make at the time he was writing,
pi t • • •
present day Locke scholars require further information in
order to understand the way in which natural law
I
contributes towards an explanation of the form and origin 
of civil government. This information, which is not to be 
found within the pages of the Treatise, must be sought 
elsewhere.
Today's interpreters have gained much from the relatively 
recent discovery of what must count as Locke's major work 
on the subject of natural law, Essays on Natural Law.18 
Although written between 1662-64 these essays fell into 
obscurity until Wolfgang Von Leyden's meticulous survey of
16 Treatise II, 136, p.404 .
17 L. Strauss, op cit., p. 227 . Strauss distinguishes
clearly between natural right and natural law only the
former being innate.
18 Cf. footnote 7 above. From here on references
shall be given as Essays.
jfche Lovelace Collection in the 1940s. Realising the 
importance of a set of essays on the law of nature, written
r
as lectures during Locke's time as Censor of Moral 
philosophy at Oxford, Von Leyden translated and assembled 
them for publication in 1954, almost three hundred years
r
after they were originally written.
Some commentators have questioned the wisdom of referring
n
closely to material which the author chose not to publish.
r
Locke's possible reasons for non-publication are therefore 
of significance here.
In the introduction to his edition of the Essays, Von 
Leyden suggests a number of reasons why the work was not 
published in Locke's lifetime, or indeed for so long after 
his death.19 The original essays were written in Latin 
which was becoming much less popular by the mid 17th 
century, meaning publication would probably have 
necessitated lengthy translation work. Also, much of the 
material within the essays was eventually used in The Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding of 1690, so re-editing 
would also have been called for.
Von Leyden also points out that while Locke was in his 
thirties when he wrote the essays, he still considered them 
to be a product of his youth, and as such might not have 
wanted to afford them any great public importance. This
19 Essays, Introduction, pp. 14-15.
would sit well with Von Leyden's opinion that the Essays 
contain two quite contradictory accounts of the basis for 
moral obligations, a fault he would not have ascribed to 
♦-he mature writer. Laslett, meanwhile, dismisses the 
Essays as 'the typical product of a mind capable of
If1'
enormous expansion as yet unable to expand at all.'20
’
is of course feasible that political events in the 
decade leading up to 1668 caused Locke to lose confidence 
in some of his earlier views, making him diffident about 
their publication, I would argue however, that such an 
explanation is more applicable to the overtly political 
Tracts 21 than to the Essays. Moreover, as there are no 
explicit links between the two works there is little reason 
to assume they should share the same reasons for 
non-publication.
ft
The Two Tracts on Government first appeared in 1961 in an 
Italian translation, but remained more or less in obscurity 
until Philip Abrams published them in English in 1967 .
There are indeed fundamental differences between the views 
held in the Tracts and those of the later Treatises, such 
that Abrams felt confident in labelling the young Locke a 
conservative, in opposition to the traditional liberal 
characterisation of the mature writer. One can therefore
20 Two Treatises of Government, op cit., p. 34.
21 John Locke: Two Tracts of Government, (ed.) P. 
Abrams, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1967.
nderstand a certain reluctance on the part of the older 
icke to embrace this particular work of his youth.
7s.
*s I have suggested above the Essays pose no such threat 
Jo Locke's traditional standing, and one is reluctant to 
scribe political reasons for their lack of exposure. There 
re, however, certain theoretical strands which pass
I.
hrough both early and later works which should not be 
/bVerlooked. As Abrams points out in his introduction to 
the Tracts, although very little reference is made to a 
theory of natural law, such a theory is needed to support 
the ideas put forward in the work, and had Locke included 
some discussion of the subject the overall argument of the 
Tracts would have appeared more coherent. Abrams further 
argues that the importance of objective natural laws was 
necessarily undermined as Locke came to rely more on 
voluntarist arguments in his later work.22
The relationship between the Essays and Locke's Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding is at once more direct and 
more complicated. Von Leyden applies what can only be 
called 'informed imagination' to the question of the 
relationship between the two works, and describes how what 
we now know to be the two preliminary drafts of the Essay, 
grew out of a discussion in 1671 concerning 'the principles 
of morality and revealed religion', which soon became a
22 Ibid. p.88-92.
[iscussion of how the natural law might come to be known,
.nd from there broadened out into an enquiry into the
fhilst Locke clearly does not lose sight of the original
[uestion of natural law throughout the course of this great
work, a lengthy discussion of the subject would have been 
out of place in what is essentially a work of semiotics as 
[opposed to ethics. Some commentators are worried enough by
|he apparent clash between the hedonism of the Essay and
R;'-
lithe theory of natural law, to suggest this as a further 
f jceason for the latter's 'abandonment'. It is undeniable 
that Locke was aware of a conflict between his belief in an 
ultimate moral law, and his assertions supporting a 
pleasure and pain principle in the Essay and other works.
Yet, three years after the publication of the Essay he
Voluntas: That which has very much confounded men
about the will and its determination has been the 
confounding of the notion of moral rectitude and 
giving it the name of moral good. The pleasure that 
a man takes in any action or expects as a consequence
of it is indeed a good in the self able and proper to
move the will. But the moral rectitude of it 
considered in itself is not good or evil nor anyway 
moves the will, but as a pleasure or pain either 
accompanies the action itself or is looked on to be a 
consequence of it. Which is evident from the
punishments and rewards God has annexed to moral
rectitude or pravity as proper motives to the will, 
which would be needless if moral rectitude were in 
itself good, and moral pravity bad.24
irigin and extent of human knowledge.24
expressed the following sentiments in a commonplace sheet
24 Essays, Introduction, pp. 60-65.
24 Quoted by Von Leyden, Essays, pp. 7 2-7 3 .
304
It is also worth remembering that although the seventeenth
f!
century was the heyday of natural law theory, by 1660 the 
debate was long run, and a thinker as innovative as Locke, 
j hungry to break new intellectual ground, may not have 
Iwished to voice his opinions in the public arena. Rather, 
he wished to formulate a sound theory which he could then
Ifapply in a political context, and thereby set the debate on
an original footing. Furthermore, Locke was somewhat out
&•
of step with his contemporaries in the debate, his interest 
in the subject being largely epistemological as opposed to 
legalistic or historical, and with him retaining a 
metaphysical basis for the law, whilst Grotius 25 et al 
were looking for a more scientific, or at least secular
^interpretation.
ir
Ever mindful of the practical purposes to which his
theoretical reasoning could be put, Locke was no doubt 
anxious to protect his theory of natural law from criticism
'
borne of opposing theoretical perspectives. Locke's great 
contribution was to be in the public and political arena 
and he did not seek diversions in the form of arguments 
concerned with theoretical specifics. Indeed, he may well
.
have been mindful of Hobbes's lengthy correspondence with
Bishop Bramhall on the subject of liberty and free will.
25 H. Grotius, De Jure Belli ac P a d s , Libri tres 
ed.itio Novissima, Amsterdam 1625 , ( 1712).
hat is important is that Locke's loyalty to a universal 
atural system of laws survived, and the subject is 
tilised, if not discussed, in a selection of otherwise 
iverse works, adding further dimensions to the core theory 
presented in the Essays. Most importantly in the
resent context, it will be argued that his theory of 
atural law is central to the argument of The Second 
Treatise of Government. However, it is to the Essays which 
_ne must turn to avoid misunderstanding resulting from the 
aucity of detail on the subject of natural law in that 
"ork.
The Theory Itself
V'
Written in the form of lectures the Essays answer eight 
specific questions concerning natural law, examples being, 
Is there a rule of moral law or law of nature given to us? 
Is every man's own interest the basis of natural law?
i?;
Although there are a few discrepancies between the 
different essays, with some contradicting others on passing 
points, they succeed in presenting a fairly coherent theory 
of natural law. Many agree that, despite a certain 
dogmatism, Locke succeeds in covering in depth a subject 
that all too many of his predecessors had skirted around.
The most obvious question which arises out of Locke's 
theory is why he accepted the existence of a law of nature.
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; Jn the first of the Essays he offers five reasons for his
belief
p. The first arises from two principles found in 
Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics which state that 'the
ft;
special function of man is the active exercise of the
I
mind's faculties in accordance with rational principle' and
m
I that 'a natural rule of justice is one that has the same
Ivalidity everywhere'.26 Taken together these two principles
£
“Suggest to Locke the existence of a system of universalw
moral law, which is not threatened by the fact that a large 
! section of mankind live as if there is no such law, and is 
only strengthened by disagreements concerning its form and 
content.
2. Locke also points to human conscience , which acts in 
the absence of other laws , to show that there is some 
moral law by which men are bound. Although conscience is
|not in itself a sufficient guarantee that the laws will be
I obeyed, its existence offers powerful evidence of the laws 
existence.
I 3. From Aquinas and Hooker Locke takes the point that all
Wc things in the universe are governed by law, so man must 
necessarily have some guiding principle suitable to his
26 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics Bk I. 1098 a7 & Bk V 
1134 bl8.
ature. As God made man reasonable and susceptible to law,
n must be guided by his reason to submit to the law.27
S'
m
Human society, Locke argues is necessary for the full 
evelopment of human potential, and it in turn depends on 
a) a constitution and form of government, and (b) an 
bligation to fulfil contracts i.e. an obligation 
ndependent of human will.
18*'
hese two fundamental bases of human society are totally 
ependent upon the prior existence of natural law. If that 
aw - and they in turn -are found to be groundless, no man 
ill be bound by positive law.
. Finally Locke argues that without natural law there 
‘^ould be no honour or virtue, no baseness or vice; men
n  9 • • •
ould therefore have nothing to do but that which his will, 
Utility or pleasure recommends 'or what blind or lawless 
impulse might happen perchance to fasten on. '28
P
Presumably Locke the empiricist has worked back from the 
existence of society, human conscience, good and evil, 
rational will and order, to locate and identify the law of
27 R. Hooker, Preface to The Laws of Ecclesiastical 
Polity in Works (1632 etc) (ed.) J. Keble, 3 vols, Oxford,
1836 and Aquinas Summa Theologica. For further discussion 
of their influence see Von Leyden's introduction to the 
Essays.
28 Essays pp. 119-21.
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iture, rather than working from the necessity of such 
ilues towards the desirability of positing a law of nature 
tich promotes them. Had he not done so his theory would 
dangerously close to that of Hobbes, who presents 
Hwtural law as a set of prudential maxims, based on 
Unde pendently determined ends. Locke works from his 
iservation of the world as it appears to be, to the belief 
a law of nature is a necessary component of such a 
jiorld.
course each stage of Locke's argument is open to 
estion:
Even if man's special function is 'the active exercise 
the mind's faculties in accordance with rational (and 
presumably moral) principle', this does not in itself prove 
that such principles exist naturally. Indeed another 
theorist might well argue that such principles are 
necessarily artificial, in the sense that they can only 
become known and recognised in political society. To state 
that a natural law of justice must have the same validity 
everywhere is a far cry from establishing that such law in 
fact exists. Indeed empirical observation makes it appear 
unlikely that it does exist.
2. Human conscience would appear to indicate the existence 
of some moral standards by which an individual has chosen 
to act. However, we have no way of knowing whether the
I '
I
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human conscience of all individuals is informed by the same
A
moral code.
3. Statements about human nature are always open to 
question. One need only look as far as Hobbes's theory of
I
liatural law to see how a different view of man's nature
6;
it
radically affects the content of the laws he is taken to be 
governed by naturally.29 Some commentators have argued
it • . . . . .that Locke, instead of stickrng to his minimalist account 
lof man's nature as 'rational and susceptible to law',
constructed a picture of natural man which included
‘
■profoundly social characteristics, and then produced a law 
of nature in accordance with that image of social man.30
if
4. Locke argues that men are naturally driven to form 
societies and that such an impulse is necessary for the 
full development of human potential. However, as he 
himself states in the Treatise, the move to society, and
t■)
the establishment of government are two separate steps,31 
and moreover, one could argue that the second does not 
necessarily follow on from the first in the manner Locke 
would wish.
29 Cf. Leviathan, especially Chs. 13-15.
30 C.B. Macpherson The Political Theory of Possessive 
Individualism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1962. See 
particularly Chapter V, Section 3.
31 Treatise II, 77, p. 362 .
5. Without natural law, natural freedom would become 
license and this is unacceptable to Locke. However, this 
is more a value statement than a proof that such a law 
exists. Before one can even begin to establish that man's
natural state was law-governed, it is necessary to consider
p
the possibility of a lawless state in which every man did 
as his will, utility or pleasure recommended. It is at
least possible that the two would not differ significantly,
•jr.
which would suggest that man's nature determined the moral 
climate as opposed to the natural law.
Ultimately Locke is more successful in showing why it is 
desirable to assume the existence of a natural law, than he 
is in demonstrating its actual existence. However, having 
shown to his own satisfaction - through deduction based on 
empirical observation - that the law of nature exists, 
Locke proceeds to show how men acquire knowledge of that 
law.
As seen above, Locke's initial assumption concerning man 
is that he possesses reason. By reason Locke means a 
discursive capacity of mind, as opposed to an objective set 
of moral principles. As he explains in the Essay,
...it stands for a Faculty in Man, that Faculty, 
whereby Man is supposed to be distinguished from
311
Beasts, and wherein it is evident he much surpasses 
them.32
jocke is seeking, from a factual starting point, to develop 
a theory of moral obligation such that men are obliged to
ise their reason. He believes that reason is an essential
fir:
rharacteristic of humanity, and that man's special function 
jn earth is to exercise his reason. This is a profoundly 
ristotelian move such that morality entails perfecting 
one's natural function, and being a 'good man' entails 
exercising one's reason, which will inevitably lead one to
Jyy-
|discover the rules of 'right reason' by which every man
:should govern his life. However, the classic problem of
IPj|deriving an ought from an is, of moving from a value free 
assertion of man's nature to a normative/prescriptive
I statement as to how men ought to behave given that nature
Iej soon arises. Luckily it becomes clear why Locke feels he
i
|can make this move, a point that will be discussed further 
below.
Leaving this problem aside for the moment, having accepted 
that the existence of reason as a faculty natural to man, 
plus a natural obligation for man to make use of that 
capacity, Locke has to show how men utilise their reason to
32 Essay Concerning Human Understanding BkIV, Ch. XVII, 
Sect. 1. Unless otherwise stated, all references refer to 
P.H. Nidditch, (ed.) Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1975. 
References shall be given as Essayr Bk., Ch., Section.
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iscover their moral duties and obligations. This is both 
meta-ethical and an epistemological question.
discovering the Laws of Nature
epistemological terms Locke can be classified as an 
Indirect perceptual realist. In its simplest form this
Sv
refers to our only having an indirect awareness of the 
sxternal world via our direct awareness of ideas. We 
jinderstand these ideas and the relationships between them 
jy employing reason. Ideas may be either simple or 
:omplex, the latter being a combination of simple ideas. 
Reason cannot create simple ideas, it can only seek them 
[out and interpret them, so Locke has to identify the 
possible sources of these simple ideas which are the basic
n
|building blocks which form complex ideas, and ultimately
IP
knowledge.n
In the Essays on the Laws of Nature Locke discusses three 
| possible forms of knowledge.
1. Inscription, or knowledge through innate ideas 
| 2. Tradition, or knowledge through hear-say
3. Sensation, or knowledge through sense experience.
In line with his later works, especially Book One of the 
Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke rejects the
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:trine of innate ideas.33 In the third Essay on the Laws 
Nature he deals explicitly with this question, and 
;hough in some of the other essays he is less adamant 
>ut the impermissibility of natural law being innate, the 
•rail impression still is that he does not regard innate 
Ibwledge as the source of moral truths. His views
EmKY
Hpreshadow this passage from the Essay:
■I?: There is great deal of difference between an innate
law, and a law of nature; between something imprinted 
on our minds in their very original and something that 
we, being ignorant of may attain to the knowledge of, 
by the use and due application of our natural 
faculties .34
HP*
ISo the laws of nature are not "natural" rn the sense ofit'
jeing ideas naturally imprinted on man's mind. Rather,
[■'
ihey are discoverable by man in his natural state - once he 
[has developed reason. He makes this point quite clearly in 
:he Treatise
W'
Adam was created a perfect Man, his Body and Mind in 
full possession of their strength and reason, and so 
was capable from the first instant of his being to 
provide for his own support and preservation according 
to the dictates of the Law of Reason which God had 
implanted in him. . . ,35
....The Law that was to govern Adam was the same that 
was to govern his posterity, the Law of Reason. But 
this off-spring having another way of entrance into 
the world, different from him, by a natural birth, 
that produced them ignorant and without the use of
33 Essay, Bk.l, Chs.II & III.
34 Essay, Bk.l, Ch. II, Section 13.
35 Treatise II, 56, p.347.
I
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reason they were not presently under that law: for no 
body can be under a law which is not promulgated to 
him; and this law being promulgated or made known by 
reason only, he that is not come to the use of reason 
cannot be said to be under this law.36
jocke also dismisses tradition as an origin of knowledge, 
ilthough he does accept that true knowledge and positive 
morality will be handed down, and that men may subsequently 
Learn the moral law as a traditional doctrine bequeathed to 
|them by their forbearers. This point becomes significant
k • . . .tyhen one considers the political importance of natural law 
tnd the necessity of its reaching the largest possible 
|&udience. In the Reasonableness of Christianity 37, Locke 
^stresses the importance of transmission far more forcefully 
than elsewhere, arguing that prior to the Gospels:
'Human reason unassisted failed men in its great and 
proper business of morality. It never from
unquestionable and clear deductions made out an entire 
body of the law of nature.'38
■V
Transmission is vital but it does not in itself prove the 
truth of the maxims transmitted, one still has to explain
El/.
how the originator of the tradition came to discover the
r  ■
truth. If we can explain how the laws first come to be 
j known, we can then go on to show how tradition plays an
36
B
Treatise II, 57, pp.347-8.
37 On the Reasonableness of Christianity as Delivered
in the Scriptures, (ed.) G. Ewing, Gateway Editions, 
Chicago, 1965. References will be given as Reasonableness, 
pg x.
38 Reasonableness, p.140.
iportant role in explaining how subsequent generations 
ome by their knowledge of these laws.
&
is leaves only sense perception as capable of explaining 
ow knowledge of the laws was originally acquired, and in 
he Fourth Essay on the Laws of Nature Locke argues that it 
s possible for reason, starting from the basis of truth 
perceived by the senses, to acquire full knowledge of the 
laws of nature.39
Three different forms of knowledge can be constructed on 
the basis of sense perception: sensitive, intuitive and
demonstrative knowledge.
Sensitive knowledge derives from ideas that are so vivid, 
constant and sharp that they are very obviously different 
from imagination - for example knowledge of the external 
world. This is the least secure form of knowledge.
Intuitive knowledge is that which is based upon a self- 
evident connection between ideas, for example knowledge of 
one's own existence - Descartes's Cogito.40 In order to 
think something one must exist, there must be an 'I' to do 
the thinking. Therefore, if one thinks anything one must
39 Essays pp. 14 9-59 .
40 R. Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy in 
Descartes Philosophical Writings (eds) E. Anscombe & P. 
Geach Nelson's University Paperbacks, Middlesex, 1954. 
Second meditation, pp.66-76.
^hereby know that one exists. This according to Locke is
the surest form of knowledge.
P
K
Demonstrative knowledge is less pure than intuitive 
knowledge, because by its very nature it allows for the 
possibility of doubt. Demonstrative knowledge depends upon 
establishing a sequence of steps to carry one from an 
original presupposition to a final idea. Intuitively it 
may be impossible to associate the final idea with the 
original proposition, but one must be able to show that 
each individual step is intuitive knowledge. The more 
steps needed to make the connection the more vulnerable to 
doubt the knowledge is.
Knowledge of the Laws of Nature is most easily understood 
as a form of demonstrative knowledge, which immediately 
makes the task of explaining how men acquire such knowledge 
a complex business. Ideally, Locke wishes men to act as if 
the laws of nature are known to be true intuitively, but he 
recognises that first he must offer something approaching 
a demonstration of their existence, origin and binding 
nature. In order to do so Locke invokes God. The route to 
knowledge of the laws of nature is via the recognition of 
God as a law maker and the acceptance of all that entails. 
Because we are told, 'what Duty is cannot be understood 
without a Law, nor a Law be known, or supposed, without a 
Lawmaker. '41 It is then necessary to recognise that the
41 Essay, Bk.l, Ch.Ill, Section 12.
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ill of the law maker is the law by which one should
|;
onduct ones life.
To establish morality , therefore, upon its proper 
basis, and such foundations as may carry an obligation 
with them, we must first prove a law, which always 
supposes a law maker: one that has superiority and
right to ordain, and also a power to reward and punish 
according to the tenor of the law established by him. 
This sovereign law maker who has set rules and bounds 
to the actions of men is God, their maker, whose 
existence we have already proved. The next thing to 
show is that their are certain dictates which it is 
his will all men should conform their actions to, and 
that this will of his is sufficiently promulgated and 
made known to all men. /42
As this passage suggests, Locke has a twofold objective: 
first to show the basis upon which morality should be 
built, and second to show that the dictates of morality 
ought to be promulgated and obeyed. First, however, we 
| need to examine his assertion that the existence of God has 
already been proved.
Proving the Existence of God the Law Maker
As mentioned above, Locke's starting point is more or less 
Cartesian - man is aware of his own existence, he is 
conscious therefore he is. 'I think it is beyond question 
that man has a clear Perception of his own being; he knows 
certainly that he exists and that he is something' and 'If 
I doubt of all other things, that very doubt makes me
42 J. Locke 'Of Ethics in General' in P. King, The Life 
and Letters of John Locke, Vol 2, published by George Bell 
and Sons, London 1884, p.133.
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perceive my own Existence, and will not suffer me to doubt
R|
P •that. /43 King reproduces a manuscript entitled Deus-
!■
Descartes Proof of God, from the Idea of Necessary 
Existence examined (1696), in which Locke argues thus,
'Real existence can be proved only by real existence; 
and therefore the existence of God can only be proved 
by the real existence of other things. The real 
existence of other things without us, can be evidenced 
to us only by our senses; but our own existence is 
known by us by a certainty yet higher than our senses 
can give us of other things, and that is internal 
perception, a self consciousness, or a most 
incontestable proof of the existence of God. ,4A
I Knowledge of one's own existence is knowledge of the surest
1
sort, and it is this knowledge which gives the first clue 
as to the existence of God. Having accepted his own 
existence man turns his attention to those things existing 
external to him which he experiences through his senses. 
Locke believes that on looking around himself man is left 
in no doubt as to the reassuring formality and pleasing 
regularity of the world around him. Indeed commentators 
I criticise the extent to which Locke is prepared to take 
existence of the external world for granted, in a manner 
which to contemporary philosophers might seem naive.
Having seen the nature of this external world, man's reason 
helps him discern that something must cause this wondrous 
pattern of events, because he works on the scholastic
43 Essay, Bk.IV, Ch. IX, Section 2.
44 King, op cit., p. 317.
principle that every event has a cause. What is more, a 
further scholastic principle suggests that not only did 
this cause exist in eternity when the causal chain began, 
but it must contain even greater properties than those 
things it created. A cannot lack what it is responsible 
for giving B, so the creator of the world, who is also 
man's creator must be reasonable and powerful..
At first this creator does not appear synonymous with the 
Christian God, but before long his identity is made 
obvious. And, unlike Hobbes, Locke works hard to make his 
God good and reasonable as well as all powerful, meaning 
that man can adhere to the precepts of God's law not only 
as a respecter of his power, but also as a moral agent 
acting upon the precepts of right reason.
There are a number of obvious difficulties with this 
account. First, in his empiricist guise Locke should have 
trouble with the proposition that every event has a cause, 
as the notion of a cause cannot be made to follow 
analytically from the concept of an event. As Hume was to 
later point out, an uncaused event is not inconceivable.45 
What is more even if the principle of causation were valid 
in terms of individual events, one could reasonably argue 
that it need not apply to the universe as a whole.
45 D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature ed. P. Nidditch 
Oxford, Clarendon, 1978, Bk I Part 3, Section 3, pp.78-79.
Even if every particular event is caused it might be wrong 
|jfco assume one overall cause, if, once every particular 
event is explained, there is nothing left to explain. 
Locke however, persists in his claim that there has to be
I
a final (as in first) cause of the series in which the 
events occur.
As for the creator possessing the gualities of its creation 
one does not need the assistance of sophisticated science
y
to discover numerous examples disputing Locke's claim. 
Once again Locke accepted and employed a questionable 
scholastic assumption, 'proven' by concentrating on a 
limited range of examples which made the principle appear 
sound.
Whilst it would be permissible to assert that a creator 
should have the ability to create the features of its 
creation, this allows for the possibility that the creator 
does not in fact possess the actual abilities itself. 
Consider for example the ballet mistress who 'creates' a 
world class ballerina. It is quite possible that the 
teacher never had the talent of her protegee, yet it is 
only she who could have nurtured that talent in the younger 
dancer, and have created the prima ballerina, who - without 
her influence - would have spent her career in the back row 
of the corps de ballet.
Locke would have been unwilling to recognise such examples 
as relevant because this would allow for the possibility 
that man, as an intelligent rational being, was created by 
something, or a combination of things, which need not have 
been rational. To make this admission would be very 
damaging to his argument at a number of levels, as will 
become apparent. Locke desperately needed to represent 
man as the creation of a rational, intelligent and 
reasonable God.
w
Leaving aside questions of the precise nature of the God 
which Locke identifies as man's creator, and the question 
of how well or badly he manages to prove (his words not 
mine) the existence of God, the most interesting question 
in this context is why he tries so hard to do so : 
accepting as one surely must that the weaknesses in his 
theory are not intentional components of a Straussian 
hidden argument, as one recent interpretation has 
suggested.46 As Locke himself wrote in a letter
one cannot say that because a writer is obliged to use 
imperfect, inadequate obscure ideas, where he has no 
better, he is deliberately trying to exclude those 
things out of being, or out of rational discourse by 
making them obviously implausible.47
46 W. Bluhm, N. Teger & S. Wintfield 'Locke's Idea of 
God: Rational Truth or Political Myth? The Journal of
Politics Vol 42, 1980.
47 cf. Essay, Bk.II C. XXXI, Sections 1 & 2 for
definition of adequate and inadequate ideas. See also 
Locke's Life and Letters, pp.198-201.
It would appear that although unsuccessful, Locke's attempt 
at a rational proof of God's existence was an important 
component of his attempt to give man's guiding moral 
principles the firmest and broadest possible grounding. 
Ultimately it is insufficient to prove the mere existence 
of a natural law, or to explain how man acquires his 
knowledge of such a law. Unlike Hobbes, Locke was not 
willing to settle for an original position in which men 
recognise the laws only in foro interno .48 Rather he 
sought to construct an explanation of how those laws place 
obligations on men, and the motives which lead them to 
fulfil those obligations.
It is not insignificant that the notions of obligation and 
obedience are separated here, Locke himself makes this 
distinction, and a failure to appreciate its significance 
has been the cause of some misunderstanding in the past. 
As has already been discussed in some detail above, the 
existence of an obligation may not in itself explain an act 
of obedience. Obedience can result from the recognition of 
an obligation to obey, but such recognition does not always 
provide a sufficient motive to act. Ultimately Locke 
seeks to show that men are obliged to obey the laws of 
nature and that they have strong reasons (motives) to 
fulfil that obligation. In fact, it is more appropriate to 
say that men ought (in a strongly moral sense, as well as 
a prudential sense) to obey those laws.
48 Hobbes, Leviathan, Ch. 16, p. 215.
The desire to prove the existence of God as law-maker is 
closely related to the political significance and purpose 
Locke wished to afford to his laws. If the laws of nature 
were to be central to his theory of government then, it was 
important that their influence should not be restricted to 
a  small section of mankind. Unless God's existence is in 
some sense provable, one has to accept that his laws will 
have no meaning to those who choose not to believe in him. 
If, however, the existence of God the law-giver can be 
proven, then the laws of nature will become law to those 
who were unprepared to accept them as a dictate of faith.
The distinction between those who have faith and those whoBp
lbh
do not is an important one in this context, and one which 
many commentators have chosen to ignore. Perhaps one need 
not go so far as to make the distinction between faith and 
the lack of it, instead one might wish to speak of those 
who believe and accept unquestioningly the dictates of 
their God, and those who at the same time require further 
rational reasons for obedience. It will be argued here 
that Locke was well aware that his arguments concerning the 
binding nature of the laws of nature would have to satisfy 
two types of men, the ordinary God-fearing individual, and 
the potentially sceptical 'studier of the laws'. Locke's 
handling of the laws of nature shows how he appreciates 
that knowledge can be acquired and transmitted in ways more 
or less, appropriate to the audience concerned.
This explains the fact that the body of Locke's work or 
atural law utilises two rather different theories tc 
explain its origin and binding power. A conflict iE 
voided by the fact that both accounts are built upon one 
basic fact which never alters - the law of nature obliges 
man because it is the will of God. The accounts vary ir 
the way in which Locke presents this will and the
individual's relationship to it, and the motives he puts 
forward as a spur to obedience. One is reminded of the way 
in which a child is told to eat carrots because they will 
help him to see in the dark, whilst an adult would eat then; 
because he knows that they contain valuable vitamins, one 
of which is claimed to enhance vision in dull lighting 
conditions.
It is possible to show why, whether or not he was
successful, Locke tried to prove the existence of God, anc
why as well as using revelation and scripture aE 
authorities, he also employed anthropological theories, anc 
an argument from design. By offering a rational proof of 
the existence of God, as well as pointing the faithfu_
towards the traditional Biblical 'proofs', Locke hoped tc 
provide a law-maker for every section of the community, anc 
thereby provide the foundations for a system of natural lav 
with a wide range of influence.
By examining the two forms of argument offered by Locke it 
should emerge that they do not differ significantly in 
content. The important difference is in terms of style.
H o r s e s  f o r  c o u r s e s ,  a r g u m e n t s  f o r  a u d i e n c e s .
The argument for the faithful
The most natural adherents to the law of nature, both prior 
to and subsequent to the creation of government, are 
religious men. Locke links a knowledge of and adherence to 
natural law very closely to men's nature, and their natures 
will have been the least corrupted. Religious men will 
come easily to a recognition of the moral worth of a life 
ruled by the law of nature. Christians accept as a dictate 
of their faith the existence of an omnipotent and 
omniscient God, quite apart from any rational proof Locke 
can offer. Faith is a very powerful force in Locke's 
estimation, and one that he plans to harness for his own 
purpose. Belief is to play an important role in his 
system:
the greatest part of mankind want leisure or capacity 
for demonstration, nor can carry a train of proofs, 
which is what they must always depend upon for 
conviction, and cannot be required to assent to, 
until they see the demonstration.... the greatest part 
cannot know and therefore they must believe. The
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instruction of the people were still best left to the 
precepts and principles of the Gospel.49
As he has stated earlier in the Reasonableness,
It should be seen by the little that has been done in 
it, that it is too hard a task for unassisted reason 
to establish morality in all its parts, upon its true 
foundation, with a clear and convincing light. And it 
is at least a surer and shorter way to the 
apprehensions of the vulgar, and mass of mankind, that 
one manifestly sent from God, and coming with visible 
authority from him, should, as king and law maker TELL 
them their duties, and require their obedience, than 
leave it to the long and sometimes intricate 
deductions of reason, to be made out of them such 
trains of reasoning the greatest part of mankind have 
neither leisure to weigh, nor for want of education 
and use, skill to judge of.30
Here Locke is more or less advocating religion as a form of 
. . .political education, and he clearly suggests the importance 
of belief and faith in bringing the religious man to the 
knowledge - if not a very thorough understanding - of the 
laws of nature. It need not be the case that he cannot 
know, but rather that it is not always necessary for him to 
do so. According to Locke, belief based on revelation is 
the nearest one can get to truth or certainty without 
rational proof. In the final pages of The Reasonableness 
of Christianity, he emphasises the importance of the 
Gospels in teaching the uneducated mass natural law, and 
providing sanctions to obedience that they will understand. 
The faithful will gain knowledge of God's existence through
49 Reasonableness, p. 146.
30 Reasonableness , p. 139.
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revelation, and receive his teaching through the words of 
Scripture and Gospel.
Leo Strauss is critical of this part of Locke's argument 
and claims that the discrepancies between Locke's theory of 
natural law, (or rather Strauss's interpretation of it), 
and scripture are enough to suggest that the natural law is 
not the will of God as presented by the Gospels, but rather 
artificially constructed in line with man's individualistic 
nature, and based upon an innate natural right to happiness 
or self preservation.
Locke's natural law teaching can then be understood 
perfectly if one assumes that the laws of nature which 
he admits are, as Hobbes put it, "but conclusions, or 
theorems concerning what conduces to the conservation
and defence" of man over against other men.... The law
of nature, as Locke conceives of it formulates the 
conditions of peace or,, more generally stated, "of 
public happiness" or the "prosperity of any people."51
This is not a strong piece of evidence, especially in view 
of the fact that Locke spends the first section of his
Sixth, as well as his entire Eighth Essay on the Laws of
Nature arguing that self interest/preservation cannot be 
regarded as the basis of natural law. This is not to say 
that there may not be a coincidence between what the law 
dictates and the means to public happiness, and this idea 
will be explored further below.
51 Strauss, op cit., p. 229 .
oncerning Locke's refusal to base civil law directly on 
scripture as evidence for his claims, Strauss is forced to
/f
Yr|
ignore what Locke has to say about the nature of Scripture. 
T.ocke acknowledges that what is written in the Bible is 
necessarily an interpretation of events and ideas, and 
feasibly at times a misinterpretation. Furthermore, once 
set down the scriptures are open to further interpretation, 
and one need only consider Locke's fundamental disagreement 
with Filmer's interpretation of scripture on the questions 
of property and paternalism to appreciate the significant 
differences of opinion that may arise. Locke is insistent 
nonetheless, as shown in the Second Vindication of the 
Reasonableness of Christianity that both the law of reason 
and revelation express the will of God, and neither 
contains distinct or unique injunctions which the other 
does not have. 'It is no diminishing to revelation, that 
reason gives its suffrage too to the truths revelation has 
discovered.' As Yolton observes the moral law intuited by 
reason, and the moral law implicit in the New Testament are 
fundamentally one and the same,32 and Locke has a further 
commitment to the idea that no civil law should be in 
contradiction of either.
Locke's reluctance to establish the Scriptures as the sole 
basis of a political system stems in part from this problem 
of interpretation, but also derives from the fact that a
J. Yolton, 'Locke on the Lav/ of Nature' Philosophical 
Review 57, 1958, p.489.
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ilirely scriptural foundation would necessarily exclude from
¥
fluence all those outside the Christian church. What is 
re the positive law of government will often need to 
idress questions unimagined by the writers of scripture, 
i order to do this they cannot be restrained by a 
equirement that all law be fundamentally based upon the 
pecific word of the Bible. Finally, Locke was willing to 
accept that historical precedent offered little evidence of 
the Scriptures acting successfully as guardians of peace
£hese are essentially practical considerations, relevant to 
the political purposes envisaged for the laws of nature, 
but in no way detracting from the claim that for those 
willing to accept its teachings, the Bible is a good 
representation of the will of God, and thereby of the laws 
of nature so long as they find no discernible differences 
between the two. And concerning the relationship between 
the laws of nature and positive law, Locke never abandons 
the belief that 'municipal laws of countries (which) are 
only so far right as they are founded on the Law of Nature, 
by which they are to be regulated and interpreted. '53
As we have seen in discussing the law of nature Locke was 
anxious not only to show that the law had been received but 
also that it would be obeyed. As well as requiring the 
existence and recognition of a law maker he clearly states 
in the Essay that a system of rewards and punishments is a
S3 Treatise II, 12, pp. 315-6.
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constitutive element of law. Locke therefore assumes the 
existence of a system of divine rewards and punishments,
which form a crucial part of his "religious" argument .
&
Strauss sees Locke's reliance upon such a system as a
I
weakness in his argument, and maintains that since Locke 
cannot demonstrate immortality and the certainty of a life 
after death in which these rewards or punishments will be
1 afforded, they cannot serve the purpose demanded of them,
I
and therefore natural law can never really be a law in the 
| proper sense of the word.54 Just as the sovereign and his 
/sword is essential to Hobbes's concept of law, so the 
system of divine rewards and punishments are to operate as 
God's irresistible and essential weapon, but they can only 
do so if one accepts the existence of an afterlife in which
they shall be made real.
k
ti Whilst it is true that Locke does not feel able to offer a
rational proof of an afterlife, this does not immediately
$ . .exclude the possibility of employing a system of divine
rewards and punishments as sanctions to obedience at this
level. This is not to say that there are not problems
i  i
involved, and Strauss was by no means the first to point 
them out. Locke's contemporary Tyrrell challenged him on
I.
54 Strauss op cit., p.220 It is worth noting that 
other respected commentators have been happy to acknowledge 
Locke's insistence upon the need for divine rewards and 
punishments without feeling that it poses the same sort of 
problem. See for example J.W. Lenz 'Lockes's Essays on the 
Laws of Nature', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 
XVII, 1956/7 and J.W. Yolton op cit..
the question of immortality as early as 1690.55 Locke
it
attempted a defence, and began by stating that 
demonstration of the facts could be taken far further than 
it had to date, but nonetheless, one had to settle for 
something less.
Were it not for two important factors, Locke might seem to 
be attempting to sidestep the issue.
1. Sanctions are employed only as motives to obedience as 
opposed to bases for obligation, and
2. this whole argument is directed at the religious 
believer who does not require rational proof, and for whom 
faith and belief are stronger bonds than rational 
persuasion.
Locke's statement that the 'bare possibility which nobody, 
can make doubt of, of an after life makes it a good bargain 
to conform actions to divine law; '56 becomes more 
acceptable when these factors are borne in mind. 
Probability as opposed to certainty is sufficient when 
dealing with those prepared to make the leap of faith: the 
mistake would have been if Locke had tried to incorporate
55 See Locke's reply to Tyrrell reproduced in King, op 
cit. pp.198-9.
56 Ibid. In the Essay he discusses a category of 
propositions that 'border so near on certainty that we 
make no doubt at all about them.' Essay, Bk.IV, Ch. XV, 
Section 2.
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1 a system of divine rewards and punishments into his
|i
attempt to persuade those without pure faith of their 
obligations under the laws of nature.
| Locke, as a religious man, did in fact believe that 
If immortality could be proved by revelation, and that nothing 
I genuine in revelation could contradict reason. Though 
| true, something might still be beyond the discovery of 
reason, but the faithful are protected by the fact that 
'nothing that is contrary to, or inconsistent with the 
*| clear and self evident dictates of reason has a right to be 
urged or assented to as a matter of faith. ' As one
commentator puts it
The scriptures like convictions and common-sense, only 
confirm the voice of reason; they cannot contradict 
it, but are tested by it.57
IP
Ri
So, Locke's divine rewards and punishments are motivating 
forces employed at a psychological level, and concerned 
with obedience to the law, as opposed to the morality of 
that law, or the individual's obligations under it. For 
these reasons, and because those whose obedience is in 
question are believers, it is fair to assume that such 
sanctions will function quite adequately, and that the 
status of natural law is unthreatened.
57 M. Seliger, 'Locke's Natural Law and the
Foundations of Politics' Journal of the History of Ideas 
XXIV, 1963, p.344.
Before moving cn to discuss the use to which Locke put his 
theory of natural law, once he had established that it 
would be understood and obeyed by the majority of
individuals, it is worth asking more about the actual 
content of the laws. given his belief that the law of 
nature is the law of God he could have employed a very 
basic command theory of law, yet he chose instead to 
elaborate.
Unlike Hobbes, who simply identified law with the will of 
he who has power, Locke introduces the notion of right. 
Men are obliged only to obey those superiors who have the 
right as well as the power to command them. God has such
a right because he created man, and those familiar with
Locke's theory of parental control, or his theory of 
property will appreciate the importance afforded to
creation, and the rights arising from it. 'He has right to 
do it, we are his creatures'38
Locke offers the further assurance that the nature of God's 
will is such that you will be able to obey it not only 
because of his evident power, but also because his will may 
be rationally apprehended as right, thus making obedience 
a truly moral act.
'The first knowledge of the truths... is owing to
revelation; though as soon as they are heard and
sa Essay, Bk.II, Ch.XXVIIl, Section 8.
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considered they are found to be agreeable to reason; 
and such as can by no means be contradicted. /59
Furthermore, God's will is neither arbitrary nor unstable, 
but rather consistent with the eternal order of the world. 
It is fortunate, he states, that 'the law of nature is the 
law of convenience too'.60
Already we can see ways of casting the argument in a more 
intellectualist or rationalist mould. One might even 
suggest that Locke goes beyond the level of argument 
required to convince those who believe in an omnipotent and 
omniscient God who created man to do his work. In fact it 
will be suggested here that there is a quite deliberate 
shift in the tenor of his argument such that it is designed 
to convince an entirely different audience of their moral 
obligation to obey the laws of nature.
As Locke's argument progresses it moves away from positions 
which require a basic leap of faith, and thereby appears to 
be directed also towards those who, for whatever reason, 
are unwilling or unable to receive the laws of nature 
directly through Christian teachings.
59 Reasonableness,, p. 140.
60 Ibid.
The argument for the rational man
Having dealt with "all the day labourers and tradesmen, 
the spinsters and dairy maids'61 Locke feels it incumbent 
upon him to offer a thesis 'proper only for a few, who had 
much leisure, improved understandings, and were used to 
abstract reasonings. '62 Faith can conceivably be lost, but 
a rational proof once accepted can never be rejected, and 
permits the constancy necessary to ensure political 
stability and legitimacy.
Locke as a true believer cannot reject as a starting point 
the existence of God as law maker, but for this potentially 
sceptical audience he has to offer something approaching a 
mathematical proof of that existence; nothing can remain a 
mere question of faith or revelation. He has previously 
declared that 'whatsoever should thus be universally useful 
as a standard to which men should conform their manners 
must have its authority EITHER from reason or revelation'63 
and at a certain point in his argument he turns his 
attention to the rational, and constructs an explanation 
designed to satisfy the 'studiers of law'.
61 In The Reasonableness of Christianity Locke
remarks that 'you may as soon hope to have all the day-
labourers and tradesmen, spinsters and dairymaids perfect 
mathematics, as to have them perfect in ethics in this 
way.' p.14 6.
62 Ibid.
It is within this context that his rational proof of the 
existence of God is crucial, and the fact that it is a very 
weak proof and thus a weak link in his argument cannot be 
overlooked. It does however explain why he persisted with 
his attempts at a proof in the face of a sceptical 
audience. Much has been written on Locke's failure in this 
field and I shall not attempt further analysis here rather 
I shall suggest that having established to his own 
satisfaction the existence of the law-maker Locke set out 
to make the (potentially sceptical) individual understand 
the nature of his creator, his relationship to him, and the 
true value of what he commands.
At this level of argument, God the creator's relationship 
with his major creation, man, must be presented in such a 
way as to enable the individual to perfect that 
relationship, and learn from it without priestly 
intervention, or the strictures of any specific established 
church. In order to embrace those who for whatever reason 
choose not to rely on revelation and scripture, Locke 
advocates a form of private religion based on rational 
understanding as opposed to blind faith, a relationship 
between the individual and his law-giver unrestricted by 
the requirements of formal religion. The individual will 
learn of the law of nature, and become obligated to obey 
it, by employing his God-given faculty of reason. This 
element of Locke's theory indicates a profound shift from 
the position held in the earlier Tract, wherein his views
n the importance of upholding ritual and ceremony within
i
he Church struck a distinctly conservative note.64
O'
i'
he argument runs as follows - God created the world and
i
everything in it, a fact that one can grasp without 
reference to scripture through observation and rational 
deduction. Reason further tells us that God is not only 
powerful but also wise, therefore one must assume that his 
creation was made for some purpose. God's purpose is 
referred to explicitly within the context of Locke's theory 
of property, and alluded to throughout his work. The 
hedonism towards which Locke was undoubtedly attracted 
further suggests that everything is done to promote 
pleasure or good, either directly or indirectly. As God is 
all knowing and wise, the purpose of his action will be to 
promote 'The Good'. With this purpose in mind he creates 
man with a nature conducive to the pursuit of good, and 
provides him with laws to live by which complement his 
nature, and facilitate God's overall purpose.
There is great logic in this system, and although the 
ultimate source of the laws to which man is obliged is 
still the will of God, they can now be appreciated at a 
different level - as part of a rational and eternal order 
in some way independent of that will. Independent because
64 As well as the Tracts as cited above, see P. Abrams, 
John Locke as a Conservative: An Edition of Locke's First 
Writings on Political Obligation, 1961, Unpublished 
Dissertation in Cambridge University Library.
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I
nee God has created the world for a particular purpose, 
nd given man a particular nature, the laws governing man, 
6nd the world in general, have to follow on logically, 
his is what Locke means when he states that the laws of 
ature are not based on a changeable and unpredictable 
ill. God has a purpose towards which all his activities 
are directed, and all that he creates and directs is in 
line with that purpose. He states in the Essay 'That God 
himself cannot choose what is not good; the Freedom of the
V{'
Almighty hinders not his being determined by what is best. '
This aspect of Locke's theory has led Von Leyden to 
comment:
By holding that moral values cannot be other than they 
are on account of their suitableness to the essential 
nature of man, Locke provides law with a natural 
foundation and makes human reason a self dependent 
source of obligation.65
This is to overstate the case as Locke never abandons the 
belief that the law of nature obliges because it is the 
will of God. What he does do however is provide an 
additional reason for accepting the fact that the will of 
God is worthy of the obligation demanded. He is once again 
dealing with motivation as opposed to obligation.
He states:
05 Essays, Introduction, p. 51
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In fact it seems to me to follow just as necessarily 
from the nature of man that, if he is a man, he is 
bound to love and worship God and also to fulfil 
other things appropriate to his nature ie. to observe 
the laws of nature. As it follows from the nature of 
a triangle that if it is a triangle its three angles 
are egual to three right angles.
In line with his basic epistemology Locke proceeds from a 
self evident proposition or definition, through a necessary 
consequence, to arrive at a certain truth.
One of the plainest examples of Locke's theory as presented 
at this level appears in a journal entry dated 15th July 
1678 .
God having given man above other creatures of this 
habitable universe a knowledge of himself which the 
beasts have not, he is thereby under obligations, 
which the beasts are not, for knowing God to be a wise 
agent; he cannot but conclude that he has that 
knowledge and those faculties which he finds in 
himself above other creatures given for some use and 
end. If therefore he comprehends the relations 
between father and son and finds it reasonable that 
his son whom he has begot (only in pursuance of his 
pleasure without thinking of his son) and nourished 
should obey, love and be grateful to him, he cannot 
but find it much more reasonable that he and every 
other man should obey and revere, love and thank the 
author of their being to whom they are all that they 
are. If he finds it reasonable that his children 
should assist and help one another and expects it from 
them as their duty, will he not also by the same 
reason conclude that God has made him and all other 
men in a state wherein they could not subsist without 
society, and has given them judgement to discern what 
is capable of preserving that society, can but 
conclude that he is obliged and that God requires him 
to follow those rules which conduce to the preserving 
of society.67
66 Cf. Essay, Bk.IV, Ch.X, Section 1.
67 Bodleian MS Locke f3, pp 201-2 headed Lex Naturae.
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By this argument, man is to come to understand the laws of 
nature by understanding his own nature, and his obligation 
to obey them by appreciating the relationship between 
father and son, creator and created, God and man. He also 
suggests that this relationship should appear reasonable to 
man, as will the assertion that God has some purpose for 
him to fulfil.
On other occasions he is less confident of this being so 
evident, and once again he introduces the notion of motives 
to obedience. As suggested above, divine sanctions will 
not suffice in this context, because of the difficulties in 
providing a rational proof of an afterlife. Locke 
therefore introduces a more earthly form of hedonism.
It has been argued that the psychological hedonism common 
to Locke's later writing is damaging to his rationalist 
interpretation of law. However, when placed in the 
context of the argument above, this hedonism, for want of 
a better word, will be seen to compliment his theory of 
natural law.
As suggested above, Locke felt it 'fortunate' that God had 
linked the virtuous to the 'convenient'. In fact he 
explicitly states that God has 'by an inseparable 
connection joined virtue and public happiness together'68
68 Essay, Bk.I, Ch. II, Section 6.
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and that 'the law of nature is the law of convenience 
too'69 The use of the term 'public happiness' in this 
context should not pass unnoticed. Desire for happiness, 
Locke states in the Essay, is a natural inclination of 
mankind, 'everyone constantly pursues, and desires what 
makes any part of it'.70 Given that God cannot but pursue 
happiness, and men naturally pursue happiness, it makes 
sense that the law which God makes to govern men should 
promote that desired happiness. Not because that is the 
reason for which the law is created, but because the law is 
created to promote what is morally right, which is in turn 
appropriate to man's nature. Moreover, in the realisation 
of man's true nature lies the surest route to happiness.
An advantage of this reasoning is that those who fail to 
grasp the nature of the good which God ultimately pursues, 
and Locke admits that men will not always be capable of 
understanding the ways in which God's purpose is being 
acted out, can relate instead to their own personal good, 
which is necessarily a part of a larger whole. In securing 
their own personal pleasures, by obeying the law suitable 
to their natures, they will also be obeying that law which 
pursues something far greater, and possibly beyond their 
everyday grasp.
69 Reasonableness, p. 142.
70 Essay, Bk.II, Ch.XXI, Section 43.
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It might be thought that this interpretation is approaching 
a notion of rule utilitarianism, however it is essential to 
appreciate that in this instance utility is the result of 
acting morally, as opposed to the reason for doing so. 
'Utility' Locke assures us 'is not the basis of the law, or 
the ground of obligation, but the consequence of obedience 
to it.'71 Furthermore the reference above to 'public 
happiness' is enough to suggest that immediate personal 
pleasures and appetites might sometimes be sacrificed. 
And, finally, it is an inescapable conclusion of Locke's 
theory that personal judgements as to the good or evil of 
an act have no objective moral status, they are correct 
only in so far as they accord with God's judgement.
Natural law, politics and morality
Having shown how it is possible for all men to come to an 
understanding of the laws of nature, and furthermore, how 
all men can be given good reasons to obey those laws, Locke 
is able to place them in a central position within his 
theory. It will be shown that he takes full advantage of 
this opportunity, and thereby changes the emphasis of his 
theory in a way which may not appear immediately obvious.
In the Treatise, as quoted above, Locke first speaks of the 
laws of nature within his account of man in his natural 
state, a state he defines as 'Men living together according
71 Essays, p.215.
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to reason without a common Superior on Earth to judge 
between them'.72 Locke never questions man's inherent 
sociability.
God having made man such a creature, that, in his own 
Judgement, it was not good for him to be alone, put 
him under strong obligations of necessity, Convenience 
and Inclination to drive him into Society, as well as 
fitted him with Understanding and language to continue 
and enjoy it.73
Within this state the law of nature is the only law, and 
for as long as man's life remains simple, and his nature 
largely uncorrupted, it is sufficient to ensure peace and 
individual security.
However, there are certain inadequacies within the law and 
the 'inconveniences' of life in the state of nature arise 
mainly because it remains unpromulgated, and there is no 
indifferent judge to adjudicate conflicts arising from its 
application. What is more Locke's 'peculiar' theory of 
punishment allows every man to judge in his own case, and 
execute punishment as he judges appropriate. As a set of 
moral dictates the law of nature is more than adequate, as 
a law it is lacking. However, 'till by their owne Consents 
they make themselves Members of some politick Society'74
72 Treatise II, 19, p.321.
73 Treatise II, 77, pp.361-2.
74 Treatise II, 15, p.318.
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men remain both subject to, and individual executioners of 
this law, and this law alone.
Returning to the vocabulary of the opening chapter of this 
thesis, it would appear that within Locke's theory the 
laws of nature inform man as to what he ought morally to 
do, the content of that moral ought being either discovered 
by his reason or dictated by his faith. The laws of 
nature stand as an objective standard of right and wrong, 
in terms of which men should judge their actions. Locke 
sometimes chooses to speak in terms of 'natural 
obligations' resulting from those laws, but he also clearly 
states that the laws tell us what we ought not do. 75
It could be argued that Locke's use of the word obligation 
is not altogether appropriate when discussing man's 
relation to the laws of nature. The 'previous committing 
action' common to all clear cases of obligation is 
difficult to identify, and it is not easy to see how these 
natural obligations may ever be discharged. Furthermore 
the specific relational aspect of an obligation is absent, 
instead one has general and universal moral duties to 
perform or refrain as the law requires. In a sense the 
dictates of natural law are like positional duties attached 
to being human, but more usefully they may be understood as 
indications of what man ought to do qua man.
7S Treatise II, 6, p. 311.
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Going against the law of nature is equivalent to 'varying 
from the right rule of reason whereby a man becomes so 
degenerate and declares himself to quit the principles of 
human nature and to be a noxious creature'.76 Locke comes 
close to saying that to perfect humanity is to live by the 
laws of nature, and to abandon the laws of nature is to 
become less than human.
In the paradigm case of an obligation one may often choose 
whether or not to create one, but man cannot choose whether 
or not to be bound by these laws. He is bound because he 
is human and because he is God's property, it goes without 
saying that he is subject to God's law. Even on the 
fundamental issue of control over his own life man is 
subject to Gods rule and preference:
For men being all the workmanship of one omnipotent 
and infinitely wise maker; all servants of one 
Sovereign master sent into this world by his order and 
about his business, they are his property whose 
workmanship they are, made to last during his not one 
anothers pleasure.77
By representing man's relation to his maker in terms of 
property ownership, and by explaining God's right to 
control as deriving from his creating man, Locke disregards
76 Treatise II, 10, p.313-4.
11 Treatise II, 61, p.350.
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the point that obligations are most commonly understood to 
be self assumed.78
In the paradigm case, either a man expressly places himself 
under an obligation, he or acts in such a way as to 
indirectly create an obligation. In Locke's account the 
obligation is seen to exist irrespective of man's actions. 
As in the case of a child's natural obligations to his 
parent, it is the actions of the obligee that appear to 
create the obligation, not those of the person who is 
obligated. The important issue then becomes whether or not 
men choose to recognise these 'obligations' to the extent 
that they feel obliged to act upon them. It has to be 
shown that men are willing to accept an obligation to do 
what the laws of nature prescribe/tell them they ought to 
do. Thus the big issue is motivation.
It has already been shown above that Locke goes to some 
lengths to provide an account which as well as describing 
how men arrive at a knowledge of the laws of nature also 
explains why they will be motivated to obey the laws. 
According to Locke, man recognises his obligations under 
the laws of nature either because he is a Christian and/or 
because he is rational. Throughout the Treatise he is
78 Cf. above p. 2 Off.
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careful to present all significant forms of knowledge as 
discoverable through reason and/or revelation.79
Although there are both moral (the laws are the will of 
God) and prudential (God's laws are directed towards mens' 
best interests and have heavenly sanctions attached to 
them) reasons for recognising and accepting one's natural 
obligations, Locke does not lose sight of the fact that men 
may nonetheless feel free to decide whether or not to obey 
these laws. Just as it is a problem within the state of 
nature that the laws of nature remain 'writ within the 
minds of men', it is a problem that the motives toward 
obedience are dependent either upon a belief in the 
afterlife, or a fairly sophisticated grasp of God's purpose 
as it relates to man.
It is possible, if not probable, that even if man 
recognises his natural obligations as such, he will not 
feel sufficiently motivated to act upon them; just as he 
might choose on occasions to rank the demands of a 
prudential ought as more urgent than those of a moral 
ought. Human nature is such that men will find it 
difficult not to judge in their own favour, and interpret 
the laws as suits their purposes.
79 cf. Treatise II, 25, p.327 in relation to private 
property, and Treatise II, 52, p.345 in relation to a 
mother and father having an equal title to power over their 
property.
though the Law of Nature be plain and intelligible to 
all rational Creatures; yet men being biased by their 
Interest, as well as ignorant for want of study of it, 
are not apt to allow of it as a Law binding to them in 
the application of it to their particular Cases.80
This is why Locke is forced to admit that life in the state 
of nature will be uncertain, and the enjoyment of property 
will be insecure. In a journal entry dated 20th March 167 8 
Locke laments that
Our state here in this world is a state of mediocrity' 
wherein 'we are not capable of living together exactly 
by a rule, not altogether without it.81
And in the Treatise he gives as the chief reason for 
wishing to join a civil society the desire to protect one's 
Property, which in the broad sense adopted here includes 
'Lives, Liberties and Estates'.82 He then goes on to list 
the 'inconveniences' of the state of nature which make the 
enjoyment of one's property uncertain, the first of which 
is the lack of an 'establish'd, settled, known Law, 
received and allowed by common consent to be the standard 
of Right and wrong'83
80 Treatise II, 124, p.396.
81 'Journal Entry 20th March 1678 ', Manuscript Msf3 
Bodleian Library.
82 Treatise II, 123, p.395.
82 Treatise II, 124, p.395-6.
This is not to say that such a standard of 'Right and 
Wrong' does not exist, however, as the preceding quotes 
suggest impartiality is too much to expect of men, 
especially in the state of nature.
The move to civil society is in the main an attempt to make 
effective the law of nature, and thereby protect men in the 
enjoyment of their property. The hope is to avoid the need 
for 'appeals to heaven', where, in the absence of a clearly 
written law and an earthly judge 'every the least appeal is 
apt to end. ' 84
It would be wrong given this account, to see the 
introduction of civil law as sweeping away or replacing the 
law of nature. Civil law does not supersede the law of 
nature, rather it amplifies and supplements it. Nothing 
can justly be called law which contradicts the laws of 
nature. In fact, the laws of nature will often prove more 
accessible to reason than the municipal laws of a society.
It is to this law that man first owes his obedience and 
this fact does not alter. Given the serious manner in 
which Locke regards transgressions against the laws within 
the state of nature, it would be unrealistic to assume that 
they become less important within civil society.
84 Treatise II, 21, p. 323, also Treatise II, 243, 
p.477 .
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In transgressing the law of nature the offender 
declares himself to live by another Rule, than that of 
reason and common equity which is that measure God has 
set to the action of men for their mutual security; 
and so he becomes dangerous to mankind, the tye, which 
is to secure them from injury and violence being 
slighted and broken by him. Which being a trespass 
against the whole Species and the Peace and Safety 
provided for by the law of nature.85
Locke is most anxious to carry the concept of natural law 
over from the state of nature into civil society. Within 
the commonwealth, 'tyes' between men are reinforced and 
extended, but an attack on the law of nature still 
constitutes a severe blow to man's fundamental security. 
The law of nature is the law of man's creator and as such 
it remains in place throughout man's existence.
Thus the law of nature stands as an eternal rule to 
all men, Legislators as well as others. The rules they 
make for others mens actions, must as well as their 
own and other mens actions be conformable to the law 
of nature and the fundamental law of nature being the 
preservation of mankind, no humane sanction can be 
good or valid against it.86
On the one hand Locke presents men as able to understand 
the laws of nature, but he also recognises that it may 
often be difficult for them to act upon what they know to 
be right. These difficulties result from man's own nature 
and also from certain structural difficulties with the law
85 Treatise II, 8, p. 312.
86 Treatise II, 135, p.403.
351
of nature. To ensure their effectiveness they must be made 
more law-like. This entails:
1. Clearly promulgating the laws.
2. Appointing judges and magistrates to administer 
disputes.
3. Annexing tangible sanctions to the laws to ensure 
obedience.
4. Clearly affording an appropriate body power to punish 
offenders.
Nowhere is it argued that the essential dictates of the law 
are inappropriate or in need of alteration, the problem is 
one of form rather than content, and such problems can be 
rectified.
'The obligations of the law of nature cease not in 
society but only in many cases are drawn closer, and 
have by humane laws known penalties annexed to them, 
to inforce their observation.87
The structural problems associated with the laws of nature 
explain the need for a 'law-maker' on earth, a sovereign 
power which will be obeyed. This is the role of 
government, and the first requirement upon any government 
is to 'govern by establish'd and standing laws, promulgated 
and known by the people and not by Extemporary Decrees.'"8
87 Ibid. .
88 Treatise II, 131, p.399.
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These laws should be 'directed to no other end, but the 
Peace, Safety, and publick good of the people. '89
Locke is committed to creating a model of government which 
will be best able to fulfil these tasks. Thus it will be 
seen that the desire to transfer the laws of nature into 
civil society determines not only the content of the civil 
laws, and the establishment of a sovereign political power, 
but also the form, extent, proper origin, and even 
personnel of government.
The moral state
Having been 'driven' into society men choose to take things 
further, and look to create a civil or political society 
where they will be:
united into one body, and have a common established 
law and judicature to appeal to with authority to 
decide controversies between them and punish 
offenders .90
Civil society is an artificial entity which has to be 
created, and the form of political society that might be 
seen to evolve most naturally is not necessarily the most
89 Ibid..
90 Treatise II, 87, p. 365 .
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desirable.91 Men decide to become members of civil 
society, and it is open to them to decide not to do so. 
Being essentially rational and peaceable it is safe to 
assume that the large majority will choose to do so.
As argued above, the fundamental principles of civil law 
are non-negotiable, based as they have to be upon the laws 
of nature. However, If the laws are now to be 'made' by 
government, in the sense of being written down, codified 
and promulgated there has to be some way of testing that 
they are in fact based on the fundamental moral principles 
which men ought to live by.
Happily, there are a number of 'tests' available. The 
content of the law may be judged either directly, in terms 
of its identity with the laws of nature, or indirectly, in 
terms of its ability to achieve its purpose, that is the 
extent to which it ensures 'the Peace, Safety and publick 
good of the people.' It would be interesting to consider 
the extent to which this second standard of judgement might 
allow an 'ends justifying means' type argument to slip in.
91 The account offered in Chapter VI of the Second 
Treatise suggests that paternal power will develop into 
monarchical power, but the important point is that this 
power is not based on right but rather on the consent of 
children which is based on gratitude. However, Locke 
wishes to keep any discussion of absolute monarchy firmly 
within the sections dealing with the state of nature (cf 
s90, s93) and leaves a discussion 'Of the Beginning of
Political Societies' to the next chapter.
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Some commentators do worry about this in relation to 
Locke's majoritarianism.92
However, just as Locke chooses to define the state of 
nature as a state of perfect freedom, but not of licence. 
A state in which every individual has executive power of 
the Law of nature, and a state in which every one has the 
right to judge in his own case and punish those who
transgress.93 He defines the existence of political 
society in terms of men giving up their rights to judge 
independently on the basis of the laws of nature. The 
individualism inherent in his account of man in his natural 
state is thus modified.
Locke clearly states that 'No Man in Civil Society can be 
exempted from the Laws of it.'94 However, there is also a 
natural law, which is
as intelligible and plain to a rational creature , and
a studier of that Law as the positive laws of
commonwealths, nay possibly plainer; as much as reason 
is easier to be understood than the phansies and
intricate contrivances of Men, following contrary and 
hidden interests put into words; For so truly are a 
great part of the Municipal laws of countries which 
are only so far right, as they are founded on the Laws
92 Cf W. Kendall, 'John Locke and the Doctrine of 
Majority Rule', Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences, 
xxvi, 2, 1941.
93 Treatise II, Ch. 2.
94 Treatise II, 94, pp. 3 7 3-4 .
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of Nature, by which they are to be regulated and 
interpreted.9S
If this is so, it suggests that individual men will, at 
times, be in a position to judge that the laws of their 
country do not conform to the natural law of human kind. 
If this is so then they must also know how to proceed.
In Chapter II of the Treatise when Locke is seeking to 
substantiate his claim that in the state of nature 'every 
man hath a right to punish the offender and be Executioner 
of the Law of Nature', he draws an analogy with a 
government's right to punish an 'alien' for crimes 
committed in their country.
The legislative authority by which they are in force 
over the subjects of that commonwealth hath no power 
over him. Those who have supream power of making laws 
in England, France or Holland are,to an Indian but 
like the rest of the world. Men without Authority: 
And therefore if by the law of nature every man hath 
not a power to punish offenders against it as he 
soberly judges the case to require, I see not how 
magistrates of any community can punish an Alien of 
another country, since in reference to him they can 
have no more power than what every man may naturally 
have over another.96
This is a reiteration of the point that everyone remains 
governed by the laws of nature, plus the additional point 
that these laws are universal, and cross national 
boundaries. 'The tyes of natural obligations are not
96 Treatise II, 2, p. 30 8 .
96 Treatise II, 9, p. 313.
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bounded by the positive limits of kingdoms and 
commonwealths.'97 However, the really interesting point is 
that it is suggested here that men retain - in some sense 
at least - their right to punish those who offend against 
the laws of nature. Although this power will now be 
exercised by those with political authority, it is derived 
from the fact that all men actually retain such a power, if 
not the right to exercise it.
The Judicious Hooker wrote that we must obey the laws of 
our society 'unless there be reason shew'd which may 
necessarily inforce that the laws of reason, or of God, 
doth enjoyn the contrary.'98 Locke is surely committed to 
the same view. Unfortunately the passage in which he most 
directly addresses this question is far from clear.
But though every man who has enter'd into civil 
society, and is become a member of any commonwealth, 
has thereby quitted his power to punish offences 
against the Law of Nature, in prosecution of his own 
private judgement: yet with the judgement of offences 
which he has given up to the legislative in all cases, 
where he can appeal to the magistrate he has given up 
a right to the commonwealth to imploy his force, for 
the Execution of judgements of the commonwealth 
wherever he shall be called to it; which are indeed 
his own judgements they being made by himself or his 
representative."
97 Treatise II, 118, p. 392.
98 Cf. Hooker op cit.
99 Treatise II, 88, p. 368.
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Punishment of offences is no longer an individual right 
within civil society, the right to 'appeal to the
magistrate' however remains, and this will be discussed 
further below. What is particularly interesting however,
is Locke's statement that the judgements of the
commonwealth are indeed the individual's own judgements 
'they being made by himself or his representative.'
For this statement to be morally significant Locke needs to 
show that in some real sense the judgements of the 
commonwealth remain the judgements of each individual
within it. Hence the importance which he places on
individual consent.
It is not sufficient that a government either emerges 
naturally, or takes power through superior might. Rather, 
it must acquire the power it exercises over the people
directly from the people. The people must understand that 
the work of government is the employment of their 
collective power on their behalf. They must also 
understand that the only way in which a government can
rightfully gain sovereignty over them is through a 
transfer of power. If these facts are made clear, then
although power is ostensibly removed from the people, it 
actually remains with them, as it is their right to entrust 
it, and indeed remove it as they see fit. Governments are 
empowered by people, and that empowerment is conditionally 
granted.
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Men being, as has been said, by Nature, all free, 
equal and independent, no one can be put out of this 
estate, and subjected to the political power of 
another, without his own consent.111
To be legitimate political power must rest on consent, but 
Locke then takes the argument further, and seeks to ensure 
that the legitimacy of government is determined not only by 
its origin, but also by its form. In the context of a 
discussion on slavery, Locke states that a man not having 
complete power over his own life (only God has that) 
'cannot by Compact or his own Consent, enslave himself to 
anyone, nor put himself under the Absolute, Arbitrary Power 
of another, to take away his life as he pleases.101 The 
'cannot' in this context having both logical and moral 
force.
This prohibition has a number of implications:
First, it illustrates the formal point that if one is to be 
moral and rational, one is not completely free to give 
one's consent as and when requested. As discussed in the 
first chapter, the fact that something has been consented 
to does not of itself make that thing moral, unless the 
immorality of the act is defined solely in terms of a lack 
of consent eg. rape. One has to ask a separate question as 
to whether, having consented to do so, it would be moral
mi j<reatise II, 95, p.374 .
101 Treatise II, 23, p. 325 .
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(or in the case sighted above, possible) to act in such a 
manner.
Second, when transferred to political context, it makes a 
specific point about the nature of political rule one is 
free to consent to. Logically it is impossible to place 
oneself under the complete control of another being, 
because one does not initially possess complete control 
over oneself. More importantly, one ought not morally 
consent to 'absolute, arbitrary Power' being exercised over 
one, because the only rightful possessor of such power is 
God. One is only free to pass over limited power and 
conditional obedience,102 and,'the State of War and slavery 
ceases, as long as the Compact endures.'103 Anything 
beyond limited political power is slavery, and those who 
seek to exercise such power over others place themselves in 
a state of war with respect to them.
Within this prohibition lie the seeds for both Locke's 
famous theory of revolution expanded in Chapter 19 of the 
Treatise, and his theory of limited representative 
government.1(14
102 Treatise II, 135, p.402.
103 Treatise II, 24, p. 326
1(14 Locke is willing to accept the need for absolute 
power to be in operation within certain circumstances eg, 
the armed forces, but even here it is restricted to power 
in matters relevant to the ends in sight, so an officer can 
demand that his soldier die in battle but cannot demand 
that he give over so much as a farthing of his money, cf 
Treatise II, 139, p. 408. 'Because such blind obedience is'
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Having rejected absolutist rule as morally unacceptable and 
equivalent to slavery, Locke is required to show what 
degree and nature of rule is morally acceptable. In terms 
of a model of government he favours a representative 
democracy, in which the legislative, executive and judicial 
powers are separated. Moreover, he feels the government 
should be free to exercise only such power as is necessary 
to achieve the ends for which it is instituted.
Two interesting questions now arise:
1. Why does Locke favour a representative as opposed to a 
direct democracy ?
2. What degree of power will he accept as necessary to 
achieve the ends for which government is created?
It has been argued that Locke's recommendations arise 
purely from normative ideological preferences.105 However, 
it may be clearly demonstrated that the form of government 
he chose was dictated by the aims it was meant to achieve.
On the question of the extent of governmental power 
desirable or appropriate, it is generally assumed that as 
a classic liberal Locke will only be prepared to sanction
necessary to that end for which the commander has his 
power, the preservation of the rest, but the disposing of 
his goods has nothing to do with it'
105 Cf. MacPherson op cit., and Pateman op cit.
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minimal government intervention through law. However, 
unlike Hobbes who can never quite reject the idea that 
liberty and obligation or law are opposing concepts, Locke 
moves cautiously towards the position of Rousseau , such 
that true freedom is only possible through law - 'where 
there is no law, there is no freedom'106
For law in its true notion, is not so much the 
Limitation as the direction of a free and intelligent 
agent to his proper interest and prescribes no further 
than is for the General Good of those under that 
Law.107
In this passage liberty is presented as a positive concept, 
involving the 'proper interest' of 'free and intelligent 
agents', and concerned with the 'general' as opposed to 
particular good of individuals.108 Just as the laws of 
nature promote God's purpose, so civil laws ought to 
promote God's purpose writ small in the commonwealth, that 
is the public interest, or perhaps more properly man's 
global interest. This allows Locke to differ profoundly 
from the classic negative position on liberty favoured by 
most liberals, where the freedom of the individual is 
measured in terms of the extent to which he is left 
unhindered in the pursuit of his individual desires.
106 Treatise II, 57, p. 348 Of course I have to 
acknowledge that the interpretation of Hobbes offered in 
the preceding chapters appears to place him in a similar 
position.
107 Ibid.
108 Cf. King's Life and Letters ii. pp.95, 103.
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Although the extent of governmental power is always limited 
by the fact that men only transfer a part of that which 
they can transfer, it may well go beyond the level favoured 
by classic liberals. Despite Locke's reassuring assertions 
on the importance of private property, and the injustices 
of taxation, it is at least possible to detect some scope 
for state paternalism. The free and rational individual 
may well understand the law as an enhancement of his 
freedom, and readily acknowledge the fact that it fences 
him off from bogs and precipices. But what of the less 
rational man?
According to Locke, what makes a man free is 'a capacity of 
knowing that law',1(19 in other words reason (or 
alternatively revelation). Those who are incapable of 
developing reason can never be free men. He sums up thus:
The Freedom then of Man and Liberty of acting 
according to his own Will, is grounded on his having 
Reason, which is able to instruct him in that law he 
is to govern himself by, and make him know how far he 
is left to the freedom of his own will. To turn him 
loose to an unrestrained liberty, before he has reason 
to guide him, is not the allowing him the privilege of 
his nature, to be free; but to thrust him out amongst 
Brutes, and abandon him to a State as wretched, and as 
much beneath that of a man as theirs.110
1119 Treatise II, 59, p. 349 . 
no idealise II, 63, p.352.
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This point is made in the chapter concerning Paternal 
power, however, in a wider social context it could be seen 
to have quite profound political consequences.
Locke acknowledges that in reality an age is set, by which 
all but the most obvious exceptions amongst men are taken 
to have acquired reason. This is in line with later 
liberal thinkers such as Mill, who are willing to assume 
rationality unless it is patently obviously absent. 
However, referring to Locke's earlier discussions 
concerning rationality, there appears to be scope for 
inquiring as to the extent to which people have acquired 
reason, by testing the extent to which they are able to 
'carry proofs'.
If it is the case that those who are completely without 
reason need to remain under the government of those who 
have acquired it (as is the case with children, lunatics 
and idiots), might it not also follow that those who have 
greater reason are in a position to govern those with less? 
This could offer an explanation of Locke's preference for 
representative democracy, wherein the 'studiers of law' may 
take responsibility for the welfare of 'the spinsters, 
milkmaids and day labourers'.
Many might choose to label this elitist, but to borrow 
Locke's term, it is 'fortunately advantageous', because,
364
according to him these men will also be those in the best 
position
a) to know what is morally right, and,
b) to understand that which is morally right is also 
advantageous.
It would appear that by identifying the 'studiers of the 
laws of nature' Locke has also identified those most 
qualified to rule, and those who will be most committed to 
the idea of limited rule, suitable to man's nature, and in 
conformity to the laws of nature.
It is therefore possible that man is only truly free if he 
consents to rule by particular men. Locke appears to 
acknowledge this when he demands that
when the People have said, We will submit to rules and 
be govern'd by laws made by such men, and in such 
forms, no body else can say other men shall make laws 
for them 111
The legislature, it would appear, is not a featureless body 
of substitutable men. To ensure that government fulfils 
the purposes for which it is designed men must consent to 
a particular form of rule by particular men. But this is 
not where the political role of natural law ends. As 
stated above, political power is entrusted conditionally,
111 Treatise II, 141, p.408.
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and it is up to the citizenry to ensure that the terms of 
the trust are met.
However, Locke is made unhappy by the apathy of men in this 
respect, and accuses them of all too often waiting until 
the chains are on before crying for their freedom. What is 
required is an active citizenry, or at least an active core 
within the citizenry and these will be men of high morals 
and principle, they as well may be drawn from the ranks of 
the 'studiers of the laws'. It is also probable that these 
will be the men who choose to consent expressly, as opposed 
to merely tacitly, to the laws of (just) governments.
This is not to say that government will be above criticism 
as faults of human nature may well exist within government: 
the studiers of the laws of nature are only human after 
all. Individual subjects therefore retain the right to 
question (either directly or through their representatives) 
not only the misdemeanours of individuals within 
government, but also the positive laws if they appear to 
contradict the laws of nature. This appeal may now be made 
on earth. Central to Locke's theory of government 
therefore is the need for a rational active section within 
the citizenry capable of, and committed to monitoring the 
laws of government.
Men consent to take on political obligations but they are 
only binding if they fit in with the morally binding
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requirements of the laws of nature. If they don't, or if 
they stop doing so, then one may be required (prudentially) 
to obey the laws but one might also be obliged (morally) to 
get them changed.
Throughout the Treatise Locke is careful to maintain the 
distinction established earlier between questions of 
obligation and questions of obedience. He speaks of a 
child's obligation to honour his parents, which is a moral 
obligation based upon gratitude for the care he has 
received. This obligation persists beyond maturity, 
obedience on the other hand is something a parent can 
expect only for as long as they have the power to command 
it, and beyond maturity this power is most realistically 
understood as being based upon the power to bestow their 
estates with 'The possession of the Father being the 
Expectation and inheritance of the children'.112 Indeed 
the father may choose to exercise this power in relation to 
his child's political obligations:
He may indeed annex such conditions to the land he 
enjoyed as a subject of any commonwealth, as may 
oblige his son to be of that community, if he will 
enjoy those possessions, which were his Father's 
property; because that estate being his fathers 
property, he may dispose or settle it as he 
pleases.113
112 Treatise II, 72, p. 357 .
113 Treatise II, 116, p .390, see also Treatise II, 117, 
p.391.
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Just as this is 'no small tye on the obedience of the 
children',114 it is no coincidence that there is 'always 
annexed to the enjoyment of Land, a submission to the 
Government of the country of which that land is part.'115 
Personal benefit under the laws of inheritance is seen as
a motive for general obedience to the laws of one's
society, at the base of which lie the laws of nature. The 
move into civil society annexes known penalties to the 
laws. Add to this the heavenly sanctions levelled against 
the religious man, and the hedonistic motives offered to 
the rest, and one sees that Locke attempts to ensure 
obedience even before he has gone far in his discussion of 
voluntarily assumed obligations to do so.
However, one cannot ignore the fact that Locke goes on to 
develop a theory of political obligation in which
voluntarily acquired obligations to obey the law have 
always been seen as central and binding. As a social 
contract theorist it is generally assumed that the
citizen's obligation to obey the laws originates from his 
consent to do so. However, some interesting questions 
arise:
1. How exactly does consent contribute to his theory of 
political obligation?
2. What is the nature of the relationship between the 
natural moral duties arising from the laws of nature, which
114 Second Treatise II, 73, p.358.
115 Ibid. .
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have the same force as moral oughts, and the duties arising 
from positive law which are taken on as the result of 
voluntarily consenting to accept such obligations?
It will be argued here that the voluntarism Locke injects 
into his theory has more to do with concerns about 
obedience, than with determining how men ought to behave. 
Locke's theory of consent basically offers a second sort of 
reason why men ought to do what the law of nature, as 
represented in the positive law, demands. The problems 
arise if the positive law does not represent the dictates 
of natural law, because if it does not, consent in itself 
does not provide a moral ought directive.
To remain consistent with the discussion in Chapter One of 
this thesis it has to be shown that moral oughts are the 
moral bottom line, that they trump all other 
considerations, including voluntarily acquired obligations. 
In other words it has to be shown that the dictates of 
natural law are the final word on moral matters, and that 
they effectively restrict the realm of actions to which an 
individual can freely and willingly consent. Just as one 
cannot use as a defence the idea that one had a positional 
duty to do something one had a moral duty to refrain from 
doing,116 Locke has to show that morally one cannot consent 
to accept something which the law of nature prohibits.
116 Cf. Ch. 1 pp. 19-23 above.
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Locke makes this point quite explicitly in the Treatise 
when he discusses slavery.117
As defined above, the freedom of nature is to be under no 
other law than the law of nature118, however once in civil 
society the definition of freedom ostensibly changes and
Freedom of men under Government, is to have a standing 
rule to live by, common to everyone of that society, 
and made by the Legislative Power erected in it; A 
Liberty to follow my own Will in all things, where the 
rule prescribes not; and not to be subject to the 
Inconsistent, uncertain, unknown, Arbitrary Will of 
another man.119
This passage is somewhat misleading, as the individual is 
not free to follow his will in all things, because in 
matters of moral import his actions remain governed by the 
laws of nature even if the civil law is silent. More 
correctly, freedom within civil society is freedom to live 
under the rule of law, and to manage one's affairs governed 
by the natural law alone in those areas in which the 
positive law is silent. This may well entail voluntarily 
restricting one's freedom to do as one wills even when the 
law is silent. For example, the positive law in this 
country allows for acts of homosexuality between consenting 
adults, however many leading churchmen believe that
117 Treatise II, 23, p.325.
118 Treatise II, 22, p.324.
119 Ibid.
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Christians should recognise a scriptural prohibition on 
such acts.
As previously noted, Carol Pateman reads this prohibitive 
strand as something of an internal contradiction within 
liberalism, such that the emphasis on individually assumed 
duties and obligations is diminished by the willingness to 
make some rights inalienable, and certain duties 
inviolable. However, it seems essential to incorporate 
this idea into Locke's theory, and it is interesting that 
the founding fathers, who claim Locke as a great 
inspiration, chose to frame the liberties of their new 
nation around a constitution which made certain rights 
inalienable and inviolable.
If one accepts the existence of a set of universally 
binding moral dictates which exist independent of 
individual human will, then one must also accept that one 
ought not to will that which goes against these dictates.
Conclusion
This chapter has concentrated attention upon Locke's theory 
of natural law, and particularly the way in which it 
becomes known to men, and the manner in which men become 
motivated to obey it. It has been claimed that Locke 
implicitly recognises that his arguments on these matters
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must suit two very different audiences. First there are the 
ordinary people who will accept the existence of God, and 
obey his laws because of their religious faith and the 
teachings of scriptures. Secondly, there are those for 
whom faith is not sufficient because they require a proof 
that God exists, and also require reasons to explain why 
they must accept his laws as binding.
This dichotomy has implications far beyond questions of 
epistemology. Having introduced the 'studiers of the laws' 
there is a potential for Locke to give them a significant 
role within his political theory. First however, it has to 
be shown that the laws of nature themselves are significant 
to that theory.
It was argued here that the laws of nature are indeed 
politically significant, and that in fact they may render 
consent far less important within Locke's theory than is 
usually assumed. The laws of nature are rational dictates 
which guide men towards fulfilling God's purpose. The god 
in question is a good and wise god who attaches to his own 
purpose certain benefits for those men who pursue it. 
These rewards may be earthly or heavenly, as may be the 
motives to obedience. Irrespective of why individual men 
feel obligated to obey the laws of nature, they are all 
obligated to do so qua men. The laws of nature are the 
ultimate point of reference in determining what they ought
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to do - nothing which is against the laws of nature may be 
obligatory.
As this is the case certain moral standards have to be set 
in political society without reference to consent, or if 
consent is utilised it is merely a rubber stamp. One then 
has to wonder how these standards will be set, and Locke 
offers a variety of sources. Some moral dictates will be 
handed down by tradition, others will be revealed by 
revelation, the most interesting source however will be 
through the work of the studiers of the laws of nature.
There will be men who through their reason, and possibly 
their faith, will be equipped to interpret God's purpose 
and laws directly. These men will have a fundamental part 
to play in government, both as members of the legislative 
and executive bodies, and as leaders of the citizenry. 
Those in government will be charged with ensuring that the 
positive law does little beyond codifying the laws of 
nature. If they do their job well then the citizens have 
no need for concern. If however such men fail to guide the 
positive laws in the right direction they must be bought to 
task, and this move will be led by their fellow studiers 
within the citizenry.
Consent is less important than it might otherwise be 
because consent merely creates political obligations, and 
these are only binding if they are identical with what one
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ought to do morally, as dictated by the laws of nature. 
Ultimately it is not left to individuals to determine what 
these laws dictate, rather it is handed over to experts - 
be they priests or scholars. It is then the responsibility 
of these men to make positive laws on the basis of the 
natural laws, and to seek to overturn those laws which do 
not conform to the dictates of natural law. To a large 
extent the mass of the people wait on the sidelines to be 
mobilised.
If you read Locke as a classic proponent of the traditional 
liberal democratic model his theory of political obligation 
is fraught with difficulties and contradictions. If on the 
other hand you place a more realist interpretation upon his 
moral theory, you see that there is room for a quite 
different reading of his political theory. Locke was not 
a subjectivist about ethics. The laws of nature provide a 
set of moral dictates which correctly state what is right 
and wrong. A political proposal is only morally right if 
it is in conformity with these moral dictates. Therefore 
the fact that even a majority of people has consented to do 
X does not guarantee that it is right to do X, similarly 
the fact that only a small percentage of the population has 
expressly consented to do Y does not make it wrong to 
demand that Y be done.
Consent is more relevant to explanations of obedience than 
to statements of how men ought to behave. The perfect
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situation is one in which men rationally comprehend the 
binding nature of natural law, and consent to be governed 
by those laws which correctly enshrine its dictates. In 
such a case obligation, obedience and what one ought to do 
are joined together. Failing this it is advantageous to 
ensure obedience through consent by offering motives, such 
as the avoidance of punishment, or the ability to inherit 
property. In the last resort however it is more important 
that men obey the right sorts of laws than that they obey 
only those laws they consent to.
For this reason Locke removes direct political control from 
the people and asks instead that they entrust their power 
to those best suited to rule. Having done so the people 
are still required to judge the success of their 
government, and remove power from them if they fail 
consistently to fulfil their tasks, but whether or not the 
people will fulfil this task is left open to question.
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Conclusion
No conviction has caused more violence, oppression, 
suffering. The cry that the real present must be 
sacrificed to an attainable ideal future - this demand 
has been used to justify massive cruelties.
Sir Isiah Berlin, 1979.
As stated in the first chapter of this thesis questions of 
political obligation still exercise our minds, and will no 
doubt continue to do so. While some choose to reassess the 
extent to which an individual is obligated to obey the laws 
of the state, others persist in announcing that no such 
obligations exist. Those who accept the existence of such 
obligations still find it difficult to explain their origin 
and justify their binding force. Consent based theories 
continue to receive particular attention from philosophers 
and political theorists, with new variations appearing, and 
with the classical social contract theorists remaining 
under scrutiny.
It has been claimed here that a proper case of consent, 
whatever the context, should entail that the person 
consenting is free (in the sense of uncoerced), autonomous 
and fully informed, and that the situation within which 
consent is requested should not work against this being the 
case. What the individual is consenting to do, be, or 
accept should be clearly stated, and understood by them,
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and the act of consenting should be deliberate and 
intentional in the full sense of these words. Anything 
less than this deprives consent of the moral force required 
for it to perform its tasks.
The work assigned to consent is the creation of rights, 
corresponding duties, and, most importantly for our 
purposes, obligations. Because obligations and duties 
account for only a 'small segment' of moral reasoning, the 
scope of consent is limited in moral terms. The fact that 
one has consented to do X does not make X morally right, 
nor does the fact that one has taken on an obligation to do 
X mean that one ought to do it.
These limitations may well have an accompanying effect on 
the political effectiveness of consent, particularly in 
those areas where morals and politics are joined. Where 
moral and political demands conflict the existence of an 
obligation created by consent may not be enough to ensure 
the obedience and loyalty of citizens. If an individual 
considers X to be a morally acceptable act he may still 
accept that he has a political obligation which entails his 
refraining from X, but if he considers X to be morally 
unacceptable he may well refuse to fulfil a political 
obligation to perform X.
Despite its limitations we soldier on with the concept of 
consent, and this is probably because it fits relatively
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neatly into the broader political ideology we are most 
comfortable with. The individualism we value so highly 
demands a role for the individual citizen in political 
life, and even the most inadequate consenting procedures 
pay lip service to that role. The image of the government 
as serving the needs of the people is promoted by the
accountability built into any contractual relationship.
At an intellectual level we remain committed to making
consent work.
Sadly however, the first conclusion of this thesis is that 
consent is not a feature of modern political life. In 
reality, consent has become something of a fiction. What 
we accept as consent in a political context is a pale
imitation of the paradigm case, and the obligations we 
accept on the basis of that so called consent go far beyond 
what any theory could reasonably justify.
Even in a liberal representative democracy political life 
affords the individual little opportunity to give or 
withhold consent, and when such opportunities do arise the 
odds are stacked against the concept doing its work. This 
is a comment not only on the political systems involved, 
but on the individuals whose consent is (so rarely) 
requested. To get consent working properly would require 
fairly radical reorganisation of our political system, and, 
even more importantly perhaps, extensive re-education and 
motivation of the citizenry.
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In contemporary political society obedience is more easily 
explained in terms of what people feel they ought to do 
prudentially (to avoid punishment, ensure a quiet life look 
after their interests, etc. ) , than in terms of what we they 
feel obligated to do morally. The activities most commonly 
taken to be acts of consent (eg. voting, paying taxes, 
staying put) are rarely intended as such, and the choices 
and information made available to people when they are 
asked to consent are severely limited. Essentially the 
people are not engaged with the system in the manner, or to 
the extent, envisaged by the theoreticians, and required by 
the theory.
In the face of these facts we can choose one of two 
responses. Either we can attempt to change the system and 
the attitudes of individuals so that consent can operate 
effectively, or we can accept that it is not going to be a 
dominant feature of political life. Neither option is 
easy, and the second may at first appear completely 
unacceptable given our attachment to the concept. But if 
we discover that consent has never really played as large 
or definitive a role as we might have assumed, even in the 
work of the most famous social contract theorists, it may 
appear less shocking.
Many commentators have had their doubts about 'Hobbes the 
consent theorist', usually because of the system he seeks 
to justify on the basis of consent, and the desperate
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position men are in when asked to give their consent. I 
have attempted to allay some of these traditional doubts, 
but in doing so have been forced to acknowledge some rather 
different ones.
The re-reading I have offered of Hobbes's state of nature 
emerges, I claim, from a more accurate reading of his 
account of human nature. Because of his mechanistic first 
principles Hobbes understands man as a form of matter in 
motion, and the most fundamental characteristic of man is 
taken to be his desire to stay in motion, that is stay 
alive. All human endeavour will be directed towards this 
end, and anything militating against it will be a subject 
of aversion. Combined with this irrefutable and very basic 
fact are further intrinsic properties - insatiability, 
equality, and hunger for power, - and also interactive 
features which necessarily develop, the most important of 
which is prudence.
In his account of the state of nature Hobbes tells the 
story of how man's intrinsic nature is affected by his 
experiences prior to the institution of political society. 
However, we discover that although Hobbes is a good (as in 
effective) story teller, his account is not as true to his 
theoretical findings as it ought to be.
It was argued in Chapter Two, that Hobbes's theory of human 
nature commits him to an evolutionary account of human
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psychology, yet his state of nature presents a static 
vision of the human mind and condition. Although we might 
want to say that men were at some point just as Hobbes 
described, by the closing stages of the state of nature 
important changes have taken place. Some men will have 
lived through the full horrors described, for others they 
will be a dim memory from their youth, and still others 
will have only the tales of their parents and grandparents 
to rely on.
The possibility of a re-reading once a full account of 
man's psychological development is incorporated has 
important implications for three quite separate groups of 
potential consenters - the participants in the original 
covenant, those living in situations analogous to the state 
of nature as presented by Hobbes, and those living in 
established, secure and peaceful political systems.
Given Hobbes's account of the state of nature, as 
traditionally read, it is admittedly difficult to envisage 
the emergence of the original contract. However, many of 
the doubts concerning the ability of men to come together 
and consent to be ruled disappear if you accept, as argued 
here, that men develop significantly within the natural 
state.
Although Hobbes will not permit talk of rationality prior 
to the formation of the commonwealth, the prudence he
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attributes to men is sufficient to explain how they will 
come to recognise the need to leave the state of nature. 
Similarly, their albeit limited social and familial 
relationships will have shown them the potential advantages 
of co-operation, and attack will no longer be seen as the 
only form of defence.
What becomes less easy to explain on this re-reading is the 
choice of an absolute sovereign, and the extent of rule to 
which individuals agree. If men are not in the state of 
war Hobbes describes so vividly we have to question whether 
they will be convinced of the need for absolute and 
arbitrary rule, even if the model of rule experienced 
within the family at least explains the acceptance of an 
individual monarch.
It is of course relevant to ask who will be consenting, and 
if we accept that it is likely to be the heads of families, 
then we can claim that they will have the most real 
experiences of the state of nature in its early stages. 
However, if their memories have faded, as memories 
inevitably do, and their more recent experiences are of co­
operation within the family, and relative peace between 
families, they may well question the need to hand over so 
completely the power they have no doubt come to enjoy.
We must not forget however that this more optimistic 
reading of the state of nature is not made easily available
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by Hobbes. He chose not to present us with the account of 
the state of nature that his own psychology necessarily 
committed him to. What we eventually realise is that his 
account is not primarily a record of how political society 
was first formed, but rather it is an integral component of 
all subsequent consenting procedures.
The state of nature, and the account of human nature 
offered therein, is primarily, and most importantly, 
information provided for individuals taking on political 
obligations within established political societies. It is 
designed precisely to affect all those who read it in such 
a way as to determine the forms of government they consent 
to, and those that they reject. The question remains as to 
whether or not it will succeed.
The word 'determine' is particularly appropriate here given 
Hobbes's commitment to a deterministic model, as discussed 
in Chapter Three. Hobbes's determinism has been taken to 
conflict with the voluntarism inherent in the social 
contract model, but here it has been argued that 
determinism and voluntarism need not necessarily conflict.
In Hobbes's case his account of deliberation within the 
deterministic framework allows for the incorporation of 
choice, but our definition of consent requires free choice, 
and one has to enquire further to discover whether the
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specific choices made are free in the sense of uncoerced, 
as opposed to undetermined.
No choice, according to Hobbes, is undetermined, but it can 
be free in other important respects, and if it is, it is 
irrelevant that no other choice could have been made in the 
same circumstances. In this thesis it was argued that a
determined choice is a free choice only if it is based on
deliberation which could effectively permit the individual 
to make the best choice available, given their pre­
determined goals and desires. In line with Hobbes, free 
and voluntary does not necessarily mean rational, but there 
must be the possibility of rational choice.
In some cases men lack the ability to make appropriate 
choices, which is essentially an issue of individual 
capability or autonomy. However, it becomes an issue of 
liberty if the lack of ability is due to the deliberate
action, or inaction of others. This is where Hobbes's
account of the state of nature becomes acutely relevant.
Given a deterministic system we have taken voluntariness to 
entail acting from motives or reasons one is (or should be) 
happy to act upon in the particular situation. Given that 
ome motives are irresistible we have to make the 
tinction between free and unfree, voluntary and 
untary in this way, even though Hobbes fails to do so.
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So, for example, in the familiar case of the robber holding 
a gun to my head and demanding my money, my handing it over 
is not a voluntary act.
Even if we accept Hobbes's claim that all actions and 
choices are backgrounded by the desire to stay alive, we 
still have to say that the validity of consent may be 
threatened if this desire is artificially, and 
inappropriately, forced into the foreground. I have chosen 
to hand over my money, but (given my desire to stay alive), 
I could not choose to ignore the considerations that 
motivated my choice.
Hobbes performs precisely the same trick with his account 
of the state of nature. By presenting the state of nature 
as an ever-present, and terrifying, possibility, a moment 
in history, frozen, magnified, and served up as man's pre­
political reality, he holds a gun to the head of all those 
consenters who have not actually experienced the situation 
he describes. Only some will be in a position to realise 
that the gun is a fake.
We need not argue with Hobbes's claim that all normal men 
wish to avoid death, ensure felicity and secure a 
commodious living, to do so would be to question his entire 
theory of human nature which is not part of our purpose. 
Nor do we need to question at this stage whether the 
political recommendations he makes constitute the
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individuals best means to that end. Even if we allow 
Hobbes his basic assumptions about human nature, and his 
preference for absolute sovereignty, there are interesting 
issues still to be raised.
Essentially the claim made here is that Hobbes's account of 
the state of nature is a tool of coercion. The state of 
nature as presented by Hobbes is a fiction grounded on 
fact. Had he presented an accurate account of man's 
development as dictated by his own theorising, his 
political theory would have had a much stronger moral 
foundation. However, had he done so he would have denied 
himself a powerful persuasive tool, and the logical case 
for an absolute sovereign would have been severely 
undermined.
As mentioned above a re-reading will have implications for 
two further groups of consenters, first we must consider 
those living within political societies in which the 
situation is analogous to the state of war Hobbes 
describes. One could include in this group contemporaries 
of Hobbes, who would have been his original readership.
It is in relation to these people that Hobbes's account is 
least problematic. Hobbes's contemporaries may have 
experienced if not the exact horror of the state of nature, 
at least something akin to it. The same could be said of 
those living in today's trouble spots, such as Beirut and 
Belfast. For them the tale of horror touches and
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illuminates and goes beyond their own reality, and cannot 
fail to make them concerned for what might happen next. 
Their own experiences may well make the desperate outcome 
Hobbes predicts appear at least possible, if not probable. 
One also has to worry that the powerfulness of his account 
will blind them to the possible flaws in Hobbes's argument, 
particularly in terms of a gap between the description he 
offers and the recommendations he makes. One can easily 
imagine that people who face daily threats to their 
security in reality will be particularly vulnerable to the 
force of Hobbes's claims.
Those who live in a peaceful and settled political state 
will be less easy to convince, but in a desperate attempt 
to do so Hobbes trades accuracy for dramatic effect, 
science for poetry. Their experiences of hardship will be 
extremely diluted, but their fundamental fears and 
preoccupations will be the same, and if he has correctly 
identified those basic fears, he may well convince them 
that the threats posed by the return of a state of war have 
completely not receded.
In both cases Hobbes attempts not merely to persuade but 
rather to determine man's political choices. He feels 
confident that he can do so because of his belief that man 
is a determined being, and because he feels he possesses a 
thorough understanding of precisely what determines man's 
actions. He knows what men want (even when they don't know
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it themselves) and he no doubt feels entitled to force men 
to accept a system appropriate to the satisfaction of their 
fundamental desires. However, his belief in man's basic 
equality, combined with his identification of man as an 
egotistical being, means that he must appear to allow them 
to govern their own existences through the consent process.
Having been forced to put the machinery of consent in place 
Hobbes attempts to determine the outcome of the consenting 
process by polluting the information upon which decisions 
will be based. He feels justified in doing this because, 
for reasons he has failed to present adequately to his 
readers, he is convinced that the political system he 
proposes is that which will promote human happiness, 
prosperity and, in a very particular sense, freedom.
But of course the consent is a facade, although the 
original consenters will be capable of consenting, those 
who read Hobbes's account are robbed of the opportunity of 
doing so. They are all denied accurate information upon 
which to base their choices, and in the case of those 
living in situations similar to those Hobbes describes 
their real fears are compounded by the horrendous finale 
Hobbes paints for them. This may prevent their rationally 
judging between Hobbes's recommendations and those of more 
temperate theorists.
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The ultimate tragedy is that if they consent to put the 
system Hobbes proposes into place, they effectively deny 
themselves the opportunity to renegotiate their contract 
(unless the sovereign fails dramatically in his role). 
Furthermore, the obligations they acquire on the basis of 
their consent entail a far stronger commitment than 
suggested appropriate by the paradigm case of obligation 
outlined in Chapter One of the thesis. Even the moral 
hierarchy of oughts, obligations and duties is thwarted 
because what one ought to do morally depends upon the 
sovereign's interpretation of the laws of nature, for which 
he is answerable only to God.
Contemporary experiences suggested to Hobbes the 
fundamental importance of peace and security as necessary 
prerequisites to the fundamental goal of preserving human 
life. His political solutions were designed to secure 
these ends. Had he promoted these political goals more 
directly it is at least possible that some of those whose 
lives had been tainted by war and instability would trade 
political liberty for peace and security, others would not. 
The important point is that they would have been afforded 
the real choice that consent based theories seek to protect 
and promote.
Instead Hobbes emerges as a positive libertarian who, 
despite his rejection of Aristotelian teleology, had a very 
clear idea of the good life, dictated to him by his beliefs
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concerning man's basic nature. The exact details of the 
good life are essentially determined by individuals, and 
will differ from person to person. Men will pursue their 
own interests, and enrich their existence in the manner 
that they choose, but they can only begin to do so once 
unhindered by fears for their safety, and threats to their 
security. According to Hobbes, the only way to guarantee 
such an existence is for men to place themselves under the 
rule of a sovereign and transfer absolute power to him.
What causes him problems is that his true account of human 
nature does not entitle him to promote life under the 
sovereign as enthusiastically as he does, nor will it help 
him to do so.
Those who have lived through the Hobbesian state of nature 
as presented here, may well consider the extent and 
severity of rule unnecessary, if not in the first instance 
at least over time, as the memory of life in the early pre­
political society fades. Even those who have experienced 
horrors akin to those Hobbes described will be 
disadvantaged by reading his account, as their choices will 
be unavoidably motivated by the fears his tale compounds. 
For those who have not experienced anything like the state 
of nature Hobbes's describes his recommendations will be 
particularly unpalatable, but thankfully they will be the 
least susceptible to his influence. Their decisions will 
be backgrounded by the desire to stay alive, but will be
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foregrounded by more immediate and more sophisticated 
preoccupations, including perhaps the desire for political 
and individual liberty.
Unless we share Hobbes's faith in absolute sovereignty the 
tricks he plays with his account of the state of nature are 
completely unacceptable. Even if we do, we might still 
wish that he had left individuals free to choose or reject 
his proposals, as required by a proper theory of consent. 
Hobbes was so convinced of his political beliefs he
manipulated the consenting procedure in order to promote 
them. Social contract theory demands that the primary 
loyalty be to the procedure of consent, and that one
accepts whatever form of government consented to. Hobbes 
is unwilling and unable to accept this fact.
Locke's theory of political obligation presents rather 
different, though not completely unrelated, problems. The 
question of information is once again important, and just 
as Hobbes is concerned to capture his audience as
effectively as possible, Locke seeks to present his views 
in a way (or more properly ways) conducive to a number of 
different audiences. However, Locke does not wish to 
pervert the consenting process, rather it has been 
suggested that he wishes to supplement it and thereby
strengthen it.
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Locke has frequently been criticised for his willingness to 
employ a theory of tacit consent which almost completely 
disregards the requirement that consenting be an be 
intentional act. It is difficult to defend him against 
this claim without arguing that individual consent may not 
be as fundamental to his theory as usually assumed. If we 
do make this claim however, we also need to show what does 
the work usually assigned to consent.
In Chapter Four, I argued that this work is actually 
performed by Locke's theory of natural law, with the result 
that ensuring obedience, loyalty, and legitimacy within 
political society has more to do with instructing citizens 
and governments of what they ought to do morally, than what 
their obligations are politically. Essentially Locke seeks 
to provide reasons for obedience which exist independent of 
consent, and which can in moral terms trump the obligations 
consent creates.
A similarity with Hobbes lies in the fact that Locke is as 
convinced of the correctness of his moral views, as Hobbes 
is convinced of the correctness of his political 
recommendations. Locke is a moral realist who essentially 
believes that there are facts about morality in the same 
way as there are facts about the number of books in a 
library, or the cost of a car. Issues of right and wrong 
can be settled by reference to these facts, and are in no 
way dependent upon human will. On this he differs
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profoundly from Hobbes, who essentially remains true to a 
subjectivist model.
In Chapter One of the thesis, I acknowledged the difficulty 
of putting content to the abstract notion of 'doing what 
one ought to do morally'. A realist must show us how to 
discover the facts about morality, and Locke has a ready 
answer. What men ought to do is obey the laws of nature, 
and the content of what one ought to do is precisely what 
the laws of nature command.
Locke is in no doubt that such laws exist, but claims that 
different people will come to know of them in different 
ways, and with varying success. Despite several confusing 
references he does not believe that they are innate ideas, 
but he does hold that they are discoverable by human 
reason. More obviously however they are available through 
the medium of Christian religion. The laws of nature are 
the will of God, and it is by understanding the nature and 
purpose of that God that one most easily learns what is 
required to be moral.
This is where Locke explicitly acknowledges the existence 
of two quite different audiences for his views. Those who 
have faith will hear the word of God through revelation and 
scripture, and particularly in the case of the uneducated 
the Gospel will be the easiest source of moral instruction. 
However, the Bible is open to interpretation, indeed the
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message it presents has already been interpreted in the 
process of being written down. Sometimes an authoritative 
interpretation will be required, and here the role of the 
expert is invoked, as it tends to be in any realist theory. 
If there is a correct way of seeing the world, or reading 
the Bible, we may sometimes need to be guided towards it by 
those who know the way.
The experts in question are those Locke refers to as the 
studiers of the laws of nature, his second audience. These 
may well be men of faith, but they need not be in the first 
instance, because Locke also (attempts) to provide a 
logical proof of the existence of God which will allow 
those without faith to come to know that he exists. What 
is more they will learn that the God in question is a good 
and rational god, whose purpose is entirely compatible with 
that of his greatest creation - man.
This second point is of crucial importance, as Locke is 
acutely aware of the issues of moral motivation discussed 
in Chapter One. Even with his benevolent interpretation of 
man's nature he has to accept that what we ought to do 
morally will not always coincide with what we want to do, 
or with what we feel we ought to do prudentially. Yet he 
has to ensure that in the event of conflict the correct 
moral choice wins out. He therefore offers two systems of 
reward and punishment designed to ensure obedience where 
pure reason or religious commitment alone fail.
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For the religious person the rewards are in heaven, the 
punishments in hell. It does not matter that Locke cannot 
prove the existence of an afterlife because these people 
will believe, independently of proof and as a matter of 
conviction, in a life after death.
For those who may on the one hand accept the existence of 
a rational first mover, but reject the trimmings of 
Christian doctrine, Locke offers more earthly inducements. 
One ought (prudentially) to obey the laws of nature because 
they promote human happiness, which is God's purpose writ 
small.
Importantly, neither of these arguments are designed to 
explain why the laws of nature are binding. They are 
binding purely because they are the will of God. These 
arguments address the crucial question of moral motivation 
and provide prudential reasons for doing what do what is 
right. If, and when, the prudential justification seems 
weak, and the action demanded appears self defeating, the 
duty to perform it still exists. God's purpose is not 
always laid bare, but he always has the last word.
Locke is thorough-going in his commitment to moral 
education, and if he can succeed in bringing all rational 
beings to an understanding of the laws of nature, by one 
means or another, the effects on his theory of political 
obligation will be profound. Given the fact that what one
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ought to do necessarily trumps what one has an obligation 
to do, when the two are in conflict the laws of nature may 
well render consent redundant in certain situations. Even 
where consent remains in place the focus will shift onto 
what is consented to, rather than the process of consent - 
for Locke the content of consent is extremely important.
Locke explicitly states that individuals cannot be 
understood to give their consent to anything which the laws 
of nature prohibit. So, irrespective of consent, certain 
laws, and presumably political regimes will be 
illegitimate. Locke, along with Hobbes, rejects the idea 
that one should accept whatever the consenting system 
throws at you. If this is so we need to know what the laws 
of nature will, and will not, permit.
As stated in Chapter One a theory of political obligation 
need not explain how an entire population becomes obligated 
to obey the laws of its government. Some people will not 
be obligated, and this is an acceptable fact. Yet, in 
Locke's theory no one escapes political obligation because 
even a visitor, or alien, is bound through tacit consent. 
This is a damaging consequence of his willingness to accept 
as signs of consent actions such as 'walking along the 
highway,' and, his quite separate but related belief that 
the receipt of certain benefits is a sufficient grounding 
for obligations. Those who expressly consent to be 
governed account for only a small proportion of the
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population, and are most obviously members of the property 
owning classes.
Given the fact that Locke's theory of tacit consent fails 
to meet the criteria set in Chapter One, few people would 
appear to have consented in the true sense of the word. 
However, all who lay claim to the title human share a 
positional duty attached to that status - that is the duty 
to obey the laws of nature. Furthermore, in this instance 
there can be no conflict between positional duty and what 
one ought to do, as the two are identical.
Each individual citizen is, first and foremost, a human 
being, a creation of God, bound to follow God's will. 
Being a citizen is a secondary role, which must on occasion 
give way to the demand's of the more important role as 
God's subject. To ensure that the two roles do not 
conflict steps must be taken to make political will and 
God's will coincide, and Locke suggests a number of ways in 
which to attempt this. Most interesting is the role of he 
implicitly constructs for the moral expert.
The studiers of the laws of nature will for the most part 
be educated and wealthy men, and as such will be in a 
position to exercise influence and acquire power. Some 
will seek direct political power as members of government, 
others will remain within the body of the citizenry, but 
they too will have an important political role.
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By ensuring that those with political power are morally 
well-educated Locke hopes to guarantee that civil law will 
match up to the standards set by the laws of nature. Just 
as the content of consent is important to Locke, so to is 
the nature of the individuals who hold power. Hence his 
rejection of hereditary monarchy in favour of 
representative democracy. This system has the benefit of 
withholding power from those unqualified to rule (in effect 
the majority of the population), and requiring that those 
seeking power demonstrate their suitability.
Allowing once again for human frailty, Locke also seeks to 
ensure that there will be studiers of the laws of nature 
amongst the subjects, the express consenters. These 
citizens will have an important, although in their case 
informal, political purpose. They are the moral auditors, 
who, to must stay awake whilst others fall asleep. They 
will be ready to alert their less educated fellows, if and 
when, the civil law and the moral law come into conflict.
This is the theory, but even Locke lacks complete 
confidence in his own plan. Political apathy is not a 
modern day malaise, and Locke complains that in practise 
the citizens will allow abuses to pile up, and let their 
liberties be severely eroded before they will put their 
political obligations aside and fight for what is right. 
However, when they do it will be because the studiers of 
the law, the moral experts, have finally been heard.
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The option of civil disobedience and indeed revolution is 
built into Locke's system precisely because moral rectitude 
is more important than political stability. The difficult 
issue has always been to decide who will judge that the 
time has come to sacrifice the latter in the interests of 
the former. It has been suggested here that the call will 
come from the moral experts Hobbes calls the studiers of 
the laws of nature.
However, Locke is right to claim that his theory does more 
to avert revolution than encourage it. The most natural 
homes for the moral experts he relies on so heavily are in 
government and the church, the two great institutions of 
power, and the bodies best equipped to ensure that 
conflicts between moral and political commitments rarely, 
if ever occur. If the right people are given power the 
right to revolution will not need to be exercised.
The final conclusion is this. Consent for Locke is the 
icing on the cake. It only counts for anything if it is 
consent to what is morally right, and in a situation where 
the laws are morally right (that is based on God's will as 
stated in natural law), independent reasons exist for one 
being bound to obey them.
The purpose of consent is merely to engage individual 
citizens in the political process. Only express consent 
can achieve this end, but as it is only worthwhile engaging
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those who can usefully contribute, it does not matter that 
only a minority of citizens consent in this way. Locke 
actually avoids giving direct power to the people until the 
point at which their numbers are required to overthrow 
evil. Even then they have to wait to be called into to 
action by a minority of educated men who will have judged 
it appropriate to move. Consent is the domain of rational 
autonomous agents, and Locke is ready to accept that those 
who are most rational and autonomous should play a special 
role in the consenting process. All men are capable of 
doing the right thing, but some will need to be helped by 
those who know better.
And so it would seem that even in the case of those we so 
readily call social contract theorists, consent in the 
strict sense defined here is difficult to find. In the 
case of Locke the implications are not too alarming, in the 
case of Hobbes they may not be too surprising. The 
question we are left with is this - is it worth another go 
at making consent work? And surely the answer has to be 
yes.
Both Hobbes and Locke dispense with consent because they 
hold claim to certainties few of us are confident enough to 
share. Hobbes feels free to pervert the consenting process 
because he is certain that the political recommendations he 
makes are correct, given his (equally correct) account of 
man's nature. Locke allows his standards to slip because
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he feels certain that there is a moral life which is more 
important than any political reality. For those of us who 
do not live in a world of such certainties individual 
consent remains an important safeguard, even though we know 
that mistakes will sometimes be made.
By demanding the right to have a part in creating my own 
political obligations, I protect myself against the 
imposition of someone else's view of what is right for me.
There is a great deal of work that needs to be done to 
ensure that consent actually means what it is taken to mean 
here, but it is certainly a job worth doing. If we can 
afford individual citizens real opportunities to give or 
withhold consent we have made a good start. If we can 
encourage them to avail of these opportunities we have done 
even better. If we can help them to acquire the skills 
required to make effective choices we are well on the way 
to achieving something success. What we have to 
acknowledge is that they will not always choose in the way 
we would hope or prefer, but this is a strength as opposed 
to a weakness of the system.
Consent creates obligations which may in the last resort be 
overridden by stronger moral claims. We are not committed 
to sticking with whatever the consenting process offers up, 
but we should remain committed to that process in the first 
instance. If we do not we are at the mercy of those who
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are, for whatever reason, convinced that they know what is 
best for us, and how to achieve it. And, as Berlin warns, 
such conviction too frequently sanctions acts of cruelty 
and oppression.
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